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 ABSTRACT  
Agriculture is undergoing extreme change. The introduction of new generation agricultural 
products has generated an increased need for efficient and accurate product segregation across a 
number of Canadian agricultural sectors. In particular, monitoring, controlling and preventing 
commingling of various wheat grades is critical to continued agri-food safety and quality 
assurance in the Canadian grain handling system.  
The Canadian grain handling industry is a vast regional supply chain with many participants. 
Grading of grain for blending had historically been accomplished by the method of Kernel 
Visual Distinguishability (KVD). KVD allowed a trained grain grader to distinguish the class of 
a registered variety of wheat solely by visual inspection. While KVD enabled rapid, dependable, 
and low-cost segregation of wheat into functionally different classes or quality types, it also put 
constraints on the development of novel traits in wheat.   
To facilitate the introduction of new classes of wheat to enable additional export sales in new 
markets, the federal government announced that KVD was to be eliminated from all primary 
classes of wheat as of August 1, 2008. As an alternative, the Canadian Grain Commission has 
implemented a system called Variety Eligibility Declaration (VED) to replace KVD. As a system 
based on self-declaration, the VED system may create moral hazard for misrepresentation. This 
system is problematic in that incentives exist for farmers to misrepresent their grain. Similarly, 
primary elevators have an incentive to commingle wheat classes in a profitable manner. Clearly, 
the VED system will only work as desired for the grain industry when supported by a credible 
monitoring system. That is, to ensure the security of the wheat supply chain, sampling and 
testing at some specific critical points along the supply chain is needed. 
While the current technology allows the identification of visually indistinguishable grain 
varieties with enough precision for most modern segregation requirements, this technology is 
relatively slow and expensive. With the potential costs of monitoring VED through the current 
wheat supply chain, there is a fundamental tradeoff confronting grain handlers, and effective 
handling strategies will be needed to maintain historical wheat uniformity and consistency while 
keeping monitoring costs down. There are important operational issues to efficiently testing 
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grain within the supply chain, including the choice of the optimal location to test and how 
intensively to test. The testing protocols for grain deliveries as well as maintaining effective 
responsiveness to information feedback among farmers will certainly become a strategic 
emphasis for wheat handlers in the future.  
In light of this, my research attempts to identify the risks, incentives and costs associated with a 
functional declaration system. This research tests a series of incentives designed to generate 
truthful behavior within the new policy environment. In this manner, I examine potential and 
easy to implement testing strategies designed to maintain integrity and efficiency in this 
agricultural supply chain.  
This study is developed in the first instance by using an analytic model to explore the economic 
incentives for motivating farmer’s risk control efforts and handlers’ optimal handling strategies 
with respect to testing cost, penalty level, contamination risks and risk control efforts. We solve 
for optimal behavior in the supply chain assuming cost minimization among the participants, 
under several simplifying assumptions. In reality, the Canadian grain supply chain is composed 
of heterogeneous, boundedly rational and dynamically interacting individuals, and none of these 
characteristics fit the standard optimization framework used to solve these problems. Given this 
complex agent behavior, the grain supply chain is characterized by a set of non-linear 
relationships between individual participants, coupled with out of equilibrium dynamics, 
meaning that analytic solutions will not always identify or validate the set of optimized strategies 
that would evolve in the real world. To account for this inherent complexity, I develop an agent-
based (farmers and elevators) model to simulate behaviour in a more realistic but virtual grain 
supply chain. 
After characterizing the basic analytics of the problem, the grain supply chain participants are 
represented as autonomous economic agents with a certain level of programmed behavioral 
heterogeneity. The agents interact via a set of heuristics governing their actions and decisions. 
The operation of a major portion of the Canadian grain handling system is simulated in this 
manner, moving from the individual farm up through to the country elevator level. My 
simulation results suggest testing strategies to alleviate misrepresentation (moral hazard) in this 
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supply chain are more efficient for society when they are flexible and can be easily adjusted to 
react to situational change within the supply chain.  
While the idea of using software agents for modeling and understanding the dynamics of the 
supply chain under consideration is somewhat novel, I consider this exercise a first step to a 
broader modeling representation of modern agricultural supply chains. The agent-based 
simulation methodology developed in my dissertation can be extended to other economic 
systems or chains in order to examine risk management and control costs. These include food 
safety and quality assurance network systems as well as natural-resource management systems. 
Furthermore, to my knowledge there are no existing studies that develop and compare both 
analytic and agent-based simulation approaches for this type of complex economic situation. In 
the dissertation, I conduct explicit comparisons between the analytic and agent-based simulation 
solutions where applicable. While the two approaches generated somewhat different solutions, in 
many respects they led to similar overall conclusions regarding this particular agricultural policy 
issue. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
For many years, Canada has enjoyed a superior reputation with customers for supplying wheat 
that consistently and uniformly meets the agreed sale specification. Canada earned this 
reputation by enforcing a reliable quality assurance system that involves all supply chain 
participants, beginning with plant breeders, and involving producers, grain handlers, marketers 
and end-users. A key strength of this system is the ability to segregate grain according to class, 
type and grade, thus enabling end-users to purchase shipments of grain with predictable 
processing qualities. 
There are a number of economic and agronomic regulations in the Canadian wheat industry to 
regulate the behavior of all participants in this quality focused export industry. These regulations 
have been working effectively, contributing much to the quality reputation and competitiveness 
of Canadian wheat. A key component of the Canadian quality system for wheat and other grains 
was the use of Kernel Visual Distinguishability (KVD) for segregation (Oleson, 2005). 
KVD was a visual system that identified classes of wheat within the production and grain 
handling systems. It allowed a grain grader to distinguish the class of a registered variety solely 
by visual inspection, which was very important because different classes of wheat perform very 
differently when processed. KVD was unique to Canada and had been successfully used for 
many years as an effective tool to keep wheat classes separate. KVD had worked well because 
Canada had maintained a strict variety registration system that required all licensed varieties 
conform to the prescribed visually distinctive kernel features for each class.  
Before a variety could be registered for production in Canada, it had to undergo careful scrutiny 
for end use quality, agronomic performance and disease resistance, and be proven equal or better 
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than all those criteria for the reference variety for its class. It also had to demonstrate that the 
variety conformed with the visual distinguishability requirements used to segregate wheat of 
different classes. As a result, each of the eight major classes of wheat had been assigned a 
combination of seed-coat color and physical kernel configuration that is visually distinguishable 
from other classes and the varieties within each class were visually similar. This specified that a 
variety of wheat with the kernel features of one of the wheat classes would have certain quality 
characteristics. Under this condition, when a farmer delivered wheat to the primary elevator, for 
example, elevator agents could segregate the wheat into the appropriate class and grade 
according to visual appearance. So KVD enabled rapid, dependable, and low-cost segregation of 
wheat into different classes or quality types in the handling system and thus had been essential to 
maintain uniformity of quality within shipments and consistency of quality from shipment to 
shipment (CGC, 2005). 
Despite its advantages, there was a significant cost associated with KVD. In the KVD system, if 
a new variety with superior characteristics did not meet the KVD's appearance standard, it could 
not be registered, grown or sold by farmers. Breeders had to incorporate KVD characteristics in 
their variety selection process. As such KVD was a significant constraint for wheat breeders 
developing wheat varieties that impedes progress in variety development and slowed the rate of 
productivity growth for the wheat sector. Given this, there had been pressure to abandon the 
KVD system due to the proliferation of wheat classes in western Canada. KVD was also under 
some pressure due to the demand for special quality types for niche markets.  
Over the past few years, there had been intensive discussions about moving away from KVD as a 
variety identification and grading system and developing alternatives to KVD. In response to this 
impediment to innovation, the Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) directed an effort towards 
eliminating the wheat quality control system dependency on KVD (CGC, 2007). Meanwhile, 
others suggested that KVD should not be phased out before ensuring the maintenance of the 
consistency and uniformity of Canadian wheat (Burden et al., 2003). These individuals also 
warned that any relaxation of KVD registration requirements should be done gradually, giving 
some time for the grain handling system to prepare for alternatives. 
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In spite of warnings about changing the current grading system away from KVD, on February 
11, 2008, the federal government announced that the KVD requirement for variety registration 
would be eliminated from all eight classes of wheat as of August 1, 2008. In the meantime, the 
CGC proposed a more flexible wheat segregation system called Variety Eligibility Declaration 
(VED) that would replace the existing KVD regulation. In a VED system, the farmer would 
declare which varieties they are delivering into the handling and transportation system. This 
would remove the requirement that each variety be visually distinguishable from varieties in 
other wheat classes. Ultimately, the costs associated with the VED system are not well 
understood and could be significant due to the current absence of technology necessary to 
prevent mix-ups or commingling of grain classes in the bulk handling and transportation system. 
Some industry participants still doubt whether VED could be made to work effectively, while the 
CGC insists that the cost of doing nothing would be greater than the cost of proceeding with 
VED. The CGC also claims that as the only alternative available at present, the VED is the best 
choice for maintaining varietal segregation in a non-visual quality control system (Paul, 2006).   
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In the past under KVD, elevator managers and terminal operators could be reasonably confident 
that they could accurately identify the class of wheat delivered to their facility merely by looking 
at samples from the truck or rail car because the visual appearance of the kernel was indicative. 
There are a number of uncertainties to consider as KVD is replaced by the VED system. The 
fundamental problem with the VED grading system is that there is an incentive for the farmer to 
potentially misrepresent the product (Furtan et al., 2003). Similarly, primary elevators also have 
an incentive to commingle different wheat classes for financial gain. After removing the variety 
registration requirement for KVD, new varieties could be introduced without requiring that they 
be visually distinguishable from other classes of wheat, and could generate class 
misrepresentation when there is a financial gain from doing so. Simply put, under VED, a wheat 
variety with low quality can be more easily misrepresented as a wheat variety with high quality 
since they are no longer required to be visually distinguishable from each other. In addition, non-
registered varieties, often from the United States, also present a serious problem for the Canadian 
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sector (CGC, 2003). A farmer could attempt to declare a non-registered variety as an existing 
eligible one since varieties can no longer be definitively identified. This issue could become even 
more important in the presence of non-registered genetically modified (GM) varieties. And 
lessons from the Canadian flax industry are critical to note here. In 2009, the contamination of 
Canadian flax exports to the European market with a GM flax was confirmed. This 
contamination greatly harmed the reputation of Canadian flax production in the world market 
(CBAN, 2012). 
While technologies currently exist to identify visually indistinguishable wheat varieties, this 
technology requires a laboratory setting, are relatively slow to perform, and are very costly 
compared to the KVD system (CGC, 2006). This means in the current supply chain, a testing 
intensity needed to guarantee varietal accuracy will involve high costs (Langen, 2011). Although 
considerable effort is still being made to develop affordable, reliable and rapid variety 
identification (VID) technology that can be used outside of a laboratory setting, it is not available 
as of this writing, and will not likely be available for some years to come. 
Before such technologies are developed, there are clearly risks under VED that could jeopardize 
Western Canada’s traditional competitive advantage in wheat markets. Under VED, there will 
likely be a significant increase in handling costs, for example, forcing separate binning of 
deliveries until variety and quality can be identified several hours or days later. Generally, the 
existence of visually indistinguishable varieties has the potential to seriously compromise the 
Canadian quality assurance system if varieties are misrepresented anywhere within the grain 
handling system. Undetected varietal misrepresentations would effectively result in 
contamination of one type of wheat with another and could lead to significant financial losses for 
grain handling companies and marketers or even damage the overall reputation and 
competitiveness of Canadian wheat in the world market. Facing these challenges, the goal of this 
thesis is to identify those effective wheat handling strategies applicable to the grain handling 
supply chain that will best help maintain varietal consistency in the post-KVD era.  
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1.3 Study Motivation 
The adoption of VED will bridge a gap between now and the time when inexpensive and rapid 
varietal testing is available. Under VED, Canada’s traditional objective of maintaining wheat 
competitiveness, enhancement of marketability and assurance of wheat quality will not change. 
To meet this objective, it is assumed that the Canadian federal government maintains the 
responsibility to deliver excellence and innovation in grain quality and quantity assurance, 
research, and producer protection.  
As described, a VED system is currently in use in various parts of the world, for example by the 
wheat industry in Australia as well as the soybean industry in eastern Canada. From an economic 
and contractual perspective, it is clear that self-declaration product quality systems like VED 
work best when backed up with credible monitoring and enforcement. But in fact they also 
require the presence of deterrents to misrepresentation of the product. Another strong element 
contributing to the success of this kind of system is the potential deterrent in order to reduce the 
potential to damage buyer/seller relationships. Given the inherent complexities of these 
challenges, there are strong incentives for researchers to work out effective novel handling 
policies under VED, creating a favourable environment to facilitate the implementation of VED 
in the grain handling supply chain.  
This study will examine strategies to mitigate handling risks and reduce corresponding costs, 
integrating key factors such as on-farm risk, misrepresentation, sampling, testing, handling, 
transportation, and penalties across the complete grain supply chain from producers to terminal 
elevators, instead of simply focusing on a particular segment of the supply chain as has been 
done in related prior work. With the support of simulation models and methods that can capture 
the complexities inherent in this problem, this thesis also seeks to understand the interactions and 
dynamics of the supply chain under VED so as to quantify the risks and costs under foreseeable 
handling scenarios. This framework will make a unique contribution to the existing literature.  
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1.4 Objectives 
The objective of this dissertation is to identify a set of varietal testing strategies that will 
maintain the integrity of the wheat supply chain under VED while keeping handling costs 
relatively low. In addition, the costs and risks to supply chain participants will be quantified. 
Since the goal of modern logistics is “to get the right goods or services to the right place, at the 
right time, and in the desired condition, while making the greatest contribution to the firm” 
(Ballou, 1999), this research will also help to identify the structure of future grain logistics under 
VED.  
To meet these objectives, static microeconomic theory as well as dynamic economic simulation 
will be applied to explore both the analytic and simulated effects of possible wheat handling 
strategies on the misrepresentation behavior of producers, staying mindful of the interaction 
between producers behavior on wheat handling testing strategies. To start, a basic principal agent 
model is developed of the economic incentives inherent in the VED system so as to identify 
handling strategies that will optimize contamination risks and costs. This static analytic 
framework is then extended in a dynamic sense through agent-based simulation of the problem, 
where this latter methodology allows for the incorporation of individual heterogeneity, 
interaction, adaptation and feedback in the system. Given the inherent complexities of the 
problem, the goal of the latter analysis is to identify handling and management strategies that 
help to minimize system handling costs, as well as to assess the distribution of risks and costs 
among system participants under these handling or management strategies.  
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
There are six chapters in this thesis. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the policy issue that 
motivates this research. In Chapter 2, the Canadian wheat quality assurance system is described 
in detail. The structure of KVD and VED will be explained as well as the opportunities and 
challenges that arise in a post-KVD environment. In Chapter 3, both farmer (agent) and elevator 
(principal) objective functions within a supply chain are defined and solved in order to identify 
optimal risk mitigation strategies. Given the nature of the situation, potential moral hazard 
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behavior among the participants is explored. Chapter 4 motivates and explains the development 
of an agent-based dynamic simulation model of the grain handling supply chain under VED. The 
simulation model will help identify superior testing strategies in this complex grain handling 
environment and also facilitate the quantification of the costs and risks of VED for supply chain 
participants. Chapter 5 extends the simulation analysis to examine various policy scenarios of 
interest. Comparisons between different handling strategies are performed to determine a set of 
good strategies for handlers under foreseeable situations. Furthermore, a comparison between the 
analytic solutions and the simulated model solutions is described in this chapter. Finally, Chapter 
6 offers some conclusions and highlights areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE CANADIAN WHEAT INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the Canadian grain handling system, KVD had been a highly effective method for ensuring 
consistency and uniformity
2
 of wheat delivered to customers. KVD was a visual wheat 
classification system that identified different types of wheat within the production and grain 
handling systems. It had worked so well because it enabled rapid, dependable, and low-cost 
segregation of wheat into different functional classes within the handling system since the visual 
appearance of wheat is indicative of intrinsic and processing quality. Despite these advantages, 
the KVD method also had some weaknesses (CGC, 2005), 
1. It placed constraints on wheat breeders’ ability to quickly improve agronomic 
characteristics of wheat, such as yield, disease resistance, or maturity rate.  
2. KVD also constrained the development of wheat varieties with improved quality 
characteristics for traditional end-uses, or different quality characteristics for new and 
diverse end-uses, including non-milling wheat for feed or fuel use.  
The CGC had recognized the limitations of KVD as a segregation tool and had directed a 
significant and sustained effort towards eliminating the grain quality control system’s 
dependency on it. On February 11, 2008, the federal government announced that KVD would be 
eliminated from all eight classes of wheat as of August 1, 2008 and a new system called VED 
was introduced. Therefore since 2008, farmers must sign a declaration (or affidavit) when they 
                                                          
2
 A customer purchases a certain class and grade of wheat in October and again in May. If there is little 
variation in the appearance and quality of those shipments over time it is said to be consistent. It is said to 
be uniform if there is little difference in these factors throughout the whole shipment (i.e. from hold to 
hold in the ship) (Oleson, 2003).  
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deliver grain attesting to the eligibility of the variety they are delivering. The declaration is 
required by each company and delivery point that they deliver to.  
Undoubtedly, movement away from KVD as a segregation tool is fundamentally altering the 
Canadian grain system and has had a significant impact on the Canadian wheat industry. Such a 
change affects relevant participants including seed breeders, grain producers, grain handlers and 
marketers, and therefore requires their support and cooperation to preserve Canada’s reputation 
as a producer of quality wheat. To fully understand the impact of the removal of KVD on the 
functions and costs of the grain handling system and understand the future of Western Canadian 
wheat quality assurance, it is necessary to know the historical Canadian wheat handling and 
quality control system, as well as the character and functionality of KVD and VED and issues 
related to them. 
 
2.2 Canadian Wheat Handling and Quality Control System 
2.2.1 Canadian Wheat Handling System 
Canada’s prairie wheat industry has grown significantly since it began in 1878. Today, moving 
Canada’s prairie wheat production from farms to world markets is done within a supply chain of 
enormous magnitude. CIGI (1993) described the wheat flow in the wheat handling system as 
follows: farmers produce wheat and store it on their farms; to move their wheat production, 
producers must load and haul farm truckloads of wheat to primary elevators; after that, wheat 
must be loaded on railcars from primary elevators  and shipped to domestic consumers or  hauled 
a long distance to export terminal elevators; finally, ships must be scheduled into Canada’s ports 
to be loaded with wheat from the terminal elevators for the world market.  
The primary elevator accumulates small lots of grain (sorted by class and grade) from individual 
farmers until there is enough to fill railcars. Current primary elevators are most often located 
beside rail tracks. Each elevator possesses a specially designed structure capable of receiving, 
storing and shipping grain in bulk lots. Terminal elevators, like primary elevators, historically 
followed railway construction to provide facilities to unload railcars, store, process and load the 
grain into ships. Several large export terminals are located on the West Coast of Canada 
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(Vancouver and Prince Rupert), while other terminals are located at Thunder Bay on Lake 
Superior and Churchill on Hudson Bay. There are also transfer elevators along the St. Lawrence 
Seaway where grain is off loaded and then transferred to ocean vessels. In addition, there are a 
growing number of inland terminals which also ship grain to the export terminals. Virtually all of 
the wheat moving from the primary elevator or inland terminal to ocean or Great Lakes terminals 
is transported by rail. Typically, each train carries only one class of wheat. Railcars move into 
the export terminal. They are unloaded, the wheat is placed in bins, cleaned and then loaded onto 
vessels. The wheat is normally kept separate by the class and grade. Shipments of wheat 
designated for the United States may be by either ship or train (grain designated for the United 
States may also originate from an inland terminal) (CP, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Canadian Wheat Quality Control System 
Canada has an enviable reputation for supplying wheat that uniformly and consistently meets 
agreed sales specifications. Such an achievement can be ascribed to Canada’s wheat quality 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Wheat Flow in Wheat Handling System (CGC, 2003, Page 8) 
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control system. Quality control refers to the preservation of the normal natural quality of grain 
from the time it is received at a primary elevator to the time it leaves terminal elevators for 
export or for delivery to the domestic market (CIGI, 1993). Canada’s grain quality control 
system is designed to consistently provide domestic and export customers with the quality of 
grain they require, year after year. A key strength of this system is the ability to segregate and 
handle grain according to quality, from producer delivery to the point of export, thus enabling 
end-users to purchase shipments with predictable processing qualities.  
Quality control of Canadian grain falls largely under the jurisdiction of the CGC. The CGC is 
responsible for establishing and maintaining standards of quality for Canadian grain and 
regulating grain handling in Canada to ensure a dependable commodity for domestic and export 
markets. The commission’s quality control system involves every phase of the grain industry 
from development of new varieties to delivery of grain to consumers. Wheat quality control in 
Western Canada has evolved over the last decades and is now made up of four key elements: 
varietal development and registration, grading system, uniformity, and cleanliness and safety. 
(CWB, 2008). A detailed description is offered here for the first element, which provides the 
cornerstone for KVD implementation. 
The CGC (2003, 2005) offerS a detailed description on the requirements for grain variety 
development and registration in the KVD era. New varieties were registered only after careful 
evaluations for their end-use quality performance, agronomic performance and disease resistance 
characteristics were performed. Samples of new varieties developed by plant breeders were 
submitted to the Commission’s Inspection Division for a report on kernel characteristics. 
Varieties of significantly different quality must be visually distinguishable from each other by 
kennel characteristics. Samples were also examined for grading patterns determined on the basis 
of uniformity of kernel type. Each new wheat variety registered would need to fall into one of 
eight specified Western Canada wheat classes
3
 and be visually distinguishable from all other 
classes of wheat. Varieties of inferior quality that were not easily distinguishable from varieties 
                                                          
3
 The eight Western Canadian wheat classes (for 2008) were: Canada Western Red Spring (CWRS), Canada 
Western Amber Durum (CWAD), Canada Western Extra Strong (CWES), Canada Prairie Spring Red (CPSR), 
Canada Prairie Spring White (CPSW), Canada Western Soft White Spring (CWSWS), and Canada Western Hard 
White Spring (CWHWS).  As of 2011, the ninth Western Canadian wheat class is introduced: Canada Western 
General Purpose (CWGP). CGC (2012) states that varieties in CWGP are not required to meet KVD registration 
requirement and may be undistinguished from varieties within other classes of wheat. 
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of higher quality might be excluded from registration to prevent them from reducing the overall 
quality of Canadian grain. As a result, wheat kernels in each class possessed a distinctive and 
unique look, as well as overall color and configuration, while varieties registered in a class 
would exhibit very similar end-use performance. The CGC referred to these visual characteristics 
as kernel visual distinguishability, or KVD, and this particular grading system was unique to 
Canada. KVD had been a vital aspect of western Canada’s unique quality control system after it 
was established and provided substantial benefits by facilitating exports of high quality wheat for 
customers over decades (Dexter et al., 2006). 
 
2.3 KVD  
In the KVD era, because of the KVD constraint on wheat registration, each of the Western 
Canadian wheat classes had been assigned a combination of seed-coat color and physical kernel 
configuration that were different and distinctive from each other. KVD made producers 
determine visually that any wheat seed they purchased was the class they intended to grow. The 
visual differences had to be significant enough to also permit elevator operators to readily 
distinguish one type of wheat from another as it moved from farms to primary elevators and 
terminals, permitting delivered wheat to be put in the appropriate segregated bin, ready for 
shipment in different railcars. Grain inspectors could check that shipments of one class of wheat 
were not contaminated by another and confirm that railcars and shiploads of wheat meet buyer’s 
requirements.  
A variety of wheat with the kernel shape of one of the wheat classes had certain quality traits and 
processing characteristics. The relationship between kernel feature and quality had been bred to 
be quite direct. Due to KVD, elevator managers and terminal operators in the grain handling 
system could be reasonably confident that they knew the class of wheat delivered to their facility 
merely by looking at truck or railcar samples. On export, the Canadian Grain Commission could 
also certify wheat shipments based on the visual grading of wheat shipments. In this manner, 
declaration of the delivery’s varietal composition by the farmer (or primary elevator manager, in 
the case of deliveries to terminals) was generally unnecessary. 
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This situation changed when KVD was removed as a registration requirement for all Western 
Canadian wheat classes. Although varieties put forward for registration have to meet all other 
registration requirements for quality, disease resistance and agronomics, they can be alike in 
appearance with wheat in another wheat class. In a declaration system, if one of these varieties is 
misrepresented or inadvertently mixed with other varieties during handling, wheat handlers 
would be unable to detect a problem without testing a sample. If undetected, Canada’s 
established reputation for guaranteed high quality wheat could be threatened by an increased 
likelihood of mix-ups between wheat classes.  
Ultimately, the goal of the CGC is to develop a quality control system that removes the 
agronomic constraints of KVD without losing its benefits. If the existence of visually 
indistinguishable wheat classes brings problems to the Canadian wheat quality control system, 
any future VED system should be validated so as to best maintain the historical consistency and 
uniformity of Western Canadian wheat (CGC, 2005).  
 
2.4 VED and Related Issues  
2.4.1 VED 
As an alternative to KVD, VED was enacted by the CGC as the policy for segregating and 
moving grain through the handling system. Under VED, every time wheat changes hands there is 
a legal declaration made comprised of a variety eligible for a specific class. Documentation and 
sample retention would also make it possible to trace grain in a cargo right back to elevators and 
farmers who made deliveries, allowing monitoring and enforcing accountability, thereby 
theoretically assuring the quality of wheat shipments. 
 The CGC (2010) lists the following policy changes in this regard, implemented after August 1, 
2008 
 VED, a varietal declaration system as part of a quality management system for Western 
Canadian wheat, was introduced.  
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 When a farm delivers wheat, the farmer has to sign a declaration form (refer to Appendix 
A for more information about the form). By signing the form, the farmer attests that the 
wheat being delivered is eligible for a specific class of Western Canada wheat.  
 As of August 1, 2011, a ninth wheat class was created to meet the needs of the feed and 
industrial sectors – Canada General Purpose– with disease resistance and agronomic 
criteria, but with no quality requirements.  
After removing the variety registration requirement for KVD, a new class of wheat (CWGP) was 
introduced without requiring that varieties in this class be visually distinguishable from other 
existing classes of wheat (CGC, 2012). In fact, a tenth wheat class has also been introduced - 
Canada Western Experimental, but there are no eligible varieties for CWE as of this writing. 
Under the VED system, incoming varieties in this class are not required to meet the KVD 
registration requirement either. In fact, varieties in new classes of wheat or new varieties in 
existing classes are likely to be similar in physical appearance to other already existing wheat 
varieties, but could differ significantly in quality. The potential increase in visually 
indistinguishable varieties may threaten the safety of the Canadian wheat quality assurance 
system. If introduced into the grain supply chain, varieties that are not visually distinguishable 
from registered varieties may cause problems with the quality assurance system because they do 
not perform the same as registered varieties.  
2.4.2 Challenge of Visually Indistinguishable Varieties under VED 
By way of example, the newly introduced varieties in the ninth class are not necessarily visually 
distinguishable from each other or the existing eight classes of wheat (CGC, 2012). Because 
visual requirements are relaxed to facilitate variety development, more varieties may be 
introduced and some of them may be visually indistinguishable from other varieties that belong 
to different wheat classes in the future. Due to the time lag between variety registration and 
adoption, it is anticipated that in the short run these varieties will not create an immediate KVD 
conflict with the main varieties of Western Canada wheat, for example CWRS, since look-alike 
varieties have not yet entered the system in large volumes. In the long run, the conflict may be 
unavoidable if newly registered visually indistinguishable varieties grow. Together with the 
visually indistinguishable non-registered varieties, they will increase the likelihood of mix-ups 
15 
 
between wheat classes and thus challenge the function of the wheat quality control system in 
western Canada. 
The visually indistinguishable non-registered varieties have been a problem to wheat handling 
even under KVD. In 2002, a grain company reportedly lost several hundred thousand dollars 
when a train shipment of milling wheat was downgraded to feed because it contained excessive 
levels of non-registered US wheat varieties. KVD as a visual identification method could not 
solve the visually indistinguishable non-registered variety problem (CGC, 2009). The CGC 
(2005) states that it hopes such a problem can be solved by VED. 
If producers or handlers know precisely the varieties of wheat they grow or handle and honestly 
make declarations on their deliveries, there will be no misrepresentation problem. Otherwise, 
these future varieties will have potential to compromise the Canadian quality assurance system if 
they are misrepresented anywhere within the grain handling system without detection.  Such 
mistakes can result in commingling and could lead to significant financial losses for grain 
handling companies and marketers. Such losses will ultimately be shared by all the supply chain 
participants and that outcome does not meet the CGC’s objectives under VED. 
2.4.3 VED Objectives 
The CGC’s stated objectives for a VED system are as follows (CGC, 2003): 
1. To protect and broaden Canadian producers' access to grain markets by strengthening the 
grain quality assurance system; 
2. To provide producers with a broader range of choices in what they grow and sell;  
3. To provide end-users more choices in what they buy, while continuing to meet their need 
for consistent, uniform quality. 
In the KVD era, elevator handlers could identify particular classes of wheat delivered by the 
farmer solely on a visual basis. The switch from KVD means that along the supply chain, wheat 
has to be identified and segregated on some basis other than visual appearance. It is much more 
critical that grain handlers are made familiar with formal documentation and operational 
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procedures for handling grain. In short, due to the potential problems with VED, there could be 
considerably more management effort required to operate with the same level of certainty that 
KVD provided. 
2.4.4 Problems with VED 
Participant cooperation and support is a prerequisite for success in any quality control system.  
Their attitudes and efforts determine the functional performance of the system. If participants 
each individually are made to take responsibility for their actions, misrepresentation problems 
should rarely occur. But under VED, it is expected that there will be an increase in the likelihood 
of supply chain participants’ misrepresentation behavior. In this regard, Furtan et al. (2003) 
defined two types of participants operating under VED. The first is one who misrepresents the 
wheat variety in order to gain a better price. The second is one who instead does not use due care 
and diligence in producing, handling, and transporting wheat, with the unintended consequence 
that wrong varieties end up in a particular wheat class. Because each party’s action is 
unobservable to a second party, it would necessarily be difficult to identify whether an individual 
made mistakes intentionally or not under VED.  
On one hand, the problem with the VED system is that there is a built in incentive for the farmer, 
as well as the primary or terminal operator, to potentially misrepresent the product. For example, 
suppose that a non-CWRS variety, visually indistinguishable from a CWRS variety, is 
represented as a CWRS variety. Because CWRS receives a greater price than most other wheat 
classes, a farmer who misrepresents the variety of wheat delivered could potentially make a 
financial gain. Similarly, grain handlers have an incentive to commingle wheat classes and make 
a financial gain. But the consequence of a commingling of wheat classes is that it could result in 
the downgrade of a bin or a vessel of grain upon export.  
On the other hand, the existence of visually indistinguishable varieties could also make farmers 
confused about the wheat classes or varieties they actually grow. Then these varieties could be 
easily misrepresented when farmers deliver them to the elevator. At the elevator stage, visually 
indistinguishable varieties cannot be readily sorted from each other. If these are misrepresented 
without detection, such varieties can then enter the elevator and result in increased costs at some 
17 
 
point in the handling chain. In addition, it is likely that visually indistinguishable varieties 
increase the probability of operation errors during wheat handling and transportation.  
In spite of these issues, existing grain declaration systems seem to work well in the grain 
industry at other locations. These include the Australian wheat industry as well as the soybean 
industry in eastern Canada. But the economics of incentives tell us that as described, VED will 
only be sustainable if supported by a functional monitoring system that includes sampling, 
testing, and traceability along with serious deterrents in the case of misrepresentation of the 
variety or class of grain. And to start, due to the existence of visually indistinguishable wheat 
varieties under VED, non-visual technology for variety identification is needed to support the 
monitoring system. 
2.4.5 Variety Identification Technology 
In general, with strict monitoring and testing along with proper deterrents to misrepresentation, 
variety eligibility declarations can be used to keep grain segregated in a manner consistent with 
historical Canadian standards. From the latter perspective, the ideal alternative to KVD would be 
some kind of automated test that could quickly and cheaply identify grain at the elevator when a 
producer delivered it. In fact, the demand for variety identification testing in Western Canada has 
increased over the past number of years because customers are seeking grains with more specific 
quality characteristics and for more diverse end-uses (CGC, 2009). Yet under VED, maintaining 
such a need becomes more urgent because new visually indistinguishable varieties have been 
introduced with more new visually indistinguishable varieties potentially introduced in the 
future. To ensure consistent and uniform quality of wheat shipments, the CGC and grain handlers 
are becoming increasingly dependent on technological developments to monitor and detect the 
presence of unwanted visually indistinguishable varieties in shipments of wheat. For this reason, 
development of rapid variety identification methods to facilitate and monitor purity of variety 
specific segregation has become a major research direction in Canada (CGC, 2009). 
In fact, the CGC has developed several non-visual methods for variety identification. Two 
protein fingerprinting techniques are used: polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (PAGE) and high 
performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) (CGC, 2009). Although very useful for certain 
purposes, these two techniques cannot distinguish all varieties. To augment its testing 
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capabilities, the CGC has also developed microsatellite-based DNA fingerprinting (CGC, 2009). 
These three biochemical methods are used to support the Canadian quality assurance system by 
monitoring the variety composition of railcars and vessels carrying grain. While these methods 
are accurate and replicable, they are laboratory based, require skilled technicians and to date, are 
not widely available. They are also relatively expensive and take time to yield results. The 
monitoring program based on these methods provides the industry with information to help them 
better manage the handling system, but intensive monitoring using these systems will 
compromise any potential benefits of wheat handling. So to improve the efficiency of grain 
monitoring, the CGC has been putting efforts into developing a rapid and affordable variety 
identification technology to facilitate and monitor the purity of variety specific segregation 
(Dexter et al., 2006). While still under development, if this technology proves successful, it 
would constitute a major step forward for quality assurance under VED. 
A reliable VED system would focus on detecting misrepresentation upon entry into the supply 
chain instead of at export position. Doing so will prevent misrepresented deliveries from entering 
the supply chain before commercial damages are realized. And even if contamination happens, 
traceability, otherwise known as a trace-back process, could be enacted to find the source 
upstream of supply chain by referring to retained samples and testing them. In light of this, it is 
clear that the utility of a variety identification technology for testing determines the functional 
performance of VED. A rapid and affordable variety identification technology can greatly 
improve the efficiency of detecting contamination and tracing it back (“traceability”) to 
determine its sources under a VED system.  
2.4.6 Traceability under VED 
The VED concept concerns “involved declaration of class eligibility and facilitated traceability 
in the event of detection of a contamination.” (Oleson, 2003). In turn, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) (1994) defines traceability as the "ability to trace the 
history, application or location of an entity by means of recorded identifications". 
Under the VED system, wheat would no longer be segregated by visual characteristics. 
Producers or handlers instead must declare the class of their grain upon delivery to the primary 
elevator or the terminal elevator. As grain moves through the handling system, the CGC (2003) 
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proposed that legislation should require that samples be taken and declarations be signed as grain 
changed hands, thus theoretically making it possible to trace detected misrepresented varieties 
back to a prior stage in the supply chain and determine the cause or the source of the problem. In 
this case, those responsible for the misrepresentation could be held accountable for their actions, 
and could be subject to penalties in the form of fines, suspensions, downgrades or other 
sanctions. Therefore, traceability is indispensable for the safety of wheat handling under VED 
given that monitoring and testing are imperfect. It is believed that a well-established traceability 
mechanism backed up by a penalty system will provide effective incentives to supply chain 
participants for segregation efforts (Viterra 2007; CWB 2008) 
When contamination problems occur in grain handling and damages result, there are economic 
incentives to identify the contamination source upstream in the supply chain by testing the 
retained samples because delays in tracking the sources of contamination always increase the 
cost of rectifying mistakes. In the case of wheat contamination, if the costs of applying 
traceability are less than the benefits coming from contamination identification through 
traceability, then traceability will be economically viable. There are three incentives to pursue 
traceability: first, contamination sources can be identified so that further contamination and 
damage can be avoided; second, penalties on offenders can partially cover any contamination 
loss; third, the deterrence effect of traceability motivates participants’ liability incentives for 
delivering eligible wheat products, eventually contributing to the safety of wheat handling 
(Pouliot et al., 2008). 
2.4.7 Consideration for VED Implementation 
In terms of the functionality of VED in Canada, first of all, it must be effective in ensuring 
consistent and uniform quality of wheat shipments. As discussed, KVD had been highly effective 
in ensuring consistency and uniformity, so that a VED system replacing KVD should not 
compromise the quality of shipments of Canada’s premium wheat classes. In a very competitive 
world market, the Canadian grain industry cannot afford the cost of a questionable reputation. To 
meet these objectives, some essential factors determining the functional performance of a VED 
system must be carefully considered.  
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First, an effective VED system is required to motivate producers’ efforts on risk control via an 
efficient risk sharing scheme. To what extent producers know the varietal composition of their 
wheat production and shipment influences the contamination risks and costs along the wheat 
supply chain in a VED system. Since some varieties are visually indistinguishable, preventing 
commingling mistakes could be difficult and costly for the typical on-farm practice. But under 
VED, producers are required to sign legally-binding declarations specifying what class of wheat 
they are delivering. Under this system, damage liability is shifted to rest almost entirely with 
producers
4
, meaning they will have to spend more to reduce their financial liability. There are 
resources a producer can put into the risk control to reduce the risk of producing undesired wheat 
varieties, such as purchasing certified seed from seed breeders or having the saved or common 
seed tested at a private lab before planting, as well as enhancing documentation for on-farm 
practice. Even if undesired visually indistinguishable wheat is produced, there is a simple way to 
avoid misrepresenting it, by having samples variety tested by a laboratory before delivery. The 
level of efforts a farmer intends to utilize determines the extent of a farmer’s confidence in the 
wheat variety produced. 
Second, a sound VED system requires efficient testing strategies. The biggest challenge to grain 
companies in the future will be the management of visually indistinguishable inventory in the 
bulk handling system. Under KVD, the handlers relied heavily on visual distinguishability to 
move product through the system. Removing this functionality means that grain companies will 
have to invest in alternative means to manage and track inventory movement. Testing wheat at 
different stages of handling could reduce the chance of commingling mistakes or prevent these 
mistakes from going further in the supply chain. But currently, due to the high cost of testing, 
complete testing at each potential testing point is not economical unless the misrepresentation 
situation is severe. Yet incomplete tests will increase the risk that commingling mistakes go 
undetected and multiply into significant commercial damages. Efficient test strategies should 
identify the appropriate balance between the associated costs and benefits. But all else equal, 
                                                          
4
The liability is made clear in the wording of the sample declaration (CGC, 2012). It states: “I acknowledge the 
Producer will be held accountable in accordance with authority granted within the Acts. I further acknowledge and 
agree that the Canadian Wheat Board may consider the Producer to be in default of his/her delivery contracts and, in 
addition to any other remedies available to it, it may cancel any contracts of the Producer. In addition, the Grain 
Handling Company may jointly with the Canadian Wheat Board or severally, claim against the Producer for all 
claims, damages, losses and costs (including legal fees) that may result.” 
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when the probability of farmer misrepresentation increases the need for testing increases and 
thus handling costs will also increase. 
Third, an effective VED system should be supported by traceability and some kind of penalty 
mechanism. It has been suggested that a declaration should be signed at each transfer point in the 
handling system. Complete documentation of where wheat came from and where it went in the 
supply chain should be required each time grain is moved. Ideally, representative samples should 
be taken from each delivery at each transfer point in the supply chain and be retained for an 
appropriate period for trace-back purposes. While testing can occur at specific critical points to 
detect misrepresented or contaminated wheat varieties, good documentation and sample retention 
would make it possible to trace shipments back to each elevator and farmer if there are problems. 
Subsequent testing of retained samples could be used to identify the cause or source of 
contamination and thereby initiate procedures to remedy the situation. Finally, a set of penalties 
should be in place that can be applied when a misrepresented or commingled wheat class has 
been detected, with the penalty enforced in the face of violation. Without financial penalties and 
enforcement, testing and traceability are ineffective in deterring any individuals inclined to 
misrepresent or engage in careless grain handling practices. 
Furtan et al. (2003) suggested that the goal of such a penalty and enforcement system is to 
provide a disincentive for participants to misrepresent their wheat as well as provide an incentive 
for all participants to invest in activities which reduce the probability of misrepresentation 
occurring. From an economic perspective, in order to achieve deterrence from an individual who 
may potentially misrepresent their deliveries, the expected value of the penalty cannot be less 
than that of the expected gain achievable through misrepresentation. Otherwise, individuals may 
neglect to take the necessary measures to prevent misrepresentation. 
Last, a penalty and enforcement system will require considerable efforts to design. The present 
Grain Act and Regulations do not provide a timely or appropriate penalty system framework for 
misrepresentation behavior in the grain handling system (CSTA, 2012). To effectively provide 
incentives for reducing the likelihood of misrepresentation risks, a strong penalty and 
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enforcement system is needed. Furtan et al. (2003) proposed three options for penalty systems: 1) 
torts
5
, 2) penalties meted out by the courts, and 3) an administrative penalty system
6
.  
In the first penalty option, industry participants damaged by variety misrepresentation of others 
would pursue compensation for damage through tort action. The second option includes court 
imposed fines and imprisonment for offences. The current Canadian Grain Act (2012) provides 
for maximum fines ranging from nine to eighteen thousand dollars for an individual and thirty to 
sixty thousand dollars for a corporation, depending on the category of offence and the level of 
conviction, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both. The third option 
involves suspensions and financial penalties. Regarding the suspension issue, Furtan et al. (2003) 
proposed that the CGC could attempt to build up a trust system with farmers. In such a system, 
‘trust’ would substitute for sampling and testing as the CGC become familiar with individual 
farmers and their behavior. A farmer who generates suspicion will be penalized by more 
intensive sampling and testing more until such a time as the desired trust level was re-
established. In this case, costly testing would be billed to offenders. With respect to the financial 
penalty option, a regulatory agency such as CGC could be given the authority to levy fines for 
infractions up to a certain amount. In fact, today if a grain company disagrees with a grain 
commission ruling, its only option is to fight it in court, an expensive option for both sides 
(Dawson, 2013). Such a proposed penalty system can avoid costly, complicated, and sometimes 
lengthy court processes when dealing with offences which may be straightforward and not very 
contestable (Furtan et al., 2003). The amount of the penalty set for a specific offender should 
have a positive relationship to the magnitude of varietal contamination losses incurred by the 
misrepresentation. In addition, it may also be useful to have penalties that are increasingly 
progressive for repeat offences.  
                                                          
5
 A tort is a civil law offence which causes another person to suffer loss or harm resulting in legal liability for the 
person who committed the original offence. The source or cause of legal action is not necessarily a crime since harm 
may have been due to negligence, but not criminal negligence. The victim is allowed to sue the offender for 
monetary losses via a lawsuit. In order to win, the case, the plaintiff must show that the action (or lack of action) was 
the recognizable cause of their harm (Lindon and Butterworths, 2011). 
6
 The administrative penalty system is a civil penalty regime that secures compliance with legislation through the 
application of (monetary) penalties. The legal authority may impose monetary penalties based on the type, 
frequency, and severity of the infraction. In fact, many penalties are graduated and often take the compliance history 
of the client into consideration (CBSA, 2012).  
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Given the importance of maintaining wheat class integrity and to provide effective deterrents for 
misrepresentation behavior, the Canadian Grain Act or related regulations will need to provide a 
robust framework for building up a penalty and enforcement system. In addition, the Canadian 
Grain Commission should be given the authority for applying a system of monetary penalties for 
misrepresentation in the face of verified violations. Although a penalty and enforcement system 
is an attempt to guard against certain undesirable outcomes, ideally any system should avoid the 
tendency to overkill with an excess of rules and procedures in a quest to ensure that those 
outcomes never occur. There needs to be a balance struck between taking risks and regulatory 
overload. To deliver favorable benefits to all grain supply participants, the process of forming 
appropriate regulations should necessarily involve consultations with farmers, grain companies 
and others in the grain industry (Dawson, 2009).  
2.4.8 Costs of VED  
The implementation of the VED system in Canada will introduce new risks and potentially 
significant costs into the grain supply chain, although it will not be an easy task to determine 
either the costs or the exact risks. Some analysis indicates that while there are tangible gains 
available in moving away from KVD (Oleson, 2003; Burden et al., 2003), the costs of 
implementing an efficient VED system are also significant (Furtan et al., 2003). Prior research 
has made clear that producers and industry stakeholders would have to make considerable 
changes to their old style of operations to operationalize the VED system. In sum, there are a 
whole array of new costs associated with wheat handling in the VED system as compared to 
those associated with the former KVD system (Oleson, 2003). These include: 
1. Cost of VED implementation. As discussed, the new system will have many direct and 
indirect costs including sampling, sample retention, testing, tracing, documentation and 
an administrative penalty system.  
2. Any loss of VED system performance. The existence of non-registered and new 
registered visually indistinguishable varieties can cause problems for the wheat quality 
control system and generate costs, e.g. those varieties can increase the probability of 
misrepresentation and faulty operation which can lead to cross contamination. 
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Under VED, coupled with an increase in visually indistinguishable wheat varieties, the 
probability of misrepresentation of any kind will increase during the handling process. 
Documentation, sampling and testing should take place at different stages of wheat handling. 
The logic for this level of diligence is that if a problem can be detected before the wheat is 
loaded onto a vessel for shipment, then corrective action can be taken. In this way, the high cost 
of downgrading a train or a vessel full of loaded wheat can be avoided.  If there are 
contamination problems, documentation and sampling at each transfer point would make it 
possible to detect the point at which unacceptable levels of unwanted varieties entered the 
system. 
By assumption, handlers’ testing strategies focus on pursuing their own profit maximization over 
time. Economic costs in the system may be substantial and should provide incentives for 
handlers to develop strategies to minimize the losses. Ultimately, the benefits of a VED system 
must be sufficient to justify its costs. 
 
2.5 Grain Issues Involved in This Study 
The objective of this research is to model a set of varietal testing strategies designed to ensure 
the safety and quality of western Canadian wheat under VED, while keeping handling costs 
relatively low. However, there are some essential considerations that need to be integrated into 
the models. 
To maintain the integrity of the wheat supply chain, one of the top priorities under a VED system 
is to prevent visually indistinguishable wheat varieties from contaminating each other. The CGC 
(2005) argues that the long-term solution to this issue lies in the development of rapid and 
affordable variety identification technology. However, because rapid variety tests are currently 
not available, a short to medium-term solution must be increased monitoring for visually 
indistinguishable varieties, backed-up by some laboratory testing, along with the existence of 
penalty deterrents for misrepresentation of grain. 
Since current testing is slow and expensive, intensive testing in the supply chain is not 
economical unless the misrepresentation situation is severe. Exactly how to distribute testing in 
25 
 
deliveries and keep it responsive to system and information feedback is an essential issue         
for future wheat handlers. In light of this, there are important operational issues to consider, 
including the decision about the optimal location to test, how intensively to test, appropriate 
penalty levels, feasibility of traceability, and so on.  
A significant logistical challenge lies in the issue of accountability. The CGC (2010) identified 
accountability as being a critical success factor for grain handling. Just as Transportation Canada 
(2010) noted, a lack of accountability has been a major drawback in operating and regulatory 
environments. While it is relatively easy to describe a VED system and propose that each 
participant in the grain handling system will be held accountable for any variety or quality 
problems, actual implementation of such a system faces great challenges. In this regard, AAFC 
(1998) proposed that accountability can be achieved through direct contracting with an enforced 
financial penalty agreed upon by the relative parties in the case of underperformance. The latter 
policy should motivate supply chain participants to manage risks and accept losses when it 
occurs. 
The mechanism to enforce accountability under VED needs some effort to develop. The CGC 
(2003) proposed that such a mechanism could be government regulated: the party who is 
damaged by the misrepresentation of grain would be permitted to sue the party who 
misrepresented the grain, or the mechanism could be industry self-regulated through litigation or 
possible arbitration. Any legislation would need to specify penalties for misrepresentation of 
grain deliveries. From an economic incentive perspective, a penalty system could motivate 
handler effort on controlling wheat handling risks but a liability system cannot (Gray, 2010). In 
fact, a penalty system would make handlers share the losses from farmer misrepresentation while 
a liability system would make such losses unconditionally covered by offenders. Thus, handlers 
have no economic incentive to prevent farmer’s misrepresentation at all in a liability system. Of 
course, in a penalty system, the penalty cannot be unbounded but would need to be carefully 
regulated. Note that if handlers feel free to set the penalty imposed on an offender so that the 
contamination losses from misrepresentation can be covered completely, a penalty system will 
provide no economic incentives on handlers for risk control, similar to the liability system. 
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It is expected that more industry level discussion will take place in order to decide upon 
strategies to handle wheat under VED. When making such decisions, an emphasis should be 
placed on the potential impact that individual decisions may have on other portions of the wheat 
quality system and supply chain. Hopefully, in this way, an appropriate balance can be found 
under VED between maintaining Canada’s high reputation for wheat quality and keeping 
logistical costs down.  
The primary economic incentive behind participant behaviors in this supply chain is the pursuit 
of cost minimization (or profit maximization). Participants’ risk management behaviors are 
influenced by moral hazard because there are costs involved in their segregation efforts, making 
an individual participant’s objective inconsistent with the greater objective of grain quality 
assurance. In the next chapter, a set of analytic models are developed in order to examine how 
and to what extent participant behaviors are governed by rules of cost minimization. 
Analytically, I examine how producers respond to a changeable environment, e.g. testing 
intensity and penalties for offences, and how elevator operators allocate testing among producers 
corresponding to commingling risks and potential losses associated with a VED system, i.e. a 
farmer’s misrepresentation probability, as well as a contamination penalty served by the terminal 
operators. These analyses provide a framework which enables us to develop better methods of 
providing participants with correct incentives for contributing to the overall security of the wheat 
handling system.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 A WHEAT SUPPLY CHAIN OPERATING UNDER VED:  
AN ANALYTICAPPROACH 
 
3.1 Introduction   
Pressures for adopting VED come from concerns about potential increases in commingling 
problems stemming from the introduction of visually indistinguishable wheat varieties. These 
varieties could be unregistered ones which have already brought problems to wheat handling 
during the KVD era, or else other varieties that have been introduced or may be introduced in the 
future. By removing the variety registration requirement for KVD, new classes of wheat with 
new varieties or new varieties designated as the existing classes of wheat could be introduced to 
enable additional sales in new markets without requiring that they actually look any different 
from existing wheat classes. For example, Canadian General Purpose wheat, a newly introduced 
class after KVD was removed, describes varieties that may not be readily distinguished from 
other varieties within other classes of wheat. Visual indistinguishability increases the likelihood 
of (intentional or unintentional) misrepresentation of a variety by farmers or other industry 
participants. Simply put, a wheat variety of low quality could potentially be misrepresented as a 
variety with higher quality if they are not somehow readily (visually) distinguishable from each 
other. Facing this challenge, it has become essential to develop efficient handling strategies for 
grain safety and quality assurance.   
From an economic perspective, the supply chain participants’ objective is profit maximization 
(or cost minimization). Generally, it is assumed that mitigating wheat risks facilitates the 
reduction of handling costs. But any risk mitigation will only be achieved through additional 
supply chain participant efforts, which generate costs. Thus there is a fundamental tradeoff 
between effort and the risks confronting participants. In light of this, there are important 
operational issues within the grain supply chain, including farmer’s choice of risk control efforts, 
handlers’ choices on strategies to mitigate contamination risks, as well as how these choices are 
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affected by other factors in the decision process. To clarify these issues, I start by focusing on 
participant cost functions and then solving the respective cost minimization problems.  
Under cost minimization, participant decision making behavior in this situation may be affected 
by moral hazard. Participants’ risk control efforts stemming from incentives may lead to 
deviations from the overall goal of maintaining grain handling system security. One way to 
maintain handling system security is to create an efficient risk sharing scheme that makes a 
participant’s costs rely on the mitigation effort they choose to undertake. To explore ways of 
realizing better grain security thorough risk sharing schemes, we need to solve the problem of 
minimizing the cost functions of various parties in the supply chain. 
In this chapter, what I refer to as a most likely wheat handling system under VED will be 
developed. This permits the development of a set of analytic models based on the objective (cost) 
functions of the farmer and a primary elevator. All the elements of the targeted system, including 
costs and risks at each node of the system, are included in these functions. The functions also 
allow for different combinations of testing points with or without functional mechanisms for 
traceability. More importantly, the solution of the farmer’s objective function indicates how the 
farmer’s risk control effort responds to economic incentives. In turn, the solutions of the primary 
elevator objective functions will identify the best testing strategies at each test point in the 
handling system, as well as provide insight on how other factors influence those testing 
strategies. Since supply chain participants’ behavioral decision-making is affected by moral 
hazard problems which threaten the security of wheat handling, this chapter opens discussion on 
these problems along with potential ways to eliminate them.   
 
3.2 The Objective Functions of Farmers and Primary Elevators  
This study only focuses on the wheat export market of Canadian Western Red Spring wheat 
(CWRS). It is assumed that each farmer is endowed with an amount of land, labor and capital 
which yield a certain production capacity to produce wheat (CWRS, No.1). In turn, farmers are 
responsible for offering documentation and signing product variety declaration when delivering 
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their products to elevator. So it is a farmer’s responsibility to ensure the class of the information 
provided on a signed declaration when delivering the products to the primary elevator is correct.  
With the use of visually indistinguishable varieties in a VED system, farmers could inadvertently 
or intentionally misrepresent the varieties on delivery. If not detected, misrepresented wheat will 
enter the supply chain and contaminate other eligible wheat. In the same way, the primary 
elevator handlers would also misrepresent delivery if contaminated wheat gets delivered to the 
terminal elevator. To avoid economic losses, the primary elevator handlers plan to conduct tests 
at various stages in the supply chain to determine if wheat declared as eligible contains any 
undesirable varieties. It is also assumed that contaminated wheat exceeding the tolerance 
standard will be diverted to other wheat flows, e.g. feed, at the stage where it is found to be 
undesirable in the supply chain. If possible, a traceability mechanism will be enacted to track 
contamination sources upstream in the chain. This will be done by testing retained samples, and 
detected offenders will be penalized.  
3.2.1  Farmer and Handler Misrepresentation Behaviors 
In this analysis, when a non-CWRS delivery is declared as eligible CWRS, misrepresentation 
occurs. In the case of misrepresentation, it would be difficult to identify whether individuals 
misrepresent their deliveries intentionally or not. For simplicity, this study excludes intentional 
misrepresentation from farmers or elevator handlers’ declaration behaviors, so that offenders can 
only unintentionally make the wrong variety declaration. Based on this, the study assumes 
inherent uncertainty for a farmer to deliver eligible wheat.  
The existence of visually indistinguishable varieties other than CWRS could render farmers 
confused about the varieties they actually grow, and then these varieties could be mistakenly 
misrepresented at the primary elevator if farmers believe they are CWRS. In addition, it is 
assumed that each farmer potentially misrepresents the deliveries with certain likelihood and the 
level of this probability is determined by the amount of risk control effort, plus the level of 
farmer risk control technology. Formally, a farmer j’s misrepresentation rate at year T is defined 
as a function of the risk control effort and the risk control technology as given below,  
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(3-1) 
where T=1, 2, 3…N, and j=1~n. Note that a higher value of c indicates a higher level of effort 
and a lower value of k indicates a higher level of technology. 
Risk control effort is effectively a measure of the resources a farmer puts into risk control for 
avoiding the problem of misrepresentation. This could be in the form of time, labour, capital or 
facility investment in on-farm practices for preventing commingling. Risk control effort has a 
negative relationship with the misrepresentation rate - the higher the risk control effort, the more 
accurately the farmer understands the variety of wheat grown, and the lower the probability that 
the farmer will misrepresent grain delivery. Risk control technology is a signal of the capacity a 
farmer has to control the risks of misrepresentation. Such technology might cover a broad range 
of factors, including the technique of accurately recording on-farm practices, knowledge about 
distinguishing among wheat varieties produced, collecting other information about risk control, 
ability to learn from experience, and so on. A farmer’s technology level is negatively related 
with the probability that the farmer misunderstands the wheat variety actually grown.  
If a farmer’s misrepresented deliveries are not detected and are unloaded in primary elevator 
bins, wheat in those bins will be contaminated by an undesired wheat variety. Handling errors 
can also lead to contamination. Handlers will misrepresent their railcar deliveries if contaminated 
wheat is not detected when those railcars are loaded at the primary elevator.  
3.2.2 Wheat Handling System Involved in This Study 
When wheat is delivered to the primary elevator, several potential events may occur in sequence. 
These can include: (1) handlers take representative wheat samples from trucks, (2) samples may 
or may not be tested, (3) wheat is unloaded from trucks, (4) wheat is stored in large bins in the 
elevator, (5) bins are sampled, (6) bin samples may be tested before loading, (7) wheat is loaded 
on railcars for shipment to the terminal elevator, (8) rail cars are sampled, (9) rail cars may be 
tested after leaving the elevator but before loading at a terminal elevator. Under VED, if bin 
contamination or railcar contamination is detected, traceability mechanisms are activated to 
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identify the source of contamination. Note that wheat segregation issues that might arise beyond 
the terminal elevator are not captured in this study.  
Figure 3.1 shows a stylized wheat handling system as assumed in this study. Here, there are three 
potential test points under the proposed system under VED. These are: (1) a truck test before 
unloading wheat into primary elevator bins; (2) a primary elevator bin test before loading wheat 
into railcars; (3) a railcar test before loading wheat into the terminal elevator bins. In addition, 
there are two points where a traceability mechanism appears to be necessary - (1) contaminations 
detected at test point 2; (2) contaminations detected at test point 3. 
 
If a misrepresented delivery is detected by the primary elevator, either through direct truck 
sample testing or contamination tracing, the delivered products will be downgraded, perhaps 
even to feed grade with a much lower price
7
. A formal penalty will be imposed on the offender if 
misrepresentation results in contamination losses to handlers. It is assumed that the penalty 
amount increases with the volume of misrepresented wheat and the contamination loss resulting 
from misrepresentation. 
Critically, due to the high cost of sample testing, there is a tradeoff between test costs and 
contamination detection. To maximize expected profits, the primary elevator handlers may not 
test farmer deliveries or elevator bins with a fixed test rate. Ideally, an efficient test strategy 
should account for sampling and testing costs along with the potential benefits resulting from 
testing and traceability.  
                                                          
7
 The tolerance level for other classes or varieties in CWRS for various grades is provided in Appendix H. The price 
difference by grade for the CWRS, 13.5% protein is provided in Appendix I.  
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Figure 3.1 Testing and Tracing Points in a Stylized Wheat Handling System 
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At test point 1, the handlers sample wheat from farmer’s deliveries, possibly testing deliveries to 
evaluate whether the variety and quality of tested wheat is consistent with the declaration. If a 
farmer inaccurately represents the delivery and it is tested by elevators, the misrepresentation is 
exposed and the misrepresented wheat will be downgraded. It is possible that primary elevators 
will impose a penalty on the offender, regardless of whether the misrepresentation of wheat 
actually resulted in any actual financial damage. 
If the misrepresented delivery is not tested, misrepresentation will not be found, and then this 
misrepresented wheat will be unloaded in the primary bin and blended with other eligible wheat 
in the bin. This contaminates wheat in the whole bin, potentially lowering the assessed wheat 
quality of the bin. The primary elevator bin test (at test point 2) occurs at the time when the 
primary elevator is loading railcars to deliver wheat to the terminal elevator. The primary 
elevator handlers possibly test bins before loading railcars. If there is any contamination 
detected, the primary elevator is likely to trace it back to farmers to identify the contamination 
source through testing the retained samples. If any delivery misrepresentation is detected through 
sample testing, handlers will impose a penalty on the offender.  
In a situation where contaminated bins are not detected and contaminated wheat is loaded in 
railcars and delivered to the terminal elevator, the primary elevator is misrepresenting some 
railcar deliveries. If there are misrepresented railcars detected by the terminal elevator’s testing 
for railcars (at test point 3), the primary elevator will suffer price reductions plus any additional 
fines imposed by the terminal elevators. The primary elevator can either be the final underwriter 
of the total system loss or instead trace it back to farmers to find the offenders. In the latter case, 
any offender detected through traceability will be penalized.  
In this study, we assume that a penalty system will be applied in the case of traceability. Any 
retrieved loss from tracing (penalty) will only partly cover the contamination loss. Recall that if 
all the contamination loss can be covered completely through tracing (for example, in a liability 
system), the handlers will have no incentive to perform tests on truck deliveries or primary 
elevator bins for mitigating contamination risks during handling. 
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3.2.3 Farmer and the Primary Elevator  Objective Functions  
As mentioned previously, to model farmer and handler incentives to mitigate wheat production 
and handling risks, the analysis needs to start by constructing the farmer’s cost objective function 
and the primary elevator’s cost objective function. 
The objective cost functions are based on the following assumptions: 
1. A farmer’s wheat deliveries are consistent throughout a year, and they are either eligible 
CWRS or non-CWRS (CWRS is the most common type of wheat grown in Canada and 
will be used as the base variety here). 
2. Test accuracy is 100%8.  
3. There are no contamination sources other than farmer’s misrepresentation. 
4. There is no intentional misrepresentation. Farmers make declarations based on their 
honest, sometimes incorrect, perception of the variety being delivered. 
5. The waiting time for truck or railcar sample testing does not incur any costs on related 
parties.  
6.  For a system with a traceability mechanism, traceability will be enacted when there is any 
contamination detected at any test point. 
7.  A penalty system will be applied in the case of an offence and the penalty can be 
perfectly enforced without costs. 
8. When computing costs, the model does not allow for a farmer or a handler’s insurance 
obtained against loss or damage from misrepresentation.  
9. Handlers have perfect information about a farmer’s behavior pattern.  
The analysis of the farmer and the primary elevator’s objective functions and optimal solutions 
will be based on possible operation combinations. There are four cases examined:  
Case 1: tests on railcars are included (test point 3).               
Case 2: tests on trucks and test on railcars are included (test points 1 and 3). 
                                                          
8
 A current testing technique called polyacryamide gel electrophoresis (PAGE) can “fingerprint” grain varieties 
while allowing for a range of accuracy levels up to 98% (CBH, 2012). The test costs vary WITH test accuracies. To 
improve testing efficiency, A handler may choose tests with different accuracies at different stages of the supply 
chain. For example, handlers may increase the accuracy (and the cost) of sample testing as getting closer to the end-
use customer (Furtan, 2003). Due to the effects of testing accuracy on testing strategies, this assumption needs to be 
relaxed in future research on this topic.   
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Case 3: tests on bins and tests on railcars are included (test points 2 and 3). 
Case 4: tests on trucks, tests on bins and tests on railcars are included (test points 1, 2 and 3). 
In addition, two different situations are considered in each case, 
(a) There is no traceability. 
(b) There is traceability.   
If there is traceability involved, sampling will occur at each test point and representative samples 
will be retained for tracing. If there is no traceability involved (case (b)), sampling will be only 
for testing purposes, and no sample is retained for traceability while sample retention costs are 
saved. 
3.2.3.1 Case 1: One Test Point - Test Point 3 
We start with the simplest case where only a terminal test is considered. The only test point is 
located at the terminal elevator where the railcars will be tested before loading wheat into 
terminal bins. There is no testing through the previous stages of the supply chain.  
Objective functions and their solutions for case 1 are developed as follows: 
(a) In case 1, even if contamination is detected at the terminal elevator, no traceability is 
activated. In turn, it is assumed that the farmer’s risk control effort is convertible to a monetary 
equivalent and that effort is a function of farmer’s misrepresentation rate. The farmer’s objective 
function becomes
9
: 
11 qcJ e                                                                                                                                     (3-2) 
That is, a farmer’s choice about the level of risk control effort has nothing to do with the primary 
elevator and the terminal elevator’s handling strategies. The farmer is completely isolated from 
detection risk and thus has no incentive to put any effort on preventing misrepresentation risks. 
As a result, the wheat handling system would likely be exposed to the highest commingling risks 
from farmer misrepresentations. 
The primary elevator’s expected handling cost is: 
                                                          
9
 Refer to the table of notation for symbol description.  
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 itiiip qnmfJ )(32                                                                                                             (3-3)  
In this case, the primary elevator handlers do not sample and test deliveries of farmers. They 
save money on sampling, testing and sample retention. Since there is no testing at either test 
point 1 or test point 2, all farmer misrepresented deliveries will enter the supply chain and 
contaminate other eligible wheat in the system, and all contaminated wheat will be delivered to 
the terminal elevator. The primary elevator losses become apparent in the railcars of 
misrepresented wheat that are detected at the terminal elevator. In this context, there are no 
control variables for the primary elevator, and the primary elevator has to absorb all the losses 
resulting from wheat contamination. 
(b) Under the condition that a traceability mechanism is available, if there is any detected 
contamination, the primary elevator will trace back upstream in the supply chain to identify 
offenders and penalize them. In this case, the farmer’s expected cost is, 
                                                                                                        (3-4) 
Minimizing the farmer’s objective function, the first order condition with respect to the farmer’s 
misrepresentation probability  is:  
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Compared with case (a), the terminal elevator’s test rate on railcars and the related penalty will 
now affect the farmer’s risk control effort choice. A farmer’s effort choice is determined by f3, 
the penalty for an offender detected by tracing railcar contamination, and t, the terminal 
elevator’s test rate on railcars. The railcar test rate determines the probability of detecting 
misrepresented railcars and thus determines the probability of identifying traceability offences. 
The primary elevator’s objective function is:  
1131 )( qcqnfJ et  
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When compared with the cost function without traceability, this function contains sample 
retention costs, traceability costs as well as retrieved loss (penalty) from tracing. 
Since there is no testing at test point 1, the primary elevator bins will unavoidably be 
contaminated if there are misrepresented truck deliveries. The absence of testing at point 2 leaves 
any contaminated wheat undetected until it is moved to the terminal elevator. Contamination 
losses can be partially covered by penalties collected from offenders through traceability. 
Traceability can be enacted by detected misrepresented railcars at the terminal elevator. Through 
referring to related documentation and retention samples, handlers can ultimately target 
offenders. Obviously, farmer misrepresentation incentives can be reduced if traceability 
deterrence can be enhanced through either increasing the tracing probability or imposing a higher 
penalty on offenders.  
3.2.3.2 Case 2: Two Test Points - Test Points 1 and 3 
In this case, a combination of two test points is considered. These are a test before the primary 
elevator and a test at the terminal elevator. There is no bin testing in this case.  
The objective functions and their solutions for case 2 are as follows: 
(a) If there is no traceability associated with the second test, the farmer’s cost function is: 
1111 qcqfJ e                                                                                                                       (3-8) 
The first order condition taken with respect to  is: 
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Then, 
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Equation 3-10 shows that farmer misrepresentation rate has a negative relationship with the 
primary elevator’s test rate and the penalty level for misrepresentation. Using equation 3-10, 
Figure 3.2 illustrates how  (on the Z-axis), the misrepresentation rate for farmer with risk 
control effort c, responds to the change in value of the test rate  (X-axis) and the penalty f1 (Y-
axis). Note as well that the value of  is located in the interval (0,1] and the value of f1 is located 
in (0,10]. In the situation when k=0.5, that resulted in [0.05,1]. 
In the situation where the test rate  or penalty level f1 are close to zero,  is then equal to 1 or 
very close to 1, meaning that the farmer has few or no incentives to prevent misrepresentation. 
When the elevator operates with a higher test rate or penalty level, farmers would prefer to put in 
more effort to mitigate contamination risks, thus lowering their misrepresentation probability. 
From this point of view, a high penalty level combined with a low test rate can have the same 
effect on lowering farmer misrepresentation rate as a high test rate combined with a low penalty 
level. 
 
By way of comparison, the primary elevator’s cost objective function is:  
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 (3-11) 
 
Figure 3.2 Farmer’s Misrepresentation Response to Test Rate and Penalty Level  
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With a first order condition with respect to , 
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Under a perfect information assumption (see assumption 9 above), handlers know the farmer’s 
cost function and also know the farmer’s response pattern to testing. In this instance,  
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And after appropriate replacement,  
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(3-14) 
When there is no traceability, the primary elevator’s test rate is positively related to t, the 
terminal elevator’s test rate for railcars, fp3, the penalty level for detected misrepresented railcars, 
and m, the contamination multiplier. When the values of these three parameters increase, the 
potential loss from misrepresented trucks also grows. Then the best choice for the primary 
elevator handlers is to increase the test rate to prevent misrepresented trucks from entering the 
supply chain. Recall that the test rate is negatively related to c1, the truck sample test cost, so that 
a high test cost can weaken handlers’ economic incentive to test. 
The primary elevator expected handling costs decreases with the level of f1 if there is 
misrepresentation. To start, the penalty level is a deterrent to farmer’s misrepresentation 
behavior, and when the penalty level for detected misrepresentation increases, a farmer would 
prefer to strengthen their effort to avoid possible misrepresentation. A lower misrepresentation 
rate leads to less intensive testing, saving testing costs (the first item in equation 3-11). Second, a 
lower misrepresentation rate lowers the primary elevator’s probability to misrepresent the 
delivery at the primary elevator and thus reduces potential misrepresentation loss (the second 
item in equation 3-11). Third, as mentioned earlier, a farmer always keeps constant the expected 
misrepresentation losses from truck testing (the third item in equation 3-11). Obviously, the 
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primary elevator handlers always prefer a higher penalty level for offences. If this penalty is 
extremely high such that handlers can unconditionally cover their contamination losses, the 
primary elevator’s test rate will approach zero, meaning that handlers will have no incentive to 
prevent misrepresented wheat from entering the handling system. In light of this set of 
conclusions, a penalty system should be preferred to a liability system for supporting grain safety 
and quality assurance in the supply chain. 
(b)When traceability is possible, the farmer’s cost objective function is: 
113111 ))(1( qcqnfqfJ et                                                                                     (3-15) 
And the first order condition with respect to  is: 
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Specially, if =1, 
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(3-18) 
In this situation, we can see that the only factor influencing the farmer’s misrepresentation rate is 
the penalty imposed if detected. If the penalty remains constant, the misrepresentation rate will 
stay constant. 
If 1, a farmer’s misrepresentation rate is negatively related to the primary elevator’s test rate 
and penalty level for farmers. In fact, the differential of misrepresentation rate with respect to 
test rate is: 
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(3-19) 
Thus the relationship between the farmer misrepresentation rate and the primary elevator test rate 
is determined by two factors, f1 and f3 (nt). If a farmer misrepresented a delivery and was 
detected at the truck test before unloading, he or she will suffer a loss f1. If the farmer’s 
misrepresentation was not detected at the truck test, his or her probability of being detected via 
tracing from detected railcar contamination is nt meaning that the expected loss from 
misrepresentation is f3 (nt).  A high value of f1 or a low value of f3 or t can make f1>f3(nt);  
conversely, a low value of f1 or a high value of f3 or t can make f1<f3 (nt). Thus under different 
conditions, a farmer’s best response to the truck testing rate can differ.  
The figure 3.3 illustrates the relationship between marginal misrepresentation rate and test rate. 
For ease of exposition, this particular figure is generated under the condition k=0.5, f1=4, f3=6, 
and nt =0.4, making f1>f3(nt) and  nt=1 so that f1<f3 (nt) respectively. If f1>f3(nt), for 
example, under the condition that the terminal test rate is very low, the value of ’() in equation 
3-18 will be negative, shown as the red line in figure 3.3. Under this condition, the farmer’s 
misrepresentation rate will fall with the primary elevator’s test rate. Thus, when a farmer’s 
penalty of being detected at the truck test point is greater than expected loss of being detected by 
the tracing, truck testing deterrence is greater than the tracing deterrence. In this case if a farmer 
can choose, he or she will prefer being detected through tracing to being detected at the truck 
test. However, if f1<f3 (nt), the conclusions flip in the opposite direction, shown in the blue line 
in the figure. If both terms are equal in value, the primary elevator’s test rate will have no 
influence on the farmer’s misrepresentation rate. In other words, for a farmer who 
misrepresented their deliveries, if the loss from detection at the truck test is the same as the 
expected loss resulting from tracing, they will not care whether they are detected at the truck test 
point or not. 
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To clarify the discussion above, Figure 3.4 shows how the farmer’s misrepresentation rate 
responds to the change in primary elevator test rate and the change in penalty provided by the 
primary elevator to farmer (equation 3-17). For ease of exposition, Figure 3.4 was created under 
the conditions that k=0.5, f3=6, nt =0.4, (0.04,1) and f1(1.1,10.7). 
 
For example, when the penalty level f1 equals 2.4 (the red line on figure 3.4), f1=f3 (nt), making 
’()=0. When the penalty is fixed at 2.4 units, the primary elevator’s test rate will have no 
influence on farmer’s risk control effort. That is, under such a condition, a farmer will not care 
               
              
 
Figure 3.3 Relation between Farmer’s Marginal Misrepresentation Rate and Test Rate 
Figure 3.4 Relationship between Farmer’s Misrepresentation Rate,  
Test Rate and Penalty Level 
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whether he or she is detected at the truck test or at the tracing activated by detected 
contamination. When f1>2.4, which in turn makes f1>f3(nt), a farmer’s misrepresentation rate 
will decrease with the test rate; when f1<2.4, which makes f1<f3(nt), a farmer’s 
misrepresentation rate will increase with test rate. Clearly, a high penalty level reduces the 
farmer’s incentives to misrepresent the deliveries. Figure 3.4 also shows that the marginal 
penalty effect is more significant when the primary elevator’s testing level is higher. 
When traceability is involved, the primary elevator’s cost objective function becomes:  
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The first order condition with respect to  is:  
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And as we can see,  
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So after replacement,   
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Thus the primary elevator’s optimal test rate is negatively related to the truck sample test cost c1,  
and is positively related with fp3, the penalty imposed on railcars detected by the terminal 
elevator and m, the contamination multiplier. To illustrate, the relationship between the test rate 
 and f1, the penalty imposed on detected trucks at test point 1, or f3, the penalty on the farmer 
who misrepresented and was subsequently detected at the second tracing, is shown in Figure 3.5. 
For ease of exposition, the figure is generated under the conditions that k=0.5, m=6, c1=0.4, 
fp3=5, nt =0.3, f1(3.4,6.6) and f3(5.6,8.2). The resulting test rate [0.37,0.72], shows that 
under above given conditions, the optimized way of testing is to test truck deliveries 
proportionally, with testing intensity influenced by the levels of the penalties f1 
and f3. 
 
The change in f1, the penalty level for a detected truck, has two effects on . On one hand, when 
f1 increases,  should increase for more penalty collections from farmers. On the other hand, the 
increase in  allows for the penalty to affect farmer misrepresentation behavior. An increase in f1 
leads to a lower farmer misrepresentation rate, and accordingly, the test rate for the farmer 
should be reduced. Under the given range for penalties in this case, the latter effect dominates the 
former, meaning that the primary elevator’s test rate decreases with f1. 
In the same way, the change in f3 also has two effects on the primary elevator’s test rate. First, 
when f3 increases, the deterrence to the farmer will increase and less testing on truck deliveries 
will be necessary. Second, the increase in f3 increases the possible penalty collection from tracing 
 
Figure 3.5 Response of Test Rate to Changes in Penalty Levels 
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and so decreases the primary elevator’s incentive to test truck deliveries. These two effects work 
in the same direction, making the primary elevator’s test rate decrease with f3. When f3 can be set 
extremely high so that any contamination losses are completely covered by imposed penalties on 
offenders, handlers again will lose their incentive to test any farmer deliveries. Under this 
extreme situation, it is clear that quality cannot be assured. From this perspective, an appropriate 
penalty level for any detected offence is essential to maintain handlers’ incentives for 
contributing to grain handling quality. 
3.2.3.3 Case 3: Two Test Points - Test Points 2 and 3 
In this case, another combination of two testing points consisting of the primary elevator bin test 
and a railcar test at the terminal are considered.  
Writing out the objective functions and their solutions for case 3: 
(a) If there is no traceability, the farmer’s objective function becomes:  
11 qcJ e                                                                                                                                   
(3-25) 
which is the same as case 1 (a), meaning that if there is no traceability involved, a farmer will not 
suffer any loss from the misrepresentation. Intuitively, the farmer will take the lowest risk 
control effort which can result in a high misrepresentation probability.  
The primary elevator’s objective function in this case is: 
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(3-26) 
The first order condition with respect to the elevator bin test rate b is:  
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(b) The primary elevator can trace back to find offenders if contamination is detected. The 
farmer’s objective function becomes: 
113121 ))(1( qcqnfqfJ etbb                                                                                  (3-28) 
In order to minimize J1, the first order condition with respect to  is:  
0]))(1([ 132
1 


q
k
nff
J
tbb



                                                                             (3-29) 
then,  
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meaning that when b1, the farmer’s misrepresentation rate is negatively related to the penalty 
level and the terminal elevator’s test rate on the farmer.  
If b=1, 
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When the primary elevator handlers undertake a complete test on bins before loading railcars, all 
contaminated bins will be found and thus all misrepresented farmers will be detected and traced 
and there will be no misrepresented railcars at the terminal. In this situation, the terminal 
elevator’s testing on railcars will have no relation to farmer benefits. So farmers will only care 
about the penalty level for offenders detected through bin contamination tracing. If the penalty 
stays constant, the farmer’s misrepresentation rate will stay constant.  
The differential of misrepresentation rate with respect to bin test rate is: 
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so that the relationship between the farmer’s misrepresentation rate and the primary elevator 
bin’s test rate is determined by both the value of f2, the penalty from misrepresentation detected 
at tracing resulting from detected contamination at the primary elevator bins, and the value of  
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f3(nt), the farmer’s expected loss from misrepresentation detected at tracing resulting from 
detected railcars at the terminal elevator if misrepresentation went undetected at the bin test.  
Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between the marginal misrepresentation rate and primary bin 
test rate. For ease of exposition, this figure is generated under the conditions k=0.5, f2=5 f3=6, 
and nt =0.4, making f2>f3(nt) and nt =1, making f2<f3(nt)  respectively. Note that if f2>f3(nt), 
the value of ’(b)  in equation 3-30 will be negative. Under this condition, the farmer’s 
misrepresentation rate falls with the primary elevator bin’s test rate, shown by the red line in 
figure 3.6. However, if f2<f3(nt), this will switch as indicated by the blue line in Figure 3.6. If 
both terms are equal in value, the primary elevator’s test rate will have no influence on the 
farmer’s misrepresentation rate. In this latter case, when other variables remain unchanged, the 
farmer’s misrepresentation rate will stay constant even if the bin test rate increases or decreases.  
 
Figure 3.7 shows how the farmer’s marginal misrepresentation rate corresponds to the change in 
primary elevator bin test rate and the change in penalty charged by the primary elevator on the 
farmer when traceability was enacted (equation 3-30). For ease of exposition, Figure 3.7 was 
created using the conditions k=0.5, f3=6, nt =0.4, b(0.04,1) and f2(0.1,9.7). We can see that 
when the penalty level f2 equals 2.4 (the red line on figure 3.7), f2= f3 (nt), making 
’
()=0.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Relationship between Farmer’s Marginal Misrepresentation Rate 
and Primary Elevator’s Bin Test Rate 
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When the penalty is fixed at 2.4 dollars/bushel, the primary elevator’s test rate will have no 
influence on farmer’s risk control effort. Under such a condition, a farmer will not care whether 
he or she is detected at the truck test or at the tracing activated by the detected contamination. 
When f2>2.4, which in turn makes f2>f3(nt), the farmer’s misrepresentation rate will decrease 
with the bin test rate; and when f2<2.4, which in turn makes f2<f3(nt), the farmer’s 
misrepresentation rate will increase with the bin test rate. 
The primary elevator’s objective function in this situation is: 
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To minimize J2, we derive the first order condition with respect to b: 
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So that, 
Figure 3.7 Relationship between Farmer’s Misrepresentation 
Rate, Bin Test Rate and Penalty Level 
 
48 
 
'
22133
'
222
' )]())([(
)(
1
iipiiipiti
iipi
i
i
b
ffmmcffmbn
ffmc







                                                 (3-35) 
From the above we see that:  
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And after replacement,   
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Figure 3.8 below shows the change in  corresponding to changes in f2, the penalty for offenders 
detected at bin contamination tracing, and f3, the penalty for offenders detected at the railcar 
contamination tracing. For ease of exposition, the figure is generated under conditions k=0.1, 
m=6, f3=5, c1=0.3, c2=0.1, nt =0.3, f2(4.0,8.8) and f3(5.1,9.9). The resulting test rate is 
(0,0.47). 
Under the specified ranges for penalties in this case, the primary elevator’s testing incentive 
increases with f2 if f3 is at a high level (accompanied by a low level of test rate in Figure 3.8). If f3 
is at a low level (accompanied by a high level of test rate), the testing incentive increases with f2 
when f2 is at a low level and then decreases with f2 when f2 is high. The reason for this is the same 
as that for case 2 (b) – the increase in penalty has two effects on testing incentives: while penalty 
collection generates more incentives to test, the increase in the penalty has a negative impact on 
the farmer’s misrepresentation rate, reducing incentives for testing. If the former effect 
dominates the latter one, an increase in testing intensity is a better choice for handlers, and vice 
versa. 
49 
 
 
In this case, the test rate always decreases with the penalty f3 under the given range of the 
penalty. Just as Figure 3.8 shows, when this penalty reaches a high enough level so that it can 
cover the losses resulting from detected railcar contamination, primary elevator handlers will 
have no incentives to perform any bin testing for the purpose of preventing mix-ups.  
3.2.3.4 Case 4: Three Test Points - Test Points 1, 2 and 3  
In this case, three test points are considered. These consist of tests before and after the primary 
elevator, and tests at the terminal. 
The objective functions for case 4 are the following: 
(a) If there is no traceability at the bin test and terminal test points, the farmer’s objective 
function is the same as that in case 2 (a):  
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The first order condition with respect to   is: 
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Figure 3.8 Relationship between Test Rate and Traceability Penalty 
50 
 
Then, 
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In turn, the primary elevator’s objective function is: 
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The first order condition with respect to  is: 
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which is same as in case 3 (a), where the b equals either 1 or 0. And when b =1, 
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And when b =0, 
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(b) If there is traceability in the system, the farmer’s objective function becomes: 
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The first order condition with respect to  is:     
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So that, 
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(3-48) 
Clearly, the farmer misrepresentation rate has a negative relationship with the penalty level for 
offenders and the terminal elevator test rate for railcars. With respect to other variables, this 
relationship can be shown as follows:  
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If the fine associated with detected misrepresentation from the truck test is less than the sum total 
of the expected loss from the primary elevator bin contamination tracing and the railcar 
contamination tracing if the misrepresentation was left undetected at the truck test, i.e. 
))(1(321 tbb nfff   , the farmer’s misrepresentation rate will grow with the primary 
elevator’s test rate, and vice versa.  
The partial derivative of  with respect to b is: 
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Again, under different situations, the farmer’s misrepresentation rate can have varying 
relationships with the test rate for the primary elevator bin. If the farmer’s expected tracing 
penalty stemming from the bin test is greater than that from the railcar contamination tracing, i.e. 
))(1()1( 32 tnff   , the farmer’s misrepresentation rate will be negatively related to the 
primary elevator bin’s test rate, and vice versa.  
The first order condition with respect to c, 
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(3-52) 
Thus the farmer’s desired risk control efforts now have a positive relationship with the penalty 
level. A severe penalty level makes farmers exert more effort to keep a lower misrepresentation 
rate. The effort is also positively related to the terminal elevator’s test rate because traceability 
puts a deterrent on farmers. The relationships between the farmer’s efforts, and the truck test rate 
 or the primary bin test b rate are determined by values of the other parameters in this case.  
The primary elevator’s objective function is (also refer to Appendix B for a detailed description 
of this function): 
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Solving for the optimal test rate for farmer i to minimize J2, 
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So, 
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After replacement, 
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where       
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))(1(321 tbibii nfffB                                                                                              (3-58) 
To obtain the optimal test rate , we need to work out the bin test rateb. To start, we find the 
optimal test rate on primary elevator bins that minimizes J2: 
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So that,  
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And after replacement,  
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After replacing b in equation 3-56, the optimal solution 
*
 can be found. Subsequently, by 
replacing * in equation 3-61, the optimal solution for b 
can be obtained. Because the process of 
deduction is algebraically difficult, the general solutions for the optimal test rate will not be 
derived here. Instead, using given parameter and variable values, the cost optimization problem 
can be shown easily. For example, under the conditions that k=0.1, m=6, c1=0.3, c2=0.1, nt =1, 
fp2=4,  fp3=5,  f1=4,  f2=10 and f3=12, the solutions for equations 3-56 and 3-61 are:  
 
 
 
meaning that the optimal solution for the test rate is: 
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based on equation 3-48, with a corresponding farmer’s misrepresentation rate of 011.0*  . 
Theoretically, each testing scheme developed above would be optimal for primary elevator 
handlers with respect to a specific combination of test points with or without traceability. And 
the distribution of costs among participants changes from case to case. However, if there are 
certain values of interest for variables and parameters, these results can help identify the system 
cost distribution between farmers and elevators and then determine which test scheme would be 
preferred by primary elevator handlers for minimizing their handling costs. 
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3.3 Moral Hazard and Incentives 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Since a supply chain participant’s risk control effort is related to costs, there is a trade-off 
between supply chain participant costs and risks. In this context, the farmer and handler decision 
making process is unavoidably affected by moral hazard. 
Moral hazard is common in cases of asymmetric information between participants in a 
transaction. Examples commonly include insurance, labor contracting and the delegation of 
decision-making responsibility. Generally, moral hazard may occur if a party that is insulated 
from risk has more information about its actions and intentions than the party paying for the 
negative consequences of the risk. The party insulated from risk may behave more recklessly 
than it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk. Holmstrom (1979) stated that the 
problem of moral hazard may arise when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions 
such that their privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of outcome. Kreps 
(1990) considered moral hazard in a circumstance where one party to a transaction may 
undertake certain actions that affect the other party’s valuation of the transaction but the second 
party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly. Foster (1994) further defined moral hazard applied to the 
labor market in a way that the amount of an input supplied by a worker to a task will depend 
positively on the extent to which that input is rewarded. When discussing agri-environmental 
policy modeled as a social welfare maximization problem, Ozanne (2001) recognized the 
potential trade-off between increased environmental benefit and increased cost of monitoring 
compliance. He stated that moral hazard arises in a situation where the conservation authority 
cannot verify perfectly that all farmers participating in a scheme are fully abiding by their 
contractual obligations, i.e. monitoring is imperfect. This provides farmers with an incentive to 
renege on their contracts, for if they are successful in avoiding detection by the conservation 
authority, they can receive the compensation payment without incurring the costs implied by 
their contractual obligations. In fact, Ozanne’s particular topical definition of moral hazard is 
more suitably applied in this study.  
Moral hazard situations are very common in agriculture. Foster (1994) established a method for 
testing for the existence of moral hazard in a labour market. Their findings offer evidence that 
56 
 
workers supply more effort under a piece-rate payment scheme or in self-cultivation on their own 
land compared to time-wage employment. Ghatak (2000) provided more evidence from farm-
level data showing that both the mean and the variance of output will be greater in farms that are 
cultivated under fixed rent contracts as opposed to sharecropping contracts. Finally, Alexander 
(1999) compared producer’s efforts on improving tomato quality under different contractual 
schemes. His evidence shows the pervasiveness of moral hazard: in agriculture, producers put 
more effort into producing high quality product under a price incentive contract than under a 
fixed price contract.  
A number of authors have explored solutions for specific moral hazard problems. Many of those 
studies have been concerned with what has become known as the principal-agent problem. 
Holmstrom (1979) used a model to discuss the role of imperfect information in a principal-agent 
relationship subject to the moral hazard problem. A necessary and sufficient condition for 
imperfect information to improve in contracts based on the payoff alone is derived and a 
characterization of the optimal use of such information is given. By creating additional 
information systems or by using other available information about the agent’s action or the state 
of nature, contracts can be improved. Hueth (1999) examined the structure of contractual 
relations between growers and first handlers in fruit and vegetable markets. When there are 
asymmetry of information problems resulting in moral hazard in the provision of fruit or 
vegetable quality, a set of incentive instruments, e.g. input control, monitoring, measuring and 
price risk, could be used to coordinate relations between growers and intermediaries and alleviate 
the moral hazard problem. The author provides evidence from California about how these 
instruments are employed.  
Taken together, these studies provide insight on how to alleviate the moral hazard problem 
through risk sharing adjustments. All those studies emphasize as well that proper monitoring is 
usually an effective method to solve or alleviate moral hazard problems. However, none of the 
studies referenced established the mathematical relationship between agent input efforts and the 
strength of contract incentives. In addition, they did not assess the level of moral hazard under 
specific incentive mechanisms nor offer a clear picture of the trade-off between incentives and 
moral hazard. So the measures suggested to alleviate moral hazard are often ambiguous instead 
of explicit and practical.  
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In this study, the primary elevator’s variety test on deliveries provides producers direct 
incentives to put efforts on controlling misrepresentation risks. The producers’ compensation 
depends on their success at the assigned task: delivering an eligible variety of product. If the 
primary elevator handlers detect a variety of wheat that is undesirable, they will refuse to pay the 
contractual price but a discounted price instead and possibly also impose a penalty on offenders 
for any contamination which results. If handlers do not undertake complete testing on each 
delivery, it is possible that a misrepresented delivery will not be identified. The producer may 
take advantage of incomplete testing by reducing their effort at ensuring varietal eligibility. As a 
result, the primary elevator will commonly share the contamination risks resulting from such 
reduction of effort, creating moral hazard problems. In the same way, a moral hazard problem 
can also affect the decision making behavior and effort of primary elevator handlers in a 
situation where the terminal elevator undertakes incomplete testing on their railcar deliveries.  
Of course, the optimal solution identified under moral hazard is not first-best
10
. There are two 
reasons for this. First, resources need to be spent on monitoring. Second, misrepresentation 
attributable to lack of effort may lead to contamination and thus economic loss. The first-best 
solution can only be obtained in a circumstance where moral hazard is absent.  
3.3.2 Moral Hazard under Free Testing 
To maximize own profit, a farmer in the VED world intends to put less effort than the socially 
optimal level if there is a non-vanishing probability that the  (misrepresented) delivery will not 
be tested (detected) or that the penalty level is less than the appropriation. In all cases, perfect 
monitoring and enforcement may be impossible, resulting in an imperfect risk sharing scheme 
and making the moral hazard issue part of the farmer’s decision making behavior.  
When misrepresented wheat enters the supply chain, wheat quality loss will result and wheat 
handling costs will increase. The increased cost will be ultimately shared among the supply chain 
participants. Under a condition of known misrepresentation, to ensure the safety of the wheat 
supply chain, elevator handlers must monitor farmer behavior. In this study, monitoring 
                                                          
10
 When the moral hazard problem is identified with the Principal-Agent model, the first-best situation is defined by 
the assumption that the principal can observe the Agent’s action. In that case he can order the Agent to choose the 
efficient action, or, equivalently, the Principal can penalize the Agent if he does not choose the efficient action, and 
then choose the prices and penalties that achieve the optimal risk sharing (Salanie, 1997).  
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objectives can only be realized through testing. When a farmer’s misrepresentation is severe, it 
appears that more human and facility resources should be put into testing to avoid contamination 
risks. Undoubtedly, the existence of these moral hazard problems raises costs for wheat handling 
and potentially compromises the overall efficiency of the wheat quality assurance system.  
As discussed, the typical remedy for moral hazard is the introduction of proper incentives. This 
means structuring a scheme so that the agent who undertakes the actions will, in their own best 
interest, take actions that the principal would prefer. If incentives can be effectively designed to 
make the agent with moral hazard bear fully the consequences of the actions, an ideal risk 
sharing scheme is established and the moral hazard problem can be mitigated.  
In the specific case examined in this thesis, the risk sharing relationship between the primary 
elevator and the farmer differ from well-established situations like those between an insurer and 
the person being insured, or a manager of a firm and the worker. The farmer’s risk control effort 
and the primary elevator’s testing intensity directly influence the distribution of risk between 
them. They can control their own fates through seeking the optimal level of risk sharing. 
Although the elevator handler cannot observe the true actions of farmer risk control effort, for 
example, on-farm practices, they can provide incentives through monitoring the outcome of the 
farmer’s action by testing their product, and there is a probability that moral hazard can be 
alleviated or eliminated under specific testing schemes with appropriately chosen penalty levels. 
At one end of the spectrum of possibilities, one (costly) example would be complete testing of 
farmer deliveries.  
If the farmer understands elevator handlers will completely test his or her deliveries and any 
detected misrepresentation will be penalized, he or she would like to substitute putting 
appropriate risk control effort for expecting luck. The appropriate level of effort depends on the 
penalty level set for offenders. Ideally, the penalty should be designed to equal the monetary 
amount of damage resulting from the misrepresented delivery (Gray, 2010). Such a penalty is 
required to eliminate moral hazard when the farmer makes the production decisions on risk 
control effort. Taking the solution from Case (4b) (Section 3.2.3.4) as an example (three test 
locations with traceability), note that when the primary elevator does not perform complete 
testing on all farmer’s deliveries, there exists a moral hazard problem. Under the (heroic and 
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premature) assumption that sample testing is free, the optimal choice of the primary elevator is to 
test each delivery of farmer at the earliest test location, the truck test point. Under these 
conditions, any and all misrepresentations of farmers will be detected. In this case, the farmer’s 
optimal response is (based on equation 3-39),   
1f

 
                                                                                                                                       
(3-62) 
The magnitude of  is determined by f1, the penalty for detected misrepresentation at the truck 
test point. This raises a question: what penalty level can generate incentives for farmers to 
provide mitigation efforts and eliminate moral hazard problems? From the definition of moral 
hazard, one can make the following supposition: when the penalty exactly equals the expected 
damage resulting from farmer misrepresentation, the farmer will put in appropriate effort to 
remove moral hazard. The logic for this conclusion is that if the penalty from the offender must 
cover all the damage made by the misrepresentation, all the misrepresentation risks will be taken 
by the offender. Note also that this penalty should include the cost of sampling and testing. That 
is, the primary elevator should not bear any consequence from misrepresentation. If the penalty 
imposed on offender is less than the resulting damage or say the primary elevator shields against 
some economic loss, the moral hazard problem will arise to affect producer choice decisions 
regarding effort. As a result, there will be an appropriate level of effort that should be offered by 
the producer in a situation in which there is no moral hazard involved.  
Figure 3.9 shows the privately optimal  in which there possibly is a moral hazard problem, and 
* , resulting from the optimal effort level a farmer takes under the condition that there is no 
moral hazard. In this case, the lower the test rate, the more the deviation between the privately 
optimal effort from the one without moral hazard. So when the truck test rate increases, more 
information concerning a farmer’s misrepresentation behavior is perceived and thus moral 
hazard is reduced. The truck test rate changes the distribution of risk sharing between the farmer 
and the primary elevator. Under an assumption of free testing, the test rate will necessarily reach 
100 percent and all misrepresentations will be exposed to detection and penalty. That is, the 
detected farmers will assume full consequences and responsibility for their behavior. Under this 
situation, a well-designed penalty level can provide an incentive for the farmer to eliminate 
moral hazard when making decisions about choosing the effort level on risk control. The optimal 
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incentive under complete testing requires an offender penalty consistent with possible 
misrepresentation damage to the value of the supply chain.   
 
Unfortunately under VED, cheap and effective testing technologies are not available. Sample 
testing is costly and with imperfect precision. Conducting full tests on all farmer deliveries will 
almost certainly not fulfill the primary elevator’s economic objectives. Even if the primary 
elevator tests each farmer delivery under VED, it still cannot be certain all misrepresentations 
will be detected due to imperfect test precision. In both situations, it is unavoidable that the 
primary elevator must bear some risks from farmer misrepresentation. From this point of view, 
the relationship between the farmer and the primary elevator under VED is characterized by 
moral hazard. As mentioned above, the optimal solution to incentive compatibility under moral 
hazard is not first-best in a social welfare sense (Holmstrom, 1977), meaning  that the full 
information and static solutions derived in this chapter all fall under the shadow of moral hazard. 
So they cannot be called the social optimum but are private optimum.  
3.3.3 Moral Hazard under Vertical Integration 
As a matter of fact, there will exist moral hazard as soon as the objectives of the parties differ 
(Salanie, 1997). To pursue the private optimum, parties restrict attention to their own benefit 
without considering the welfare of the whole economy. There is possibly a significant loss of 
economic efficiency as a result of self-interested behavior. Sometimes, it is said that the moral 
hazard problem could be solved by “selling the firm to the agent.” Although this case has little 
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practical interest for this work, from a theoretical respective, this analysis will also explore how 
some degree of vertical integration within the supply chain could help eliminate moral hazard 
problems. 
The idea that vertical integration can eliminate moral hazard problems is not new. Vetter (2002) 
used a credence goods case to demonstrate that vertical integration is one efficient way of 
dealing with the moral hazard problem when monitoring is costly. But the effectiveness of 
integration to eliminate moral hazard can be reduced by freely available monitoring. Holmstrom 
(1982) showed how workers’ ownership of a firm (with the appropriate sharing rule) fully 
eliminates moral hazard problems. Baker (2001) noted integration is efficient in some 
circumstances precisely because integration eliminates moral hazard. These studies showed the 
efficiency of vertical integration on alleviating or eliminating moral hazard problems. 
Consider a case in which homogeneous farmers are the owner of the primary elevator and the 
terminal elevator. Here the meaning of “homogenous” is not only that the farmers have the same 
productivity and technology, but also that they own the same share of the company. The farmer, 
the primary elevator and terminal elevator’s economic objectives, originally somewhat separated, 
are now fully aligned. For simplicity, it is assumed end consumers are perfect monitors about the 
variety of wheat they purchased, i.e. any misrepresented wheat can be precisely detected by 
consumers. Reversing the status of those farmers will reverse their pattern of behavior as well. 
Now the producer responses under two circumstances are discussed: one is that there is no 
testing at any transfer point, and the other is that tests are taken at each transfer point. In both 
circumstances, traceability is not needed because it increases the handling cost. In any case, the 
vertically integrated company should be responsible for any misrepresentation damage. In the 
former circumstance, the cost function for the integrated company is: 
 qmfqcJ pi 4                                                                                                           (3-63)
 
The first order condition with respect to , 
mf
k
p4
                                                                                                                                 (3-64) 
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The term mf p4  just represents the value of penalty or profit loss resulting from detected 
misrepresentation. If the value of this term equals the damage from misrepresentation, the above 
equation indicates the optimal response of the farmer. When knowing one has to fully undertake 
the consequences and responsibilities of one’s action, one will choose one’s efforts without 
moral hazard considerations.  
In this case, the misrepresented wheat cannot be detected until it moves to the farthest point in 
the supply chain. The resulting loss will be greater than that if misrepresented wheat can be 
detected at an earlier point in the supply chain. Compared with the optimal   solved above 
under a private optimum condition (equation 3-62), this optimal  is smaller, indicating a higher 
level of optimal efforts without moral hazard.  
In the second circumstance, there is testing at each wheat transfer point. Then the associated cost 
function is:  
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(3-65) 
Solving for the first order condition with respect to , 
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The denominator represents the possible losses if delivered wheat is misrepresented. The terms 
(fp1+c1), (fp2+c2) and (fp3+c3) represent the exact economic damage if misrepresentation is 
detected at each test location, respectively. If fp4, the penalty imposed on misrepresentation by 
consumers, exactly equals the economic loss from consumer rejection of the misrepresented 
variety, the above equation represents the optimal response of farmers without moral hazard. In 
this case, the test cost plays an essential role in determining the magnitude of optimal efforts. 
When test costs are low, the handlers (farmers) will tend to test more and so more potential 
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misrepresentation losses will be avoided. As a result, the marginal benefit of effort becomes less, 
lessening the farmer’s incentive to increase input efforts. 
The optimal test strategy renders the marginal testing cost equal to the marginal testing benefit. 
When the marginal cost is less than the marginal benefit, an increase in testing intensity will be 
an efficient way to increase the profit of the company. Doing so also prevents misrepresented 
wheat from moving further in the supply chain, decreasing contamination risks and reducing 
related damages to the grain value chain. When misrepresented wheat is present, the company 
will bear more risks if there is no testing at each wheat transfer point rather than when there are 
tests at some transfer points. From this point of view, the magnitudes of producer efforts without 
moral hazard are not identical in different situations. For example, in this vertical integration 
case, the producer’s efforts without moral hazard are greater when there is no interior testing in 
the integrated company than when there are interior tests.  
3.3.4 Moral Hazard under Infinite Penalty 
A penalty imposed on offenders plays an essential role on the producer decision about choosing 
efforts regarding risk control. From the elevator handler’s perspective, an infinite penalty is 
preferred. If the penalty could approach infinity, moral hazard problems will be eliminated even 
if testing is incomplete. In the free test and vertical integration cases, to eliminate the moral 
hazard problem, it is emphasized that the penalty needs to be equal to the resulting damage from 
misrepresentation. If the penalty surpasses the resulting damage, can the moral hazard problem 
still be eliminated? There is no doubt that the producer will put in greater effort at reducing 
misrepresentation if the penalty is higher. As a result, there are no moral hazard problems. But 
there will be over cautiousness problems. Producers will overact to a higher penalty level and 
maintain higher risk control efforts than optimal. In this case, the marginal benefit of efforts is 
decreasing with effort levels, so when the effort level is extremely high, the marginal benefit 
from it approaches zero.   
In either case, greater efforts at reducing misrepresentation are always desired by the primary 
elevator. But from the social welfare provision, such efforts are not necessarily efficient. In a 
social optimum, the marginal social costs equal to the marginal social benefit. When the 
marginal cost of effort is less than the marginal benefit of effort, there is no problem as the 
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primary elevator gives more incentives to producers. If the marginal cost is greater than the 
marginal benefit, farmer overactions may compromise social efficiency. Although a high penalty 
can eliminate moral hazard problems inherent in producer decisions on effort, it is not at all 
assured that a high penalty can increase social efficiency. A large penalty for avoiding a small 
loss resulting from misrepresentation is not a socially efficient outcome. Such a conclusion is 
also consistent with that of Mirrlees (1999) in the context of moral hazard in health insurance, 
who argued that there is no loss of economic efficiency as a result of self-interested unobservable 
behavior under the condition that individuals take too much care rather than too little.   
3.3.5 Moral Hazard in a Handling System With/Without Traceability  
A grain handling system with traceability can ensure that offenders are ultimately identified even 
if their misrepresented deliveries enter the supply chain without detection. Undoubtedly, 
handlers confront more risks if they operate a handling system without traceability: they must 
bear all the economic losses if contaminations occur at any stage of the supply chain. When there 
is no traceability, a farmer enjoys the opportunity of evading responsibility even if he or she 
misrepresents delivery sometimes. From this point of view, a system without traceability can 
generate or buttress a farmer’s moral hazard problem. Taking case 2 (Section 3.2.3.2) and case 4 
(Section 3.2.3.4) as examples, the moral hazard problem becomes more serious in a system 
without traceability than in a system with traceability when there is no complete testing at test 
point 1, i.e. the farmer misrepresentation rate in the former system is greater than that in the 
latter. 
Table 3.1 Farmer Misrepresentation Probability in System With or Without Traceability 
Case Without Traceability With Traceability 
Case 2 
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3.3.6 Summary  
In general, when the farmer chooses the effort on risk (misrepresentation) control, the moral 
hazard problem will be eliminated when the following three conditions are all satisfied: 
1. Testing is free, which means every time wheat changes hands, complete sample testing 
will be taken.  
2. Testing precision is perfect. Once a wheat sample is tested, the variety and purity will be 
determined with full accuracy. 
3. The penalty for misrepresentation is equal to potential damage to the value of supply 
chain. 
When the handling strategies are different, moral hazard problems evaluated by due efforts are 
different. With respect to the effort without moral hazard under these different situations, the 
value of 
*  possibly differs from each other. Take former case 3 (b) as an example, if the test is 
free, the primary elevator will test each elevator bin before loading wheat in the railcars. Under 
such a condition,  
2
*
f

 
                                                                                                                                
   (3-67) 
Here f2 equals to quality loss of wheat in the contaminated bin. The amount of damage depends 
on the volume of wheat contaminated and the contamination level. Normally, the farther a 
misrepresented delivery moves in the wheat flow, the greater the contamination damage. If a 
farmer knows he or she will be traced and detected due to detected bin contamination resulting 
from the misrepresentation, the effort response will be greater than in the situation where he or 
she will be surely detected in the truck test (equation 3-62). 
Possibly the contamination loss is great enough to make an offender bankrupt if one is required 
to make a payment equal to the full loss of potential profit. As alluded to earlier, to protect 
farmers, normally this penalty is set at an upper limit (Canadian Grain Act, 2012). The extra 
amount over the upper limit of a penalty needs to be shouldered by other parties, e.g. the primary 
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elevator. However, it is possible that the practical penalty level is less than the resulting damage. 
If the penalty level is low enough to provide the required deterrence, moral hazard will be still 
present even if any misrepresentations can be detected accurately. The upper limit of the penalty 
can be another reason for weakening the incentives for farmers to put in effort, generating a 
moral hazard problem. 
When the primary elevator takes a proportionate test on farmer’s deliveries, a higher penalty 
helps alleviate moral hazard and thus induces the farmer to take efforts approaching the desired 
optimum. If the penalty is infinite, even if the test rate is low, moral hazard will be eliminated. 
The upper limit on penalty for offenders narrows the scope for the penalty as a complementary 
method for the test rate on motivating effort. 
Generally, there is a moral hazard problem if the upper limit of a penalty for an offence is less 
than the possible damage resulting from undetected misrepresentation. Based on a limited 
penalty assumption, if either of the following two conditions is satisfied, the moral hazard 
problem relevant to this policy issue will be aggravated: 
1. There is no test point at which related samples are fully tested. Such a situation generally 
exists, under the condition of costly testing, complete testing is almost impossible. 
2. The test precision is imperfect. There exists a probability that the farmer misrepresented 
the delivery and still is tested, but is not detected. 
Due to the costs of monitoring behavior, a perfect perception of an agent’s behavior is 
impractical. Casual observation indicates that imperfect information is extensively used in 
practice to alleviate moral hazard (Holmstrom, 1978). It can also be shown that any information 
about an agent’s action, even imperfect, can be used to improve the welfare of both the principal 
and the agent (Harris, 1977). Clearly, one cannot expect imperfect monitoring to solve the moral 
hazard problem. In this case, to pursue the private optimum, the primary elevator probably 
should test farmer deliveries proportionally (refer to Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.8) instead of testing 
completely and allow the moral hazard problem to exist to some degree. 
Moral hazard problems also exist in handlers’ behavior. When the terminal elevator handlers do 
not completely test railcar deliveries or the penalty for farmer in case of offences is high, the 
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primary handlers’ testing decision will be characterized by moral hazard. In the former situation, 
incomplete testing will lower the primary elevator handlers’ incentive for testing because they do 
not need to bear all the misrepresentation responsibility (refer to equation 3-14 in case 2(a) and 
equation 3-44 in case 4(a)). In the latter situation, the handlers have no incentives at all to test at 
any point because all contamination losses can be covered by penalties from offenders (refer to 
equations 3-14 and 3-44, Figure 3.5 in case 2(b) and Figure 3.8 in case 3(b)). In this situation, the 
handlers only need to establish a formal traceability system whereby they can trace the source 
when there are contaminations detected somewhere within the supply chain. There are measures 
that will give primary elevator handlers incentives for greater testing. Either an upper limit on the 
penalty imposed on traced farmers who misrepresent their deliveries or a high penalty on 
detected misrepresented railcars can each force handlers to share risks from their due efforts and 
thus mitigate their moral hazard problems. 
 
3.4 Summary  
The specification of appropriate handling strategies in the new VED wheat supply chain will be 
important due to the potentially large consequences on system reliability and parties’ profitability 
associated with any particular choice of handling strategy. Among these strategies include choice 
of test location, testing intensity and penalty levels for those offenders who are detected and can 
be traced. The objective of this chapter has been to compute optimal strategies for wheat 
handlers so as to minimize the costs and risks associated with wheat handling under VED.  
In this chapter, using a reasonable set of assumptions, supply chain participants’ cost functions 
were specified through incorporating different testing locations, and with or without a 
traceability mechanism, in a stylized VED wheat supply chain. The solutions of the set of 
optimization problems functions provide a guide for analyzing how these related factors affect 
testing strategies and also for exploring ways under which the moral hazard problem inherently 
present in the new supply chain can be mitigated or eliminated. 
Because testing is costly, taking complete testing on farmer deliveries may not meet the primary 
elevator’s objectives unless the misrepresentation situation is severe. Proportional testing makes 
the primary elevator suffer some risks from misrepresentation and raises moral hazard problems 
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in the farmer’s choice of effort (misrepresentation) decision. Under the assumption of zero cost 
testing, the moral hazard problem can be solved. But another way to eliminate the VED moral 
hazard problem could be the vertical integration of the wheat production supply chain. In both 
cases, the elimination of moral hazard requires adequate incentives generated through penalties 
on offenders. Of course, such penalties should be not less than the resulted damage by 
misrepresentation.  
As might be expected, a high penalty is preferred by the elevator handlers because of the strong 
incentives it gives for motivating effort from farmers. A higher penalty helps alleviate moral 
hazard problems, but it may bring on an excessive caution problem. These findings suggest that 
farmers are sensitive to the penalty level that could be imposed in the case of an offence. Any 
increase in the penalty will squeeze more effort from farmers, but when a penalty level drives up 
efforts from farmers such that the marginal cost surpasses the marginal benefit of effort, this 
penalty level will not be socially efficient. But if this misrepresentation penalty is set at a level 
below the measurable damage resulting from individual misrepresentation, a farmer may 
suboptimally reduce the effort. This is another way to generate moral hazard problems for 
farmers in the VED supply chain. 
Without question, the farmer is exposed to very different misrepresentation risks under different 
wheat handling schemes. A system misrepresentation test can generate different distributions 
depending on where it is conducted and as well, the penalty for identified misrepresentation 
could be set at levels from finite to infinite. Handling strategy combinations indicate various 
risks the farmer should take if misrepresenting the delivery and thus provide the farmer different 
incentives with respect to their efforts to control risks. In fact, the magnitude of farmer’s efforts 
without moral hazard varied according to the test and penalty system applied. 
While moral hazard problems add costs to wheat handling, alleviating them by increasing test 
intensity is also costly. If the expected cost of inducing the farmer to select a high level of effort 
is too high, the primary elevator will probably refuse to do that, and instead, the primary elevator 
would tend to try to induce some lower level of effort from the farmer at a lower cost, allowing 
moral hazard problems to exist in equilibrium. When those moral hazard problems are present, 
the first-best societal outcome may not be possible to achieve. Instead, the primary elevator’s 
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testing strategies must be designed to achieve the second-best (under moral hazard and hence 
with a need for costly supervision) such that the system handling costs are minimized. 
Although explicitly solvable, the analytic models in this chapter do not provide a very realistic 
perspective on handling strategies. The testing strategies are developed based on the assumption 
that the grain handlers know the cost function of farmers and thus know the response of farmers 
to testing adjustment and make perfect use of information. In reality, grain handlers only have 
limited information about farmers. Actually, the great challenge confronted by handlers is how to 
develop an effective testing strategy while depending on limited information from imperfect 
monitoring of effort. From the elevator’s perspective, the issue becomes understanding how to 
use the imperfect information about farmer’s misrepresentation behavior to infer the farmer’s 
actual risk control effort.  
The inability to accurately identify the farmer’s actual effort level will negatively affect the 
efficiency of tests distributed among heterogeneous farmers, making handlers necessarily subject 
to bounded rational behavior. For example, a farmer with high effort may be tested more than 
another farmer with low effort due to the elevator handlers’ incorrect determination about their 
misrepresentation risks. Furthermore, in reality wheat handling decisions are in fact a complex 
dynamic process because of farmer interaction with respect to testing, individual learning about 
testing and information feedback on testing. To pursue economic efficiency in this situation, the 
elevator handlers would need to continuously adjust their test strategy for detecting farmers’ 
misrepresentation behavior based on several factors, including newly perceived information.  
In reality, the probability of detection is likely influenced by testing location, testing intensity 
and the accuracy of testing for misrepresentation. Knowing this, the analytic model developed 
above is useful for developing intuition about the problem, but it cannot possibly reveal the 
consequences of the dynamics and complexities inherent even in a simple real-world economic 
situation like a grain supply chain under VED. To get past the limitations of the analytic model, a 
basic agent-based economic simulation of the VED supply chain is developed in the next 
chapter. The simulation will help to uncover the effect of bounded rationality on behavior as well 
as help us to understand how inherent dynamics and complexities affect the strategies chosen by 
the various players in a VED wheat handling system.    
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CHAPTER 4 
 
AGENT-BASED SIMULATION OF THE VED SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The model discussed in Chapter 3 is an analytic one. Its utility is limited by some assumptions 
and limitations. First, in the analytic model, it is assumed that farmers are homogeneous. Second, 
the analytic model does not allow for inter-agent interactions, feedback and system dynamics. 
Third, wheat handlers have complete information about farmer behavior and display perfect 
economic rationality. In reality, the supply chain is a dynamic system composed of 
heterogeneous participants who interact with each other and adapt their behaviors continuously 
over time. Handlers cannot know the exact misrepresentation probability for a farmer due to 
information asymmetry and also cannot use information perfectly, therefore their testing 
strategies are not fully rational but boundedly rational, i.e. individuals are limited in their 
knowledge and their cognitive abilities about their environment and in their computing ability, 
and thus in the degree to which they are able to optimize their utility (Simon, 1957). Simon 
(1957) also argued that bounded rationality is a more accurate and more realistic description of 
human behavior than perfect personality.  
To take a more realistic view of the grain supply chain system dynamics and management, the 
behavior of participants with bounded rationality over a certain time interval should be more 
realistically described. This objective cannot be reached by using the standard mathematical 
techniques of algebra and calculus within an analytic model. To capture the dynamic and 
complexity inherent in the supply chain, a behavioral adaption simulation model is needed. By 
implementing and optimizing a set of behavioral agent-based simulation models, this study will 
derive a range of economic insights for the wheat handler’s efficient testing strategies while 
benchmarking essential features of the dynamic economic system of interest. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
Implementing the declaration system promises to have a substantial effect on the wheat handling 
industry. While there are tangible benefits from moving away from the visual identification 
system, the declaration system will create additional costs for the wheat handling and marketing 
system. The extent of these additional costs for the new segregation system is an important issue 
for the sector and will vary with the handling objectives and with the strategies employed by the 
sector participants. 
There are two prior studies that have examined the impact of a move from KVD to a declaration 
system. These studies provide a detailed description of what the process would be and 
circumstantial qualifications of costs and risks along systems. However, these models simplify 
the complexity of the wheat handling system and thus deviate from the representative 
experimental conditions used for evaluating the costs and risks of wheat handling under the 
declaration system.  
Furtan et al. (2003) in an unpublished paper, developed a static mathematical model for assessing 
the costs of implementing a VED system. They examined three different scenarios involving 
varying degrees of sampling and testing requirements, traceability, blending cargo and new 
administrative and enforcement activity costs. The three scenarios are: (1) besides a vessel test, 
no other test in the upstream supply chain; (2) random testing occurs at specific critical points 
along the supply chain; (3) tests are distributed strategically among farmers based on their 
delivery performance. For any of these, if there is any problem detected by testing, there would 
be a trace-back process implemented to locate the exact source of the problem. In order for a 
VED system to work, the authors suggest there should be a required penalty and enforcement 
procedure. The estimation results show that the third scenario has the lowest costs. But the 
adoption of this scenario requests a system of trust built up between the farmer, grain handler, 
and, at the time, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). 
The Furtan study was not focused on developing efficient testing strategies, and in fact testing 
strategies considered for cost evaluation are exogenously given (i.e. arbitrarily given test rates 
for farmer’s delivery and for railcars). The authors do not state whether such testing strategies 
are efficient or not. When discussing actual contamination problems, they make assumptions 
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about the volume of contaminated grain and do not explain how the contamination occurs and 
gets disseminated, or how serious the contamination can be. Both the contaminated grain volume 
used in cost evaluation as well as the value for traceability cost are included without further 
explanation as to why these values are fixed rather than variable. Generally, the model simplifies 
uncertainties in the system, so the calculated costs for three scenarios can only allow for three 
special cases and are not a representative assessment of risks in the grain handling system under 
the VED system.  
Wilson and Dahl (2006) conducted a study evaluating the costs and risks of a dual marketing 
system with GM/Non-GM wheat segregation. A stochastic optimization model is developed to 
determine optimal testing strategy and quantify the costs and risks of the system. Sensitivity 
analysis was done to evaluate impacts of risk attitudes of policy makers, variety declaration, 
grower truth-telling, price discount (penalty), test accuracy, and tolerances. Their numerical 
simulation results pointed to optimal testing strategies and provided estimates of the additional 
costs of testing and rejection for the system. These results are suggestive of risk mitigation 
strategies that could be adopted in the wheat marketing system. Ultimately, they concluded that a 
supply chain based on testing and segregation can efficiently control the costs and risks for 
uncertainties within the system. 
There are several simplifying assumptions made in Wilson’s model. First, they assumed all 
growers are homogeneous with respect to the probability of truth-telling that reflects their own 
uncertainty whether the content of grain delivered includes GM varieties. Second, the model 
does not allow for any interaction or feedback between participants, meaning there is no adaptive 
behavior among the participants as might be expected in reality. As a result the optimal testing 
strategies are fixed throughout the simulation. These assumptions render their model only 
weakly representative of the basic economic and social environment of participants in the grain 
handling system. Finally, their model does not allow for traceability (i.e. identifying exactly 
where wheat comes from), but as we shall see, a grain handling system facing commingling risks 
can function more efficiently if traceability is possible. 
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4.3 An Agent-based Modeling (ABM) Approach 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the development of optimal testing strategies in this situation can be 
thought of as a variant of mechanism design, an optimization procedure that has been used to 
solve economic incentive problems under incomplete information. In economics, mechanism 
design concerns the problem of designing a protocol or contract that helps implement a desired 
objective, despite the possibility of divergent self-interest among individuals (Parkes, 2001). 
In designing a testing strategy mechanism in the context of this research question, we first 
needed to specify an agent’s objective and then define the set of behavioral strategies. Here, it is 
assumed that the wheat handlers’ objective is to minimize their handling costs, including testing 
costs and contamination losses. Outcomes of testing strategies in this case must coincide with a 
desirable overall objective. But with respect to designing a realistic and sustainable testing 
mechanism in this supply chain composed of heterogeneous and dynamically interacting agents, 
one will need to turn to an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach.    
This study differs from prior research in that this particular grain supply chain is modeled as a 
type of complex system, a system that is not readily amenable to analytic solution. By definition, 
a complex system is characterized by non-linear relationships between participants along with an 
out of equilibrium dynamic (Durlauf, 1998). In the grain supply chain system modeled here, it is 
assumed that participants behave independently and are heterogeneous, while their aggregate 
activity is inherently nonlinear (i.e. not derivable from the summations of the activity of 
individual components). In addition, individuals may also behave irrationally or out of 
equilibrium, making the system pass through unsteady states. Nonlinearities and out of 
equilibrium behavior require algorithms capturing how individuals in a system react to each 
other (feedback) and how they adjust continually to the overall situation they together create 
(recursion). Traditional mathematical techniques of modelling, which work best for static, 
homogenous and equilibrating situations, are typically very limited in their ability to deal with 
nonlinearities, disequilibrium or heterogeneous individuals (Forrester and Senge, 1996). Given 
the current state of computing power and software, it is now possible to model complex 
problems using more realistic assumptions to better capture the nonlinearity of participants’ 
behavior with an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach (Li et al., 2010). 
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The supply chain modeled here falls within the paradigm of a complex adaptive system. The 
specified system is composed of boundedly rational participants who repeatedly interact with 
each other over time, including learning from interactions. Those individuals are limited in their 
cognitive abilities, as well as knowledge about their environment, and thus the degree to which 
they are able to optimize their individual utility. Farmers are boundedly rational in making 
decisions on taking risk control efforts. Similarly, handlers’ testing strategies are not fully 
rational but boundedly rational instead. The latter cannot know the exact misrepresentation 
probability for a farmer due to information asymmetry and also cannot integrate perceived 
information in their decision making perfectly.  
To take a more realistic view of the grain supply chain system dynamic and its complexity, the 
behaviors and incentives under bounded rationality over a certain time interval must be 
developed. ABM allows the researcher to create boundedly rational agents and directly represent 
their interactions, adaption and learning, none of which is easy to do with other modeling 
approaches (Gilbert, 2007). By implementing and optimizing a set of behavioral agent-based 
simulation models, this study will derive a range of economic insights for the bounded rational 
behaviors while maintaining essential features of the complex economic system of interest.  
Formally, ABM is a computational framework for creating, analyzing and experimenting with 
models composed of agents that interact within an environment (Gilbert, 2007). For a complex 
system, an agent-based approach, which emphasizes autonomous actions and flexible 
interactions, is a natural computational model (Jennings and Bussmann, 2003). In this context, 
economic applications using ABM require building economic systems that can be mapped as 
computer programs. The computer program itself represents the processes that are thought to 
exist in the actual world (Macy and Willer, 2002). ABM creates a simplified representation of 
economic and social reality that serves to express as clearly as possible the way in which one 
believes that reality operates, capturing system dynamics and consequences out of the reach of 
analytic or mathematical methods. In the context of this problem, Labarthe et al. (2007) stated 
that the ABM simulation approach is the only one allowing an observation of the behavior of 
each supply chain actor through time, as well as the dynamics of the supply chain stemming 
from their interactions. ABM has become an important tool for understanding supply chain 
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behavior and can yield the information necessary to make informed decisions regarding supply 
chain design and management (Nolan et al., 2009; Schmit and Rounsevell, 2006).  
Since the mid-1990s, ABM has been more widely used to analyze a variety of complex social, 
business and economic problems including supply chain management (Li et al., 2010; Chatfield 
et al. 2007; Labarthe et al. 2007), natural resource management (Carpenter et al., 1999; Barreteau 
et al., 2004), structural change in agricultural activities (Parker et al., 2004; Schmit et al., 2006), 
finance (Takahashi, 2003), labour markets (Neugart, 2006), urban sprawl (Brown et al., 2005), 
city growth (Zhang, 2003), electricity markets (Bunn and Oliveira, 2003, 2007), among others. 
In these economic ABM applications, the system of interest is simulated by modeling the 
behavior of individual agents and their interconnections. The targeted system is modeled as a 
collection of autonomous decision-making entities called agents. Each agent individually 
assesses its situation and makes decisions on the basis of a set of rules. Rather than focusing on 
stable states, ABM considers a system's robustness, providing a natural framework for 
harnessing the complexity of the agents: their diversity, connectedness, and level of interactions.  
 
4.4 Model Logic and Description 
First, to develop an appropriate agent-based simulation model, the wheat handling procedures 
involved in this study must be carefully defined. As indicated in Chapter 3, there are several 
possible testing points for grain quality - (1) a truck test before unloading wheat into primary 
elevator bins; (2) a primary elevator bin test before loading wheat into railcars; (3) a railcar test 
before loading wheat into the terminal elevator bins. There are two points where the traceability 
mechanism can be useful; (1) contaminations detected at the test point 2; (2) contaminations 
detected at the test point 3. Once again, for tractability, segregation issues that arise after the 
terminal elevator are not included in this study. 
In this model, supply chain participants are represented as autonomous agents that interact with 
each other as well as with their environment through a set of rules that govern their actions, 
decisions, and interactions with other agents. These agents exhibit individual behaviors through 
the actions they perform and interactions they have with each other. Even though very little 
optimizing behavior at the agent level is assumed, examining the simulated aggregate of the 
76 
 
individual behaviors provides an analytic tool for understanding how the system performs as a 
whole. 
4.4.1 Model Structure and Behavioral Assumptions 
Like all modeled representations of reality, one must rely upon a set of simplifying assumptions 
and a set of realistic behavioral algorithms to render the simulation tractable. Considering the 
issue as described (except Assumption 9), all other assumptions made in Section 3.2.3 are 
applied to this model. In this simulation, it is assumed handlers have imperfect information about 
a farmer’s misrepresentation behavior and they can only perceive a farmer’s misrepresentation 
probability through testing. In addition, there is an assumption about the capacity of the primary 
elevator bins involved in this model: all storage bins in a primary elevator have the same 
capacity
11
. 
Of course, the modeled misrepresentation situation and testing regime in this study does not fully 
represent the current Canadian wheat handling system. Although a declaration system is already 
in place, at present there appear to be few misrepresentation cases and truck testing and bin 
testing for variety identification have not yet been implemented. Officers at the CGC (2012) are 
already aware that commingling risks from visually indistinguishable varieties can unexpectedly 
occur any time and safety threats could be serious in the future. They have also indicated that 
stringent testing regimes will be implemented if there are significant contamination threats from 
farmer misrepresentation. Allowing for this, at the time of this writing, my research in fact 
models a situation that is likely to occur in the wheat handling system of the foreseeable future. 
In turn, the results will help to develop strategies under VED to efficiently mitigate these risks 
before they can undermine the handling system functionality and integrity.  
The next sections detail the key components of my simulation model of grain segregation and 
testing, as well as provide a description of the overall logic of the simulation. Due to the novelty 
of this aspect of the research, many of my assumptions or algorithms have been created using 
                                                          
11
 In the prairie region, a typical primary elevator contains several storage bins with various capacities ranging from 
tens of tons to thousands of tons. The homogeneity assumption about the bin capacity helps reduce the complexity 
of other handling strategies rather than testing strategies which are the focus of this study. As a result, this model is 
not concerned with wheat receiving strategies, e.g. unloading wheat from a “high risk” client’s delivery into a 
smaller bin. 
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related literature in agent-based simulation modeling or alternatively what is considered to be 
best grain industry practice regarding a particular situation. 
4.4.2 Farmer Behavior   
Consider a number of farmers located on a defined space. In the initial state of this simulation, 
farmers are randomly generated farming on a grid. The primary elevator’s location is given on 
the space. Every location has explicit coordinates in an imaginary coordinate system, 
determining the distance between farmers and the distance from each farmer to the primary 
elevator. The magnitude of distances determines transportation costs when delivering wheat and 
also helps define the relationship between farmers.  
Each farmer is endowed with an amount of land, labour and capital which yield a certain 
production capacity to produce wheat (No.1 CWRS, 13.5% protein). Farmers deliver their 
products to the primary elevator at the call for CWRS. It is assumed that each farmer delivers 1 
truck of wheat at each delivery and makes 9 deliveries each year
12
. Just as before, it is assumed 
that each farmer could potentially misrepresent deliveries and this probability is determined by 
the amount of the risk control effort plus the level of risk control technology. A farmer is 
endowed with a certain level of risk control effort and a certain capacity of risk control 
technology and both of them evolve over time. Risk control effort is essentially a measure of the 
resources a farmer puts into avoiding possible misrepresentation, while the technology is a 
measure of the knowledge, management and agronomic capacity of a farmer to control the risk 
of misrepresentation. Similar as in Chapter 3, an individual farmer j’s misrepresentation rate α is 
defined as a function of the risk control effort ce and risk control technology k,  
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 (4-1) 
where α ],1,0[ the time (year) T=0, 1, 2, 3…(N-1), j=1, 2, 3…n, and η is an exogenous 
parameter common to all agents used for the purpose of scaling. Note that higher value of c 
indicates a higher level of effort and a lower value of k indicates a higher level of technology. 
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12
 This represents about one delivery per month during the shipping season. 
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It is assumed that agents are boundedly rational but purposeful. They look about them, gather 
information and act in the next time period on the basis of that information. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, there are potential moral hazard problems with a farmer’s effort if deliveries are not 
completely tested. Adapting to their environment through information, a farmer adjusts efforts to 
control misrepresentation risks based on perceived information. Potential profit loss from 
misrepresentation is assumed to be an effective deterrence to farmers who may potentially 
misrepresent their deliveries. How a farmer makes an effort at behavioral adjustment is 
determined in this model by two factors. The first factor is how the farmer was treated by the 
primary elevator. The second factor comprises information on how farmers adjacent to an 
individual were treated by the primary elevator. 
First, if a farmer misrepresents a delivery and is detected, he or she will suffer a penalty. The 
penalty imposed is assumed to be a strong motivation to expend additional effort and thus 
mitigate moral hazard. If a farmer is tested but is in fact correctly represented, such a testing can 
serve as a warning mechanism to the farmer to take more care in the delivery, again reducing the 
moral hazard problem. If a farmer is not tested within the standard time frame (one year), it is 
assumed that he or she will reduce the diligence towards misrepresentation just a little and drop 
efforts at risk control in the following year, potentially worsening the moral hazard problem.   
Second, there are interactions between farmers within the geographic landscape. Each farmer’s 
opportunities and constraints for interaction are determined by geographic location. Historically, 
spatial and social situations have been determined primarily by geographic distance (Dibble, 
2006). More recently, opportunities for social and economic interaction are driven by networks 
of transportation or communication spatial technologies (Couclelis, 1994). Considering that a 
farmer can more easily contact or develop collaborations with neighboring farmers than with 
those located far from him or her, the physical distances between farmers play a determining role 
on defining the interaction network. For simplicity, it is assumed that farmers within certain 
physical space exchange information with each other and react to this information. For example, 
if a neighbor was tested or detected in a given year, this affects the farmer and causes him or her 
to be a little more cautious with his or her own deliveries in the future. Conversely, if a neighbor 
has been not tested for some time, the farmer might start behaving in a risk-taking manner and 
may gradually relax diligence on misrepresentation risk. Doing so most certainly exposes this 
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individual to being detected with a higher probability in the future. So the behavior of a farmer’s 
immediate neighbors influences the evolution of individual risk control effort, possibly either 
reducing or worsening the moral hazard problem. 
To measure this interactive influence of neighbors, this simulation assumes that what one can 
call “social” distance is proportional to physical distance which is represented by kilometers. 
This assumption is based on the concept of “distance decay”, which is the usual geographic term 
reflecting a diminished effect or degree of interaction with respect to greater distance (Dibble, 
2006). d(i, j) represents the shortest distance between farmer j and his or her neighbour i. Farmer 
j’s neighbors are defined as farmers adjacent to him or her within a radius of 30 kilometers. Of 
course, when i=j, d(i, j) =0. For neighbors located beyond such a radius, their influences are 
neglected. The reciprocal of the distance value acts as a weight for the influence of different 
neighbors, so the farther a neighbor is located from the farmer j, the lower the neighbor’s 
influence on the farmer j’s behavior.   
Figure 4.1 shows a defined spatial landscape with a 100(km)×100(km) space. The locations of 48 
farmers and 1 primary elevator for grain deliveries are distributed on the landscape in a manner 
similar to the simulations used in this study. The red circle at the left bottom shows farmer #29 
and the 14 neighbors within a 30 km radius.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
30km 
Figure 4.1 Farmers and the Primary Elevator’s Locations in a Landscape 
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Farmer j’s risk control effort, and its evolution is algebraically defined as, 
]
1),(
)1(
1),(1),(
[
1
3
1
2
1
1
1









jid
D
jid
D
jid
F
Dcc
T
in
i
T
i
n
i
T
i
n
i
ji
T
j
T
j                                             (4-2) 
where T = 1, 2, 3…N, i or j=1, 2, 3…n, λ1, λ2 and λ3 are free parameters in this study. Fi 
represents the units of farmer i’s loss due to detected misrepresentation (a thousand of dollars per 
unit). The Ds are indicator variables. If the distance between farmer i and farmer j is within 30 
kilometers, Dji =1; otherwise, Dji =0. If farmer i’s delivery was tested or traced within the year T, 
1TiD ; otherwise, 0
T
iD . As before, d(i, j) indicates the physical distance between farmer j and 
farmer i.  
A farmer can also improve risk control technology by learning from his or her own experiences 
or from his or her neighbor’s experiences on personal on-farm practices. Learning behavior is 
now studied frequently in the social sciences. Vriend (2000) states that there are two levels of 
learning for computational agents: individual-level learning and population-level learning. An 
agent is said to employ individual-level learning when it learns from its own past experiences, 
and to employ population-level learning when it learns from other agents. It is assumed that these 
two forms of learning play roles on a farmer’s technology improvement in this model: a farmer’s 
technology advances after he or she or the neighbors suffer failures in delivering eligible wheat. 
Such logic stems from the view that accumulated experiences can improve skills in on-farm 
production processes. The technology evolution of k is defined as,  
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Where T=1, 2, 3…N, i or j=1, 2, 3…n, and 01  .  11 
T
iD  if the delivery of farmer i  was 
detected within the year T ; otherwise, 01 
T
iD .  
4.4.3 Primary Elevator Behavior 
There is one primary elevator operating in this basic simulation model. The handling procedures 
are similar to those described in Chapter 3. For example, it is assumed that the primary elevator 
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calls for CWRS from farmers 9 times each year and subsequently delivers collected wheat to the 
primary elevator 9 times each year. Movement of grain through the handling and transportation 
system is accompanied by documentation and with samples taken and retained at every link in 
the supply chain where accountability shifts from one party to another. If there is bin 
contamination or railcar contamination detected, traceability mechanisms will be activated to 
identify the contamination source. When there are detected farmer’s misrepresented deliveries, 
the primary elevator is responsible for finding alternative markets for them. Of course, farmers 
with those delivers will be paid discounted prices.  
As a key component of the primary elevator’s risk mitigation long-run behavior, testing both on 
trucks at test point 1 and on elevator bins at test point 2, is driven by the pursuit of efficiency.  It 
is assumed that the primary elevator’s testing strategy choices are not entirely deterministic and 
predictable, but may be limited by bounded rationality. Moreover, there are random 
perturbations in the environment. The presence of perturbations implies that the evolutionary 
dynamic in testing strategies never settles down completely but is always in flux instead.  
Due to the assumed heterogeneity of the farmer misrepresentation performance, it may be not 
efficient to homogenously distribute tests among farmers over time (Ge et al., 2011, 2012). A 
farmer with a higher probability of misrepresentation is optimally given a tighter test regimen 
than a farmer with a lower probability of misrepresentation, where the probability of 
misrepresentation by a farmer is calculated according to the perceived farmer’s performance in 
the delivery history.  
This simulation assumes that a farmer randomly misrepresents the deliveries with a 
predetermined misrepresented rate over a year. Risk control efforts and technology for a farmer 
evolves from one year to the next, meaning that the misrepresentation probability changes from 
year to year. To compensate, the primary elevator handlers in the model reset the test rate for all 
farmers at the beginning of each year. From the perspective of the elevator, a farmer’s delivery 
performance should be considered when designing a testing strategy for that farmer. A farmer 
with misrepresentation in the delivery history will be offered a higher testing rate than another 
farmer with no misrepresentation. The more the misrepresented deliveries a farmer delivered in 
the past, the higher the test intensity one will face at the first delivery within a year.  
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Since handlers initially have little information about an individual farmer’s probability of 
misrepresentation, handlers will try to establish a risk indicator system between farmers and 
themselves. Such a system must approximate the level of misrepresentation risk for a farmer. 
Obviously, this can only be developed by perceiving the performance of each farmer through 
delivery history. Such information accumulation takes time and is costly. 
Due to farmer behavioral evolution, the perception of their misrepresentation probability 
involves information value decay over time. Perceptions far from the current period may only 
weakly indicate a farmer’s current misrepresentation status. An exponential weighted moving 
average (EWMA)
13
 of misrepresentation rate over the whole delivery history is used as a proxy 
for a farmer reputation and is arguable more accurate than a simple average of misrepresentation 
rate over any period of time. When using EWMA, weighting for each older data point decreases 
exponentially. In this case, with a given degree of weighting decrease equals 0.222, EWMA 
gives significantly more weights to recent perceptions. For example, the weighting factors from 
past 1 to 8 years are set at 0.222, 0.178, 0.134, 0.105, 0.081, 0.063, 0.049 and 0.038, and the total 
weight for the past 8 years data is 0.866. 
In the early years of the simulation, random testing dominates the testing strategy because there 
is limited information about individual misrepresentation. After more information has been 
embedded in the simulated testing strategy, testing gradually concentrates on farmers with a 
history of problems. The test rate for the first delivery in the first year is initialized due to a lack 
of information. From the second year of the simulation, the test rate for a farmer’s first delivery 
within a year (T+1) (i.e. the (9T+1)
th 
delivery) is,  
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(4-4) 
where T=1, 2, 3…N, j=1, 2, 3…n, 1 and 2  are constants to be determined through parameter 
optimization, 
f

is the exponential weighted moving average of the general misrepresentation 
                                                          
13
 Exponential weighted moving average applies weighting factors which decrease exponentially. The weighting for 
each older data point decreases exponentially but never reaches zero, giving much more importance to recent 
observations while still not discarding older observations entirely. Please refer to Appendix D for more information 
about EWMA. 
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rate of all n farmers in the simulation over the past years, and j

is the exponential weighted 
moving average of individual farmer j’s misrepresentation rate over the past years14. 
This specification means that testing strategies are sensitive to a farmer’s misrepresentation 
conditions over the past years. If the farmer’s misrepresentation situation is serious on a 
continuous basis, the offered test rates will be greater, preventing eligible wheat from 
contamination by undesirable wheat. Alternatively, if misrepresentation rarely occurs, the test 
rate will be maintained at a low level, reducing the testing costs without compromising test 
efficiency. Finally, the test rates offered to farmers in the model are heterogeneous, and farmers 
with different performances in their delivery histories will be given different test rates.  
After the first delivery in a given year, the primary elevator handlers adjust their test rate from 
delivery to delivery based on new information such as truck misrepresentation and railcar 
misrepresentation conditions. Furthermore, if a farmer’s delivery has been tested or traced 
sometime during the year but is proven eligible, the remaining deliveries in the year will not be 
tested. If the farmer’s delivery is proven to be misrepresented, then all of that farmer’s deliveries 
will be tested for the rest of that year. Such a strategy is founded on the assumption that a 
farmer’s production is identical within a year as well as the assumption that the test precision is 
perfect (Assumptions 1 and 4 in Section 4.4.1). This means: 
 
where T= 1, 2, 3…N, g= 1~8.  
If misrepresented deliveries are unloaded into primary elevator bins without detection, ineligible 
wheat will then commingle with eligible wheat and result in some level of contamination. Given 
the nature of testing in the simulated supply chain, railcars loaded from contaminated bins will 
be misrepresented. Misrepresented railcars may also be detected at the terminal elevator. When 
there are misrepresented railcars detected in a delivery, the primary elevator handlers will 
consider the need to maintain a certain level of testing intensity for those farmers who to that 
                                                          
14
 The probability of misrepresentation for each farmer is initialized at the beginning of the simulation. 
 (4-5) 
1-if detected previously 
0-if tested or traced previously but not detected 
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point have not been tested or traced. For farmers who have been tested or traced within the year, 
as mentioned above, they will be treated in two ways for the rest of in the remaining time left in 
the year, they will be tested or will be left alone. From the second delivery within a given year, 
all untested or untraced farmers will face testing as defined,  
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where T=1, 2, 3…N, i or j=1, 2, 3…n, g=1~8, 1 and 2 are constants, tr is the perceived 
misrepresentation rate of farmers through tracing, and 1is the probability that a farmer’s 
misrepresented delivery is identified through bin tracing, while 2 is the probability that a 
farmer’s misrepresented delivery is identified through railcar tracing. In fact, 1 just equals the 
primary elevator’s bin test rate. Just as shown in Chapter 3, 2 is no less than the terminal 
elevator’s test rate for railcars. Thus, at the gth delivery within the year T, if there are no 
misrepresented railcars, D
9(T-1)+g
 =0; otherwise, D
9(T-1)+g
 =1.   
As discussed in Section 3.3.6, if the terminal elevator does not perform complete testing on 
railcars, handler testing efforts are affected by moral hazard which lowers their incentives for 
testing. If there are no detected misrepresented railcars for a specific delivery, the primary 
elevator handlers will regard the current testing strategy as appropriate, although there may be 
some farmer misrepresented deliveries left undetected. In this context, they will only test the 
farmers who were revealed to have misrepresented within the year and will not test other 
farmers’ deliveries until misrepresented railcars are detected. If there are misrepresented railcars 
detected at the terminal elevator sometime in a year, from that moment on, all untested or 
untraced farmers will be subject to more intensive testing. The intensity of the new tests is 
determined by anticipation about undetected misrepresented trucks. The anticipation is based on 
information such as the primary elevator’s previous test rate for bins, the terminal elevator’s 
prior test rate for railcars, as well as the misrepresentation rate of railcars at the terminal elevator. 
The level of this new test rate allows flexibility around potential costs and potential benefits from 
using alternative testing strategies. 
The intensity of bin and railcar testing affects anticipation on undetected misrepresented trucks. 
If the test rate on primary elevator bins or railcars is high, there will be less contamination left 
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undetected and fewer misrepresented trucks left untraced. In the simulation, when there are 
contaminated bins or railcars detected, there will be an economic incentive to activate the  
traceability mechanism. By referring to delivery documents and testing retention samples, 
handlers can identify the source of contamination with low traceability costs. Here, the potential 
penalty amount collected from identified offenders is much greater than traceability costs. 
Before loading wheat into railcars, the primary elevator is allowed to test some bins to monitor if 
there is a contamination problem. For the adjustment of the test rate at the bin, more information 
is available for consideration. Not only is information available about the truck and railcar 
misrepresentation in the previous delivery, but the general test rate on farmers and detected 
farmer’s misrepresentation for the current delivery affects handlers’ bin testing strategy. For 
example, if most of a farmer’s deliveries were tested and there are few misrepresentations, the 
overall risk of bin contamination will be small and thus a lower test rate on bins will be the best 
response. So for the first delivery within year T, the primary elevator’s test rates for bins are 
defined as: 
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where bi is the  test rate for bin i, 1  and 2 are constants, f

 is an exponential weighted 
moving average of the perceived misrepresentation rates for all farmers over the past years, f is 
a variable reflecting the general misrepresentation rate of all farmers,
i  is the ratio of deliveries 
tested before unloading into the bin i, and Pi represents the sum of perceived misrepresentation 
probabilities of farmers whose deliveries are unloaded in bin i without being tested. The value of 
Pi  can indicate the magnitude of the contamination risk of bin i.  
After taking into account this updated information, the handlers can adjust their bin test 
strategies more effectively to meet the specific situation at each first delivery. Testing is 
distributed heterogeneously among bins, whereby a bin believed to have high contamination risk 
will be tested more than a bin believed to possess low contamination risk.  
The changes in test rates for farmers influence bin testing strategy. The higher the test rate on 
farmer delivery, the lower the primary bin test rate. At any time, if all the farmers’ deliveries 
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were tested before being unloaded into bins, misrepresented ones would all be detected and thus 
all wheat entering bins would be eligible. Under such a condition, there will be no need to test 
any bin under the assumption of no other contamination sources other than farmer’s 
misrepresentation during wheat handling (Assumption 3 in 4.4.1).  
In addition, railcar test rates and results from previous deliveries affect these bin test rates. A 
high prior railcar test rate implies a low current bin test rate. If all railcars were tested at the 
terminal elevator in the n
th
 delivery that year, all the misrepresented railcars will be detected and 
all the contaminated primary elevator bins will be identified through tracing. Through testing 
retained samples, the primary elevator handlers will finally find all farmers who misrepresented 
their deliveries. Those farmers who were detected will be continuously tested in the subsequent 
deliveries within the year. In such a situation, wheat entering primary elevator bins will be 
acceptable and thus bin testing becomes unnecessary from the n
th
 delivery in that year. If there is 
no detected railcar contamination at the terminal, the handlers will test no bins at the next 
delivery until there is detected railcar contamination. Based on this logic, from the second 
delivery for each farmer, there are adjustments on the bin test necessary to meet this new 
environment. The model defines the bin test rate from the second delivery as: 
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where T= 1, 2, 3…N, g= 1~8, 1 and 2 are constants, bi is the  test rate for bin i, 2 is the 
probability that a misrepresented delivery can be identified by traceability after detection in the 
railcar, i is the ratio of deliveries which were tested before unloading into the bin i, and D is a 
dummy variable with the following interpretation: if there are detected contaminated railcars at 
the terminal elevator at the previous delivery in year T, D=1; otherwise, D=0. 
Based on equation 4-8, the bin test rate is positively related to contamination risks to which the 
bin is exposed, and negatively related with the truck test rate at current delivery and railcar test 
rate at last delivery. Specifically, if there is no detected railcar contamination at the terminal, 
then the handlers would not prefer to test any bin at the next delivery until railcar contamination 
is detected. For a situation where the farmer’s misrepresentation situation is a problem but the 
truck tests are not complete, the bin test acts as a buffer against risks to avoid further quality loss.  
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4.4.4 Terminal Elevator Behavior 
The terminal elevator handlers receive wheat deliveries from the primary elevator and test 
deliveries before unloading them. It is assumed that testing will be done randomly on railcars 
with a specified probability. Any delivery in which undesirable classes of wheat exceeds the 
specified tolerance will be downgraded to feed. In this portion of the model, there is a trade-off 
between the terminal elevator’s test rate for railcars and the penalty imposed on the primary 
elevator if misrepresented railcars are detected. Of course, the terminal elevator’s test rate and 
test results will influence the adjustment of the primary elevator’s handling strategies. However, 
all other factors involved with the terminal elevator’s wheat handling are beyond the scope of the 
simulation model. 
4.4.5 Cost Functions 
In the simulation, attention must be paid to changes in the risk management costs of each supply 
chain participant. The cost levels measured through time provide a foundation for comparing 
efficiencies between different testing strategies. And only variable costs are considered in this 
research. Thus, a farmer’s cost in this sense includes revenue (or price) loss due to 
misrepresentation plus a contamination penalty: 
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 (4-9) 
where p1 is the eligible wheat price provided by the primary elevator, p0 is the feed price, fj is the 
fine for  per unit of misrepresented wheat, and qj is the volume of discovered misrepresented 
wheat.  
The primary elevator’s handling cost function is composed of the following components, which 
translate into equation (4-10): 
 
 
  
+sampling and sample retention cost 
+test costs (testing and tracing) 
+ losses due to bin contamination 
- retrieved losses from testing and tracing  
  (collected  penalty) 
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Where    is the unit sample retention cost,    is the unit sample test cost of each truck delivery, 
   is the test cost of a bin sample, S1  is the number of retained samples of farmer truck deliveries, 
S2 is the number of tested truck samples, S3 is the number of retained samples of bins, S4 is the 
number of tested bin samples, p2 is the eligible wheat price provided by the terminal elevator, Q1 
is the total amount of contaminated wheat detected via bin testing, Q2 represents the total amount 
of contaminated wheat detected at railcar testing, and ft is the monetary penalty per unit volume 
for railcar misrepresentation.  
4.4.6 Model Control Diagram 
Farmer behavior is influenced by both primary elevator handling strategies and the behavior of 
the neighbor. The primary elevator handlers actively respond to the terminal handling strategy 
and perceived misrepresentation situation and subsequently adjust their handling strategies to 
meet changing conditions.  
Agents in the model interact with each other and the system is dynamic and evolutionary. 
Existing literature attempts to generate insights through a static model of homogenous agents. 
Unfortunately, the gap between a complex decision-making environment and these models is 
significant because those models are applied in a static situation with simplistic assumptions. An 
agent-based model takes into account the inherent system dynamics as realistically as possible in 
order to help address the limitations of static models. While the idea of using software agents for 
understanding, modeling and operating the dynamic of the supply chain is novel, they can 
provide valuable information for the transition from static supply chain modeling to dynamic 
supply chain modeling.  
Figure 4.2 shows a simple control diagram of simulation. The thick lines indicate the main 
stream of the handling system dynamics while the dotted lines indicate the interactions between 
participants in the systematic environment. A more detailed description of the control diagram is 
in Appendix E. 
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4.5 Parameters Variables and Data 
Variables as well as their assumed values in the simulation are listed below: 
Table 4. 1 Parameters, Variables and Their Values 
 
Variables Values 
 Years for delivery (N) 30 
 Farmer number (n) 48 
 Initial risk control  effort distribution U[0.15, 1]
15
 
 Initial technology index distribution U[1.8, 2.0]
16
 
 Exogenous parameter  in equation 4-1 10 
 Misrepresentation probability distribution U[0.0039, 0.4724] 
 Mean of misrepresentation probability 0.10
17
 
 Production capacity per farmer 360 tonnes 
 Yearly deliveries for a farmer  9 (1 truck each time) 
                                                          
15
 Here 0 is no effort to control risk, and 1 is a full effort to control risk, which makes a farmer’s misrepresentation 
probability approach zero if the farmer risk control technology is also high. 
16
 The highest risk control technology a farmer can approach is 1. As defined previously, a lower value in 
technology proxy indicates a higher level of technology. 
17
 Refer to Appendix F for the calculation of the mean of initial misrepresentation probability.  
Initialization 
Farmer 
Behavior 
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Elevator 
Handling ……
…Testing Strategy  
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Figure 4.2 Simulation Control Diagram 
Farmer Effort 
Adjustment 
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 Yearly delivery for the primary elevator 9 
 Total deliveries for a farmer or the primary elevator 270 
 Truck loading capacity 40 tonnes 
 Cost of  truck sample test with  100% accuracy $400/sample  
 Primary elevator bins used 8 
 Bin capacity 240 tonnes 
 Cost of  bin sample test with  100% accuracy $600/sample 
 Railcars used  32 
 Railcar capacity 60tonnes 
 Price of eligible No.1 CWRS 13.5 protein $10/bushel 
 Price of feed $6/bushel 
 Initial primary test rate for farmers 100% 
 Initial primary test rate for bins 0% 
 Railcar test rate 80% 
 Test accuracy 100% 
 Effort cost of the farmer $500/unit
18 
Source: Author 
 
 
If detected, contaminated wheat in bins and railcars is downgraded to feed wheat due to the high 
level of undesirable components in it.
19
 For misrepresenting farmers detected at the truck test 
point, there is no additional penalty imposed on them other than a price decrease. For any 
misrepresented farmer detected with the tracing procedure, he or she will suffer greater penalties 
due to the contamination losses resulting from misrepresentation.  
In this study, supply chain participants share the contamination losses in the following manner. 
Generally, the farmer with misrepresentation absorbs 40% of the total contamination loss (after 
the reduction of price loss undertaken by the farmer), while the remaining portion (60%) of the 
                                                          
18
 It is assumed that farmer’s risk control effort, e.g. time, labour, carefulness, and resource allocation and 
utilization, can be measured by unit and each unit is convertible to a monetary equivalent. 
19
 In this study, at most six deliveries share one bin. If one of them is misrepresented, the bin will be commingled 
with 16.7% undesired wheat at a minimum. According to the CGC (2011) (Official Grain Grading), if a Canadian 
Western wheat variety contains undesired varieties at over 5%, the wheat would be downgraded to feed. 
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loss is absorbed by the primary elevator
20
. Based on the Canadian Grain Act (2012), the 
maximum value of the penalty for an individual farmer in a delivery is eighteen thousand dollars. 
If the calculated penalty amount for a farmer exceeds such a maximum value, the farmer will 
only pay eighteen thousand dollars and the primary elevator will bear the rest.  
Parameters defining the evolution of farmer’s efforts or technology are given starting values as 
listed in Table 4.2. These values determine the pace of risk control effort and technology defined 
in equations 4-2 and 4-3. Although both capturing and testing arouse farmer efforts, deterrence 
stemming from the former (with marginal effect of λ1) is much greater that from the latter (with 
marginal effect λ2). 
 
Table 4.2 Parameters Involved in the Evolution of Efforts or Technology 
Parameters Application Values 
1 Risk Control Effort 0.005 
2 Risk Control Effort 0.001 
3 Risk Control Effort 0.001 
1   Technology 0.01 
Source: Author 
Note: The values of 1, 2 and 3 help determine the pace of risk effort for farmers. In turn, the 
value of 1 helps determine the pace of technology improvement that results from experience 
and learning. 
To start, a random search was used for testing strategy parameter optimization. In MATLAB○R, a 
routine was designed to check a number of combinations of parameters involved in developing 
testing strategies to identify the best. Each combination of parameter values is simulated for 100 
iterations to collect objective values (handling costs). The minimum objective value from this set 
                                                          
20
 There are no laws and regulations to control the exact share of damage a related party should bear in the case of 
contamination. The eligibility declaration (CGC, 2012) (Appendix A) states a producer “will be liable to the Grain 
Handling Company and/or Grain Buyer for all claims, damages, losses and costs (including legal fees) that may 
result from such false and/or negligent representation”, while the Canadian Grain Act (2012) clarifies the primary 
elevator “shall exercise reasonable care and diligence to prevent any grain in the elevator from suffering damage or 
from deteriorating or going out of condition”. Allowing for this, it is assumed that the primary elevator and the 
farmer commonly share contamination losses in this case. 
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yields the best parameter values for shaping the most efficient testing strategies across time. 
These parameters and iterated “best” values are shown in Table 2.  
Table 4.3 Parameters Involved in Handling Strategy Development  
and Their Best Values 
Parameters Application Values 
1 Testing at point 1 for 1
st
 delivery 30.0 
2 Testing at point 1 for 1
st
 delivery 60.0 
1 Testing at point 1 for deliveries after the 1
st
 8.0 
2 Testing at point 1 for deliveries after the 1
st 16.0 
1 Testing at point 2 for 1
st
 delivery 30.0 
2 Testing at point 2 for 1
st
 delivery 75.0 
3 Testing at point 2 for 1
st
 delivery 90.0 
1 Testing at point 2 for deliveries after the 1
st 8.0 
2 Testing at point 2 for deliveries after the 1
st
 20.0 
Source: Author 
Note: The values of  and  are associated with developing the test rates for farmers. The values 
of  and  are associated with developing the primary elevator’s test rate for bins. 
There is some intuition in these optimal parameter values. We can see that to pursue testing 
efficiency, handlers use perceived farmers’ misrepresentation information in different ways 
based on the characteristics of information. To highlight the heterogeneity inherent in farmers’ 
behavior, handlers give more weight to individual information (2, 3 and 2) than to general 
information (1, 1, 2 and 1) when designing testing strategies. In the meantime, to allow for 
the variation of misrepresentation probability across time, handlers consider newly perceived 
information in the current year (2 and 2) as more important than old information perceived in 
the past years (1 and 1).  
4.6 Simulation Method – MATLAB○R 
As a mathematical tool and a high-level programming language extensively used to solve 
engineering and scientific problems, MATLAB○R is also becoming a standard software tool used 
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by economists to solve a large array of numerical optimization problems (Nolan et al., 2009). It 
integrates computation, visualization, and programming in an easy-to-use environment where 
problem and solutions are expressed in familiar mathematical notation (MathWorks, 2001).  
The MATLAB○R language supports the vector and matrix operations that are fundamental to for 
large-scale agent-based modeling and testing. Specifically, the sparse matrix functions allow 
storage and manipulation of large matrices in memory. This function helps manage and operate 
with the tremendous amounts of data generated in this simulation. MATLAB○R enables one to 
perform computationally intensive tasks faster than with traditional programming languages such 
as C, C++, and Fortran. As a result, one line of MATLAB○R code can often replace several lines 
of C or C++ code. This allows the researcher to focus on applications rather than on 
programming details. At the same time, MATLAB○R  provides all the features of a traditional 
programming language, including arithmetic operators, flow control, data structures, data, 
input/output, object-oriented programming, and debugging features. These features provide a 
block of diagram tools for modeling, simulating and prototyping dynamical systems. 
 
4.7 Simulation and Results 
All simulation results discussed here were obtained using 500 iterations of the simulation 
model
21
. Due to random elements in the model, simulation results differ from one run to another, 
thus summarized or averaged results from multiple runs are more representative of system 
operation. The histograms summarize values for 500 model iterations and display how the 
handling system operates under the aforementioned predetermined rules governing participant 
behavior. 
 
Farmers interact with the environment and their risk control effort and technology evolves across 
time. Each farmer’s misrepresentation probability may dramatically change from the initial time 
to the end of the time. Figure 3(a) and 3(b) shows the distribution of farmer’s actual 
misrepresentation rate at the initial and at the end year of delivery.   
                                                          
21
 The Matlab code for this simulation is available upon request from the author.  
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Handlers rely on a moving average of perceptions to determine an individual farmer’s 
misrepresentation status for any specific time period. The efficiency of testing greatly depends 
on how exactly the moving average misrepresentation probability can represent the actual 
misrepresentation probability a farmer applies in a specific year. The moving average function 
levels out the year to year misrepresentation fluctuations, meaning that testing strategy cannot 
overreact to any accidentally occurring misrepresentation. Generally, the robustness of the 
moving average grows with time and so does the efficiency of testing based on this 
misrepresentation risk indication system. To this end, Figure 4(b) shows the distribution of 
perceived farmer’s misrepresentation probability at the 15th year of the simulation. Note how 
well it approximates the distribution of actual misrepresentation shown in Figure 4(a). 
 
 
Figure 4.3(a) Distribution of Actual 
Misrepresentation Probability in the Initial Time 
Figure 4.3(b) Distribution of Actual 
Misrepresentation Probability in the 30
th
 Year 
Figure 4.4(a) Distribution of Actual 
Misrepresentation Probability in the 15
th
 Year 
 
Figure 4.4(b) Distribution of Perceived 
Misrepresentation Probability in the 15
th
 Year 
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Using the model to generate data for this supply chain, we start by showing how the simulation 
works with the truck testing procedure. Figure 4.5 shows the effects of the previously described 
test strategies on farmer deliveries over time (test point 1), while Figure 4.6 shows the test 
results: the number of misrepresented trucks detected in the simulation. Note that these figures 
do not include the tested or detected amounts in the traceability procedures, as these will be 
shown subsequently. Figure 4.5 indicates the testing intensity as it corresponds to the 
misrepresentation condition: when a farmer’s misrepresentation situation is serious, it is efficient 
to test all or most of the first deliveries of farmers, and when farmers rarely misrepresent their 
deliveries, a low testing rate is more applicable for monitoring purposes.  
 
This simulation assumes each farmer’s deliveries are consistent through a year and there is no 
cheating behavior (Assumption 5 in Section 4.4.1). If a farmer knows his or her wheat 
production is ineligible, he or she will not deliver it again at the call for CWRS. Farmers who 
were tested but proven non-misrepresented will not be tested again this year. After all 
misrepresented deliveries are identified at sometime in a given year, there is no 
misrepresentation from that time on in the year.  
Actually, as shall be shown later, almost all misrepresented deliveries are in fact identified just 
after every first delivery is finished in a year. That explains why the tested number of trucks (and 
also the tested number of bins subsequently) mostly drops to zero from the second delivery in 
each year. When the farmers’ misrepresentation situation is serious (in the first few years shown 
in the Figure 4.5), the testing strategy used in the simulation model tests all or most of the first 
deliveries of farmers. As a result, a large volume of misrepresented wheat never enters the grain 
handling system and thus extensive contamination is avoided. Conversely, when the farmer’s 
  
Figure 4.5 Number of Tested Trucks Figure 4.6 Number of Detected Trucks 
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misrepresentation was not that severe, there were fewer trucks tested in the first delivery within a 
given year. For example, as shown in Figure 4.5, after the 15
th
 year, less than half of 48 trucks in 
the sample were tested in the first delivery.  
In the model, handlers receive feedback from the truck test, the primary bin test and then the 
terminal test, adjusting its testing strategy to meet the eventual misrepresentation situation. It is 
suggested for the most part that not all trucks are tested at the first delivery within a given year. 
Thus, there exists some probability that undetected and misrepresented wheat enters the primary 
elevator and results in contamination. The goal of the bin test is to detect contaminated wheat 
early enough to prevent it from moving to the terminal elevator.   
Figure 4.7 shows the bin testing and results over time (testing point 2 in the supply chain) and 
Figure 4.8 shows the traceability enacted by detected bin contaminations. In Figure 4.7, the 
number of tested bins (red lines) and the number of bins found to be contaminated (blue lines) 
for each delivery are indicated. The structure of the simulation means that bin tests only occur in 
the mid to late time frame in the delivery history. This is due to the fact that all or most of 
misrepresented trucks are detected before unloading in the first 10 years, minimizing the need for 
a bin test during this period. Even if there is bin testing, the testing intensity is in low levels. One 
reason is that testing at the previous test point has prevented most of misrepresented wheat from 
entering primary elevator bins and there are few contaminations occurring at the bin level. In this 
situation, intensive bin testing is not efficient. The other reason is that this model excludes any 
potential penalty from the terminal elevator contamination resulting from misrepresented 
railcars, lowering the primary elevator handlers’ incentive to test bins. 
 
Figure 4.7 Number of Tested Bins and  
Number of Proven Contaminated 
Figure 4.8 Number of Tested Farmers and 
Number of Detected Farmers at the Tracing 
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If there is bin testing necessary in a year, it mostly occurred in the first delivery of the year.  The 
reason is the same as mentioned before: almost all misrepresented deliveries are identified just 
after the first delivery is finished. So there is almost no need to take a bin test from the second 
delivery within a year. Any time when there are contaminated bins detected, there is an 
economic incentive to trigger out traceability mechanism in each of those contamination cases 
(traceability 1). At given testing cost for samples and penalty level for offences, the potential 
penalty amount collected from identified offenders is much greater than traceability costs in each 
case. By testing the reserved truck samples, the primary elevator traces the particular farmer who 
misrepresented the delivery. Figure 4.8 shows the traced (red line) and detected (blue line) 
number of trucks. Mostly, but not all the retention samples related to a contaminated bin need to 
be tested in the tracing procedure. The reason is that some trucks get tested and identified before 
unloading into the bin, so there is no need to test them again. It has been assumed that normally, 
each bin contains 6 trucks of wheat, so sometimes the average number of traced trucks is less 
than 6 for 1 contaminated bin.  
To pursue testing efficiency, the handlers testing strategies are adjusted according to 
misrepresentation conditions. In some years, the truck testing cannot be complete. Thus it is 
possible that undetected misrepresented deliveries are unloaded into primary bins and are 
commingled with other eligible wheat. If contaminated bins are left undetected, wheat from 
those bins will then be loaded in railcars and delivered to the terminal elevator. Those railcars 
loaded with contaminated wheat will be misrepresented at the terminal elevator and exposed to 
terminal testing.  
As the final stage of the supply chain, Figure 4.9 shows the railcar test result at the terminal 
elevator (test point 3). Ultimately, not all the misrepresented railcars were detected because the 
terminal elevator’s test rate for railcars in the simulation is fixed at 0.8. Thus, the number of 
detected railcars is less than the actual number of misrepresented railcars. 
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Once a misrepresented railcar is detected, a traceability mechanism will be enacted to find the 
offenders along the upstream of the supply chain (called traceability 2). By referring to the 
railcar loading records, the handlers can trace the corresponding contaminated bin from which 
the misrepresented railcar was loaded. Any detected misrepresented railcar provides enough 
information to target a contaminated bin from which the railcar was loaded. In most of the 
simulations, the probability of successfully tracing a contaminated bin is greater than the railcar 
test rate. For example, if the railcar test rate is 0.8, the probability of successfully tracing a 
contaminated bin is about 0.998.
22
  This is the reason why not all the misrepresented railcars 
could be detected at the terminal elevator, but almost all the contaminated bins were traced and 
found at the first delivery each year.  
In the simulated supply chain, each identified misrepresented railcar corresponds to a 
contaminated bin and each contaminated bin indicates the need for sample tests for farmers 
whose deliveries were unloaded in this bin. Finally, after targeting the contaminated bin, the 
handlers can trace the misrepresented farmers through related truck sample testing.   
Figure 4.10 shows the number of traced bins associated with the traceability procedure. Figure 
4.11 shows the associated number of test deliveries and the number of detected farmers. The 
simulation shows that a well arranged tracing procedure can save costs for the wheat handlers. 
To start, it is not necessary to test each truck sample related to a contaminated bin. If a farmer 
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elevator, a contaminated bin will be identified with a probability (
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Figure 4.9 Number of Tested Railcars (Left) and Number of Detected Railcars (Right) 
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has proven to have honestly represented sometime within a year, either through testing or 
tracing, then retention samples of his or her deliveries should not be tested again in tracing. Only 
truck samples that have never been tested or traced within the year needed to be tested to identify 
the offender. As figure 4.11 shows, the number of traced farmers is mostly less than the total 
number of farmers whose deliveries were unloaded in the contaminated bins in each delivery. In 
the example, at the first delivery in the 8
th
 year, there are only 2 farmers in average who are 
traced to identify the offender for one contaminated bin.  
 
From the farmer perspective, Figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 respectively illustrate the evolution of 
the farmer’s average risk control effort, technology, and the resulting misrepresentation 
probability through the simulation.  
 
Generally speaking, it is found that farmer risk control effort increases over time. The motivation 
of testing and penalty dominates the evolution of effort and helps to reduce moral hazard issues 
over time. In this case, the value of effort is initialized at a medium level 0.57 and ends at a high 
 
Figure 4.10 Number of Traced Bins Figure 4.11 Number of Tested 
and Detected Farmers 
  
Figure 4.12 Farmer’s Effort Figure 4.13 Farmer’s Technology Index 
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level 0.97, where 0 is no effort and 1 is a full effort. Note as well that the technology improves 
over time while the value in technology proxy goes down gradually, with the technology 
spanning from 1.88 to 1.24 units.  
 Accordingly, shown in Figure 4.14, the farmer’s misrepresentation rate goes down from a 
relatively high value of 0.095 to a final of value 0.005. This means the farmers in the simulation 
are being detected when they misrepresent and corrective steps enacted within the supply chain 
to trace and penalize them seem to push incentives in the correct direction.   
 
Next, there are relative costs for supply chain participants. These costs include the primary 
elevator’s handling costs, the farmer’s economic loss from misrepresentation, and the farmer’s 
costs to undertake risk control efforts. Figure 4.15 shows the primary elevator’s handling costs as 
they evolve over time. In the simulation, higher handling costs occurred in those delivery periods 
when there were serious misrepresentations which incurred high test costs. Handling costs were 
also high in those periods when contaminations were severe. Although in the contamination 
cases all the misrepresented trucks resulting in contaminations were ultimately traced, the 
misrepresentations already resulted in contamination and thus revenue reductions in the system. 
And as was assumed, although the detected offenders were able to cover part of their ultimate 
revenue shortfall, the primary elevator also shared some of this shortfall. So any bin 
contamination adds costs for the primary elevator handlers.  
Figure 4.16 shows the collective farmer’s economic loss from misrepresentation. If a farmer’s 
misrepresented delivery is detected at an early stage (test point 1), he only suffers a price drop. If 
a misrepresented delivery is identified at a later stage (i.e. test point 2 or test point 3), loss will be 
Figure 4.14 Farmer’s Misrepresentation Probability 
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greater because the farmer suffers both a price reduction and a contamination penalty. Figure 
4.17 tracks the cost of farmer’s efforts over time. In the simulation it is assumed that cost for per 
unit effort is fixed, so the farmer’s effort costs linearly increase with efforts. Figure 4.18 shows 
the summation of the listed three types of costs over time, and illustrates the total costs of 
maintaining a trustworthy grain supply chain for the participants involved in this simulation.  
 
 
 
4.8 Cost Analysis 
In order to compare the simulated “best” testing regime against reasonable alternative regimes, 
relative costs generated by the simulation results are compared with costs generated using 
alternative test strategies that may offer potential efficiencies. The alternatives considered for 
comparison are: 
Figure 4.15 Elevator’s Handling Costs 
 
Figure 4.16 Farmers’ Loss from  
Misrepresentation 
 
Figure 4.17 Farmer’s Effort Costs Figure 4.18 Total Costs 
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Model 1 (base model): Test strategies used in the above simulation. As shown previously, there 
are 3 testing points along the handling system and the testing strategies at the testing point 1 and  
point 2 are conditioned on perceived information (testing at the point 3 is fixed at 80%). Those 
strategies are continuously adjusted according to updated farmer’s misrepresentation data over 
time. 
Model 2 (truck 100%): 100% testing of trucks before unloading. This model has two possibilities 
to add efficiency to wheat handling: First, there are no other strategies better than this one to 
ensure grain consistency. This testing strategy can exclude any misrepresented deliveries from 
entering the supply chain; second, there is no need to take any bin testing. Whether this model is 
better than Model 1 depends on whether benefits from avoided contamination and bin testing 
cost savings can cover the increase in costs for truck testing.   
Model 3 (bin 100%): 0% testing of trucks before unloading, but 100% testing of the elevator bins 
before loading. Compared with Model 1, this model enjoys advantages. First, handlers can save 
costs of truck testing. As shown in Model 1, truck testing costs significantly more than the bin 
test costs in Model 1. Next, contamination sources are all identified at bin test point and there is 
no contaminated wheat moving farther to the terminal elevator. Can those benefits surpass the 
bin contamination losses resulting from the absence of truck testing? Model 3 can answer this 
question.  
Model 4 (truck 50% plus bin 50%): 50% testing of trucks and 50% testing of bins. This strategy 
is a representative random testing without allowing for misrepresentation situations across time.  
Model 5 (traceability only): There is no truck testing or bin testing but there is a full testing of 
railcars. Thus, the system relies solely on traceability to identify offenders in cases of 
contamination. Simulations in Model 1 shows most truck and bin tests catch nothing. If there is 
no testing at those test points, testing costs can be reduced. This model can provide a comparison 
as to whether these reduced testing costs lead to large contamination losses.  
To produce large sample results, each model was run for 500 iterations to obtain cost values. The 
average values from the simulations are shown in Figure 4.19. To facilitate comparison, each 
cost value in Model 1 (the base model) is normalized to unity.  
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As expected, Model 1 (the base model) generates the lowest primary elevator handling costs. In 
contrast, no contamination occurs in Model 2 (truck 100%), but the testing cost is very high, 
raising the overall handling costs. And although Model 5 (traceability only) saves test costs, 
contamination loss is the highest among the models. It is also worth noting that high test costs 
and significant contamination losses occur in both Model 3 (bin 100%) and Model 4 (truck 50%,  
plus bin 50%). Interestingly, farmer losses from misrepresentation are lowest in Model 2 (truck 
100%). This occurs because all the misrepresented deliveries are detected at an early stage of 
supply chain. If misrepresented wheat enters the handling system and moves farther along the 
chain, large contamination losses will ultimately result. This helps explain why farmers’ losses 
are so high in Model 3 (bin 100%), Model 4 (truck 50% plus bin 50%) and Model 5 (traceability 
only). Finally, the difference between farmer’s effort costs in the five models is not significant. 
However, Model 1 (base model) and Model 2 (truck 100%) enjoy generate lower farmer effort 
costs. This stems from the fact that in these scenarios, farmers suffer less misrepresentation 
losses, so their motivation to improve efforts are not as strong as in the other models. In 
summary, the aggregation of farmer and elevator costs in Model 1 (base model) is the lowest 
among all the models/scenarios, so it is concluded that from either the handlers’ or a social 
welfare perspective, Model 1 represents the most efficient testing regime.  
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4.9 Summary 
Mirroring reality, in this chapter grain supply chain participants are represented as autonomous 
agents exhibiting a degree of heterogeneous behavior. The agents interact with each other as well 
(b) Farmers’ Losses from Misrepresentation 
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Figure 4.19 Relative Costs in Different Models 
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as with their operating environment via a set of heuristic rules governing their actions and 
decisions. The operation of a hypothetical grain handling system under VED including sampling, 
testing, misrepresentation, contamination and traceability is simulated from the individual farm 
level up through the supply chain to the elevator. Integrating information flow and feedback into 
decision-making allows the developed testing strategies to better coincide with different 
misrepresentation situations. These preliminary results suggest contamination testing strategies 
under VED will be more efficient when they can be continually adjusted with respect to testing 
location within this dynamic operational environment. 
Simulation results indicate the testing strategies are also very sensitive to the particular 
misrepresentation situation. When the farmer’s misrepresentation condition is severe (here 
severe is assumed to be over a 2% misrepresentation rate), the simulation indicates that it is cost 
efficient to test all or most farmer’s deliveries at the first delivery (at the truck stage) for each 
year. When the misrepresentation condition is less severe (0.005%-2% misrepresentation rate), 
testing intensity will need to shift from farmer’s trucks to elevator bins to maintain cost 
efficiency.  
The adoption of a traceability mechanism under VED in the agent based simulation contributes 
to the trust and cost efficiency of the overall handling system. Simulation results suggest that it is 
efficient to enact traceability when there are contaminated bins detected or misrepresented 
railcars detected. The main reason for this is that under the misrepresentation situation assumed 
in the simulation, the possible penalty from the offence is higher than traceability cost. A 
handling system operating under traceability has the potential to save the entire system much 
more than a system without traceability. Based on delivery documentation and retention samples, 
it is relatively straightforward to figure out tracing steps in order to swiftly identify where the 
contamination occurred. Traceability cost is low in each tracing case assumed here because only 
truck or bin samples related to detected contamination need to be tested. Furthermore, successful 
traceability gives a strong deterrence to misrepresentation behavior and thus helps motivates 
farmers to put more effort on controlling production risks, reducing potential moral hazard 
problems and further contributing to the risk and cost reduction of the supply chain system.  
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Moral hazard problems under VED add complexity to the development of handling strategies. 
Testing helps alleviate these moral hazard problems and the success of a handling regime even if 
tests cannot catch any misrepresentation. The aim of such testing is to create an incentive for 
farmers to put efforts into production activities to reduce the likelihood of misrepresentation. 
This is especially true if the testing is designed with a higher level of test intensity for those 
farmers who have a higher likelihood to misrepresent their deliveries than others. The effect of 
testing is to reduce moral hazard over time as participants react rationally to the costs of being 
tested. Under the defined regulations governing individual reactions in the simulation, the results 
show that cost efficient testing is possible for wheat handling under VED.  
A grain handling system under VED with carefully considered testing strategies can mitigate 
contamination risks while keeping handling costs relatively low. As shown in the latter parts of 
the chapter, the simulation provides a foundation on which to compare testing strategies that may 
be thought useful in a specific operating environment or alternatively to evaluate the efficiency 
of a predetermined test strategy. Given the current policy environment, this research is timely 
and can provides input into potential unforeseen consequences of implementing VED within the 
grain supply chain.  
In the simulation, the rules that govern participants’ actions, decisions, and interactions with 
other agents are rested on specific assumptions regarding functional forms and parameter values. 
Any change in these rules can change the simulation results. The degree of rationality inherent in 
these forms and values determines the extent to which the simulated environment matches 
reality. Overall, the approach used in this study contributes to the methodology of risk 
forecasting and assessment under VED as well as moral hazard situations in modern agriculture.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MODEL COMPARISONS: TESTING STRATEGIES 
  
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 characterized a set of testing strategies for a handling system under VED with three 
test points in a supply chain. In fact, the handlers enjoy considerable freedom for selecting test 
points. This raises some other interesting questions: Can the efficiency of testing strategies be 
improved if fewer test points are chosen for testing? Can handling efficiency be ensured if it 
depends only on testing without traceability? What are the influences of an initial 
misrepresentation condition on developing testing strategies? We attempt to answer these 
questions as part of the study on developing better handling strategies under VED.  
Analysis in Chapter 3 showed us that when test points are predetermined, various testing 
strategies could reduce contamination, but at possibly different costs to the system or to certain 
participants. To this end, the effects of different strategies on handling system costs are evaluated 
by examining simulation models with different combinations of test points under different levels 
of misrepresentation. Recall that the comparative simulation model in Chapter 4 used what were 
considered to be three logical test points in the wheat supply chain: (1) a truck test before 
unloading wheat into primary elevator bins (test point 1). (2) A primary elevator bin test done 
before loading wheat into railcars (test point 2). (3) A railcar test before loading wheat into the 
terminal elevator bins (test point 3). Due to this, there are two points where the traceability 
mechanism can be activated: (1) when there are contaminations detected at test point 2; and (2) 
when there are contaminations detected at test point 3. When developing these new models for 
comparison, it is firstly needed to decide which test points to use in each model and then develop 
appropriate testing and trace strategies for the predetermined test points in each model. 
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This thinking led to the development of the following five models. They are considered for this 
portion of the study because it is believed they represent the best variety of combinations of 
testing possibilities throughout each step of the wheat supply chain and offer the potential to 
contribute to wheat handling efficiency: 
Model A (truck, bin and railcar): In this model, there are 3 test points - truck, bin and railcar. 
Samples for all truck deliveries are retained. If there is detected contamination at test point 2 or 
test point 3, traceability will be triggered. Note that this model is similar to the one developed in 
Chapter 4, but different assumptions on initial misrepresentation rates will be applied. In this 
manner, one can check whether testing strategies developed in Model 1 in Chapter 4 still work 
well under different misrepresentation conditions. 
Model B (truck and railcar): In this model, there is a truck test (test point 1) and a railcar test 
(test point 3). If contamination is detected at test point 3, traceability will be triggered. Results 
from Chapter 4 suggested the test point 2 (bin test) can be neglected when the misrepresentation 
rate is extremely low or extremely high. This model will examine whether the omission of test 
point 2 can generate additional efficiency to wheat handling. 
Model C (bin and railcar): In this model, there is a bin test (test point 2) and a railcar test (test 
point 3). Traceability will be triggered if there is any contamination detected at those two test 
points. If test point 1 is available in the supply chain, most testing occurs at this test point and 
accordingly, testing costs at test point 1 generate a considerable share of the total costs of wheat 
handling. This model checks whether the absence of testing at point 1 contributes to the 
efficiency of wheat handling. 
Model D (railcar only): In this model, only a railcar test (test point 3) is used and traceability is 
available for offending cases. Interestingly, this strategy is openly preferred by managers in 
Viterra (2007) and the CWB (2008). These participants believe a well-established traceability 
mechanism will provide incentives to supply chain participants for segregation efforts. Through 
this model, one can check whether the testing costs saved at test point 1 and test point 2 can 
cover the increased contamination costs due to testing omissions.   
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Model E (no traceability): There are 3 test points in this model, but samples for truck deliveries 
are not retained. So traceability is not available even if contamination is detected at test point 2 
or test point 3. Through this model one can examine whether costs saved from eliminating 
sample retaining and traceability processing outweigh the relative contamination cost increases 
from misrepresentation under these different misrepresentation conditions. 
When test points are chosen, the procedure for determining efficient testing and tracing strategy 
is complicated due to the factors involved in the strategy design. For example, a farmer’s 
reaction to testing, tracing and penalty, or a handler test strategy adjustments are made according 
to perceived misrepresentation information. Many parameters might be considered in the 
evolution of testing strategies. Any change in these parameter values in such a complex system, 
even those that might seem insignificant, can influence the simulation results significantly. The 
procedure used to assess best parameter values is the same as that developed in Chapter 4. By 
examining numerous parameter value combinations, the most successful parameter values for 
handling and cost minimization can be identified.  
Handling costs are closely related to a farmer’s misrepresentation rate. Under different 
assumptions on a farmer’s initial misrepresentation rate, each model generates a set of different 
testing strategies resulting in varying handling costs. For doing this, two different base 
assumptions on the farmer’s initial misrepresentation rate are considered: a high 
misrepresentation rate and a low misrepresentation rate.    
First, this part of the study starts the simulation under the assumption of a high misrepresentation 
rate. Then a low initial misrepresentation rate is introduced as an alternative and the simulation 
results are compared with those obtained under a high initial misrepresentation rate assumption. 
All other assumptions about the grain handling system are the same as those used in Sections 4-
4.3.1.  
 
5.2 Wheat Handling under a High Initial Misrepresentation Rate Condition 
Here, the simulation identifies efficient testing and tracing strategies for each model under the 
assumption that a farmer’s initial misrepresentation situation is serious. After that, the reaction 
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by the farmer via risk control effort and risk control technology under those strategies will be 
shown. Finally, by calculating handling costs and farmer losses and making comparisons, we 
conduct a scenario analysis on the effects and efficiencies of handling strategies within each 
model. 
These five comparative models are all affected by the evolution of participant behavior over 
time. For the same model, simulation results will vary from iteration to iteration due to 
randomness and uncertainties along the supply chain during handling. By way of example, 
farmers randomly misrepresent their deliveries over time and are also randomly detected at 
different testing points and those situations will almost never be the same in two different 
simulation runs. And farmer effort and technology can evolve in different ways depending on the 
frequency of being detected, the test point used for detection and the time detected, and this will 
differ across iterations. Further, contamination from misrepresentation can occur in different 
ways. It can occur in a way that two misrepresented truck deliveries contaminate one bin or one 
misrepresented truck delivery contaminates two different bins. Finally, a railcar can also be 
randomly loaded with wheat from the same bin, either clean or contaminated, or loaded wheat 
from two different bins, one that is clean and the other that is contaminated, while handlers’ 
testing strategies are different from iteration to iteration since the handling environment is never 
consistent in different runs - and so on. As a result, individual simulation runs can generate very 
different outcomes. Simulation results from any single model run are not representative of the 
system operation in that model. To reduce the effects of this variability and generate large 
sample results, the averaged simulation results obtained from 500 iterations of each model are 
illustrated in this study.  
5.2.1 Test Strategies and Trace Strategies 
Under the first assumption of high initial misrepresentation probability, the initial farmer’s effort 
is set ata randomly generated low value interval [0.0934, 0.4173] and the average effort value is 
set at a low level of 0.2441. The initial farmer technology is in a randomly generated interval 
[1.8295, 1.9980] with an average value of 1.8874. Based on equation 4-4.1 (with η=10), the 
initial farmer’s misrepresentation rate is distributed in the range [0.0940, 0.6489] with an average 
value of 0.3152. Such a high initial level of misrepresentation probability is clearly hypothetical. 
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But modeling such a specific situation can provide insight into those extreme cases which may 
rarely be perceived in reality. Once again, the simulated time period is 30 years for each model. 
Figures A-G1 to A-G5 in Appendix G illustrate test strategies at each test point as well as tracing 
strategies for detected contaminations across the 5 base models. These strategies include a testing 
strategy for trucks, a testing strategy for elevator bins and a testing strategy for railcars. Test 
results include the number of detected misrepresented grain trucks, detected contaminated bins 
and detected misrepresented railcars at each test point and in the trace procedure.  
All models include test point 3, the railcar test at the terminal. It is further assumed that the 
terminal elevator handlers test 80 percent of railcars delivered by the primary elevator, so the 
railcar test does factor in strategy design. If traceability is possible, all contamination sources can 
be identified with a probability 0.998 (refer to Appendix C for more information). This implies 
almost all misrepresentation will be detected if not detected already at each previous test point.   
For those models including the first test point (models A, B and E), intensive truck testing is 
suggested. The logic behind such a test strategy is that it should effectively prevent 
misrepresented wheat varieties from entering the supply chain in early stages. If misrepresented 
wheat enters in the supply chain and moves farther along, greater losses will result. When most 
of the misrepresented deliveries are detected at the truck testing stage, the necessity and 
efficiency of primary bin testing is reduced (models A and E). 
When there is no testing at point 1 (models C and D) in this grain handling system, grain 
movement along the supply chain will be under threat of contamination from misrepresented 
deliveries. In this situation, if test point 2 is available (as in Model C), a high bin test rate is 
assumed. Doing so helps avoid a situation where the misrepresented contaminated wheat is 
moved to and results in misrepresentation at the terminal elevator.  
Ultimately while costly, the truck test and the primary elevator bin test help prevent 
misrepresented wheat from moving farther into the supply chain. Without these test points, in 
fact contamination from misrepresented deliveries can be severe, leading to high costs. Among 
the five models, serious contamination occurred in Models C (bin and railcar) and D (railcar 
only). In Model C, because there is no test point number 1, wheat from misrepresented deliveries 
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was loaded into primary elevator bins and contaminated other eligible wheat. Although part of 
the contamination losses are compensated by the traced offenders (40 percent of contamination 
losses or less), the primary elevator still suffers large economic losses (60 percent of 
contamination losses or more). And in Model D, there are no test points 1 and 2. In this case, 
contaminated wheat cannot be identified until it arrives at the terminal elevator.  Thus, it is found 
the number of contaminated railcars is much greater than found in the other simulations. For 
example, contamination losses in Model C are less than those generated in Model D. When a 
certain amount of contaminated wheat is moved to the terminal elevator, the deliverer will be 
penalized not only the lower price but also any penalty imposed by the terminal. If contaminated 
wheat can be detected before it is loaded in railcars, such losses can be discounted.   
Model E is the only one without traceability among the five models. Unlike the other models, if 
there are contaminations detected at the test point 2 or test point 3 at the first delivery within a 
year, offenders cannot be immediately targeted through traceability. The only way to identify 
offenders is to enhance testing at a later time within the year, but doing so increases handling 
costs. Allowing for this situation, the testing at test point 1 is enhanced and most contamination 
sources in the model were detected at previous test points. The costs for eliminating all 
contamination sources before test point 3 are too high so that, just as the simulation shows, there 
remain a few cases in which contaminated railcars are still undetected. 
5.2.2 The Evolution of Farmer’s Misrepresentation Rate under VED 
Testing and tracing strategies influence not only the probability of wheat contamination in this 
supply chain, but also the evolution of a farmer’s misrepresentation condition. As Figure 5.6A-
G6 in Appendix G shows, the farmer’s effort, technology and misrepresentation rate 
continuously evolves during simulation runs and their end values at the 30
th
 year are often vastly 
different from those initial values. For example, in Model A (truck, bin and railcar), the 48 
farmers’ effort values end in a set [0.4250, 1.2405] with an average value 0.8738 (initial average 
value 0.2441); their technology values end in [0.8507, 1.5237] with an average value 0.8489 
(initial average value 1.8874); finally their misrepresentation rate values end in [0, 0.0676] with 
an average value 0.0040 (initial average value 0.3152). The average misrepresentation 
probability in the simulation over 30 years is 0.0279. 
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Table 5.1 lists the evolution of farmer’s total misrepresentation rate across 30 years in each of 
the five models. 
 
 
Model Interval over 30 Years Average over 30 years 
Model A 0.3152 – 0.0040 0.0279 
Model B 0.3152 – 0.0041 0.0278 
Model C 0.3152 – 0.0040 0.0273 
Model D 0.3152 – 0.0041 0.0272 
Model E 0.3152 – 0.0043 0.0289 
 
The main motivation to drive farmer efforts under the VED regime is the penalty imposed by the 
system on offenders. Based on the assumption that effort incentives are mainly motivated by 
penalty deterrence, the penalty imposed on farmers dominates the evolution of their risk control 
efforts. In Models A to E, all offenders are finally detected by testing or tracing. Simulation 
results show that in these models, farmers keep increasing risk control efforts over time.  
There is no test point 1 in Model C (bin and railcar) and D (railcar only) and in these models, 
misrepresented truck deliveries cannot be prevented from entering the supply chain. Although 
eventually identified, all offences generate contamination losses. Due to where they are detected 
in the supply chain, penalties for those offenders are greater than penalties for offenders detected 
earlier at test point 1. Note as well that in Model A (truck, bin and railcar) and B (truck and 
railcar test) most of the offenders are detected at test point 1. Based on the assumption used in 
Chapter 4 (equation 4-4-2), a farmer’s efforts to properly represent their crop grow with the 
penalty and the testing he or she receives. On one hand, farmers detected in test points 2 and 3 
have more motivation to arouse these mitigation efforts than farmers detected attest point 1. On 
the other hand, the absence of testing at test point 1 clearly lowers a farmer’s incentive to put 
efforts on risk control. In effect, those two effects cancel each other out. Just as shown in Table 
5.1, the average misrepresentation level over 30 years in Models C and D is only slightly lower 
than in Model A (truck, bin and railcar) and B (truck and railcar). We conclude that a VED based 
Table 5.1 The Farmer’s Misrepresentation Rate Over Time (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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grain handling system without traceability deterrence can increase moral hazard (Section 3.3.5). 
And as the simulation results demonstrate, the average misrepresentation rate in Model E (with 
no traceability) is the highest.   
5.2.3 Handling Costs, Farmers’ Losses and Total Costs  
The primary elevator’s handling costs comprise costs resulting from wheat contamination due to 
undetected misrepresented deliveries, including both price reductions and penalties from the 
terminal, as well as costs resulting from operations associated with assuring supply chain safety 
(including sampling and sample retention costs), testing costs at each test point and tracing costs 
associated with the traceability process. Penalties collected from those detected farmers will be 
used to cover handling costs. Clearly, if a particular design does not allow for traceability, 
sampling, sample retention and tracing costs will be excluded from the handling costs. Farmers’ 
losses in this case include a price drop due to misrepresentation as well as penalties if 
misrepresented deliveries are actually detected. The handling costs and farmer losses all form 
part of the supply chain system costs shared by different participants. From this point of view, 
the sum of those costs can also be used as a measure of the handling efficiency for a VED supply 
chain.  
Under VED, wheat contamination can occur in the primary elevator bins if misrepresented wheat 
is loaded in bins and blended. If handlers cannot detect contamination in the bins before loading 
the wheat in railcars, contaminated wheat will be moved to the terminal elevator and additional 
economic losses will result. In those models shown here using traceability, when offenders are 
detected, they will suffer a price drop loss and subsequent penalty from the primary elevator. The 
penalty amount depends on the contamination losses resulting from their misrepresentation. 
Conversely, if there is no traceability in the model, e.g. Model E, the primary elevator will 
completely absorb all the contamination losses. By way of illustration, Figure A-G7 in Appendix 
G shows the primary elevator’s handling costs, farmers’ losses and the total costs over time in 
each simulation, assuming a high initial misrepresentation rate. 
One component of handling costs is contamination loss. Contamination losses vary with the level 
of wheat contamination across time. When there is no wheat contamination, contamination losses 
are zero. The other component of handling costs are those related to the safe maintenance of the 
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wheat handling system. These always occur even if there is no wheat contamination. Finally, 
farmers’ losses occur when farmers who misrepresented their deliveries are detected. If there is 
no farmer misrepresentation, farmers’ losses are zero.  
The peaks in the values for handler’s costs indicate the periods when the misrepresentation 
situation is severe (Figure A-G7). In those periods, testing intensity at test point 1 for Models A 
(truck, bin and railcar), B (truck and railcar) and E (no traceability) is very high, generating high 
testing costs which are the main components of corresponding handling costs. The handling cost 
value peaks in Models C (bin and railcar) and D (railcar only) and can be attributed to serious 
contaminations detected at the test point 2 or 3. With respect to values of farmers’ losses, 
thispeaks during the first few years of the simulation when farmers’ misrepresentation is severe. 
Finally, Model E does not include traceability, so wheat handlers alone absorb all contamination 
losses. Farmers suffer losses only when they are verified as having misrepresented their wheat at 
test point 1. 
To facilitate the comparison of the efficiency of those five models, this study computes the total 
handling costs and the total farmers’ losses over the 30-year delivery history. The values of 
handling costs are illustrated in Figure 5.1.  
 
To more readily evaluate the variability of costs from model to model, the value of the handling 
costs generated by Model A (truck, bin and railcar) is normalized to unity. By comparison, the 
value of handling costs in Model B (truck and railcar) is 0.99, the lowest among all the models. 
The handling cost value is at the highest in Model D (railcar only) at 1.30. From the primary 
elevator handlers’ perspective, those handling strategies utilized in Model B are their best choice.  
Figure 5.1 Primary Elevator’s Handling Costs (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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In the same manner as with primary elevator handling costs, the value of farmers’ losses in 
Model A is normalized to unity. And as shown in Figure 5.2, the value of farmer losses in Model 
E (no traceability) is the lowest. Obviously, farmers will prefer Model E as the set of rules in 
which they are most likely to minimize their economic losses.  The reason is simple: Model E 
allows the farmer to escape a penalty when there is detected contamination which he or she 
should be found responsible.  
 
The reader will note that handling costs and farmers’ losses are lower both in Model A (truck, 
bin and railcar) and Model B (truck and railcar) than the other models (except farmers’ losses in 
Model E (no traceability)). This is likely due to the fact that most of the misrepresented 
deliveries in these models were prevented from contaminating primary elevator bins by the truck 
test at point 1. When misrepresented wheat can be detected at an early stage of grain supply 
chain, contamination losses will be lower. In contrast, in Model E, most misrepresented 
deliveries were also detected at test point 1. However, handling costs are greater because the 
handlers must absorb the contamination costs alone. Farmers who misrepresented their deliveries 
and were not detected at test point 1 are not penalized for misrepresentation because there is no 
traceability in this particular model. This explains why the handling costs and farmers’ losses in 
Model E run in opposite directions. In Models C (bin and railcar) and D (railcar only), 
contamination from undetected misrepresented deliveries creates more problems than in the 
other models. Considerable economic losses from contamination in this model are shared by 
wheat handlers and farmers. This is the main reason why handling costs along with farmers’ 
losses are so great in these two models.  
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Figure 5.2 Farmers’ Losses in the Five Models (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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Figure 5.3 shows the total costs, the summation of the handling costs and the farmers’ losses, in 
each model. The total cost value generated by Model A (truck, bin and railcar) is normalized to 
unity. In fact, the primary elevator’s handling strategies utilized in Model B (truck and railcar) 
generate the lowest total system costs among five models. The second lowest value is of Model 
A, whereas the highest value, 1.19, is generated by Model D (railcar only).  
 
The total costs for both Models C (bin and railcar) and D (railcar only) are considerably higher 
than those generated by the other models. Once again, the reason is that there is no test point 1 in 
these two models, so misrepresented deliveries have no way of being detected before being 
unloaded in primary elevator bins. As a result, the ineligible wheat contaminated wheat in the 
whole bin in which the misrepresented delivery was unloaded in, degrading wheat quality in this 
bin. When contaminated wheat is not detected early and is allowed to move farther through the 
supply chain, the resulting losses can be even greater.  
The handling costs and farmers’ losses generated through Model A (truck, bin and railcar) are 
only slightly different from those generated by Model B (truck and railcar). The results indicate 
test point 2, the primary bin test, is not essential for VED system if test point 1 is available. 
When the first test point is available in the supply chain, the best test strategy is to test most of 
deliveries at the first test point at the beginning of each year. In this case, most misrepresented 
deliveries are detected before being unloaded into the primary elevator bins. In those models 
using a high truck test rate, a low bin test rate is presumed to be efficient. However, there is little 
chance that a rare contaminated bin will be detected using such a low bin test rate. Thus, under 
the given conditions in this study, the bin test contributes little to the efficiency of the testing 
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process if there is a prior truck test in a given supply chain. The advantage of bin testing is it 
reduces the volume of contaminated wheat delivered to the terminal elevator and thus prevents 
further contamination at the terminal level. If the system costs can allow for losses from the 
terminal contaminations which are not considered in this study, the importance of bin testing will 
be enhanced.  
Compared with Model D (railcar only) which uses only a railcar test, the amount of handling 
costs in Model C (bin and railcar) is 4 percent less. So although the bin test in Model C detected 
most of the contaminated bins, the test costs were also relatively high because of my assumption 
about bin sample testing cost ($600/sample). Ultimately, if contaminated wheat in bins is not 
detected and delivered to the terminal, the potential losses in the system are greater. But in the 
simulations, these losses are shared by the primary elevator and the traced offenders. Obviously, 
those losses shared by the offenders are not significantly higher than bin test costs, lowering the 
feasibility of bin testing. 
The condition of farmers’ misrepresentation influences the choice of testing strategies. This 
situation can be described using a special case. If the farmer’s misrepresentation rate stays at a 
very high level, e.g. greater than 2% in the simulation, then best testing strategies will become 
relatively simple. The best strategy at the truck test point is to test all the first deliveries of 
farmers within a given year. Under an assumption of perfect test accuracy, all misrepresented 
deliveries will be detected at this test stage and no further tests are necessary in the supply chain. 
This means models including truck test points (e.g. Models A, B, and E) will generate similar 
results regarding the best testing strategies, and the handling costs of these three models will 
necessarily be very close to each other, while the same conclusion is applicable to the farmers’ 
losses. The overall total costs in these three models will remain the lowest among the five 
models under comparison, with the total costs in Model C (bin and railcar) the highest and those 
in Model D (railcar only) the second highest. For models without a truck test point but with a bin 
test point (e.g. Model C), the best test strategy is to test all bins upon first delivery within a year 
if the farmer’s misrepresentation rate is over 2%. (please also refer to Figures A-F1 to A-F6 in 
the Appendix) 
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5.3 Wheat Handling under a Low Initial Misrepresentation Condition 
Figures A-G8 to A-G12 in Appendix G illustrate the results of different testing strategies for the 
five models under consideration, with the assumption that the farmer’s initial misrepresentation 
rate is low. The testing intensity at each test point is much lower than under the higher initial 
misrepresentation rate condition due to slight contamination risks. It must be noted again that all 
results shown in those figures and tables were generated using simulations with 500 iterations.  
It is assumed here that the randomly generated farmer’s initial misrepresentation rate is low 
(0.0051). As in the previous section, Figure A-G13 in Appendix G shows the evolution of 
farmer’s effort, technology and corresponding misrepresentation probability. Based on the 
simulation results, the farmer’s misrepresentation rate over time evolves as follows, 
 
 
Model Interval over 30 Years Average over 30 years 
Model A 0.0051 – 0.0024 0.0034 
Model B 0.0051 – 0.0023 0.0034 
Model C 0.0051 – 0.0024 0.0035 
Model D 0.0051 – 0.0023 0.0034 
Model E 0.0051 – 0.0024 0.0034 
Clearly there is only a rare chance that a farmer will misrepresent his or her deliveries in these 
simulations. Under this situation, there are fewer chances to detect truck misrepresentation at the 
truck testing point or bin contaminations at the bin testing point. In fact, intensive testing at 
either of those two test points is no longer efficient. The need for tests at the two test points 
becomes negligible. As a result, testing and tracing strategies in the five models under 
consideration are significantly different from those generated previously under the assumption of 
high initial misrepresentation.  Here, there is need for only minimal testing at the truck and bin 
test points. The handling system depends instead on traceability to locate the exact contamination 
source and catch system offenders.   
Table 5.2 The Farmer’s Misrepresentation Rate Over Time  
(Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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Figure A-G14 in Appendix G shows the flows of costs over time. Once again, the evaluation of 
the efficiency of each comparative supply chain depends on the relative costs generated by the 
model, i.e. handling costs, farmers’ losses and their combined total. 
Figure 5.4 here shows the primary elevator’s handling costs under a condition of low initial 
misrepresentation. 
 
As above, handling costs in Models C (bin and railcar) and D (railcar only) are now the lowest. 
This is just the opposite of the results obtained under an assumption of a high initial 
misrepresentation rate. When there are few misrepresented deliveries, the truck test point and the 
bin test point are rendered unessential. As a result, most of the time, there are few tests at those 
two test points in models with those test points available.  The absence of a truck test point in 
Models C and D does not lead to large-scale contamination since there is a low misrepresentation 
risk. On the contrary, the handling systems in those two models take advantage of savings in 
testing, resulting in the lowest handling costs.  
Handling costs in Model E (no traceability) are now the highest, supporting the need for 
traceability to provide efficiency to wheat handling. First, traceability helps identify the source of 
contamination in an efficient way. When there is no traceability, if there are contaminated 
railcars detected at the railcar testing sometime within a year, the only way to identify the 
misrepresented farmers is to test more truck deliveries in the later time in the year, costs incurred 
by misrepresentation identification are far more than those generated by the traceability system 
establishment (sampling and sample retaining) and traceability application (sample testing). 
Second, any compensation paid by offenders can partially cover contamination losses. If there is 
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Figure 5.4 Primary Elevator’s Handling Costs (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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no traceability, grain handlers have to bear all losses from contamination by themselves. Third, 
traceability contributes to reducing farmer moral hazard issues and thus reducing potential 
handling costs. Finally, traceability allows more information to be obtained, information that can 
be used to improve test strategies with the goal of cost savings.  
Figure 5.5 shows farmer losses due to detected misrepresentation. Again, the value of farmer 
losses in Model E (no traceability) is the lowest. Since there is no traceability applicable in 
Model E, farmers who misrepresent their deliveries without detection do not share contamination 
losses resulting from their misrepresentation. Farmer losses are in similar levels in Models A, B, 
C and D. Here, all contamination sources, misrepresented deliveries, are identified through 
traceability, and part of any contamination losses are shared by those farmers who 
misrepresented their deliveries.  
 
Figure 5.6 shows total costs as the sum of handing costs and farmer losses. The total costs in 
Models A to D are very close. The highest total costs occur in Model E (no traceability). The 
simple reason is that handling costs in this model are much higher than those in the other models. 
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Figure 5.6 Total Costs (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate)  
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5.4 Analytic Solutions vs. Agent-Based Simulation Solutions 
Given the need for modeling this supply chain as a complex system using agent based modeling, 
this section compares the simulated solutions generated in Ch. 4 and this chapter with related 
analytic solutions solved for in Chapter 3. These comparisons are summarized in Table 5.3.  
To generate the table, parameter values used in the simulations were substituted into the general 
solutions of the cost minimization problems solved in Chapter 3 (recall equations 3-17, 3-37, 3-
43, 3-56 and 3-61). This allows us to compute a comparative set of specific analytic solution 
values for truck or bin test rates, shown in the second column of the table. Next, the 
corresponding farmer’s misrepresentation probability for each related analytic model (column 3) 
was computed (recall equations 3-24, 3-30, 3-40 and 3-48). By checking this against the 
simulated results, we can identify specific points where the farmer’s misrepresentation 
probabilities are approximately the same as those computed for the analytic models, along with 
the perceived misrepresentation probabilities at these points (Column 4).This allows us to verify 
the corresponding truck or bin test rates at those points as simulated counterparts of the analytic 
solutions. To facilitate the subsequent analysis, we also illustrate the simulated truck or bin test 
rates that would be generated if the perceived misrepresentation rates were equal to the computed 
ones from the analytic model (Column 3).   
Table 5.3 Analytic Solutions vs. Simulated Solutions 
Model 
Analytic/Simulated Solutions 
for Truck Test 
i and Bin Test b ) 
Computed   
Mis Rate 
Perceived  
Mis Rate 
Two test points: 
truck and railcar 
(with traceability) 
Analytic (Ch. 3, case 2 (b)) *i  0.1175 0.0090  
 
Simulated (Ch. 5, Model B) 
 
i 0.4375  0.0116 
i 0.3750  if 0.0090
 
Two test points: 
bin and railcar 
(with traceability) 
Analytic (Ch. 3, case 3 (b)) *b 0.5567 0.0100  
 
Simulated (Ch. 5, Model C) 
 
b 0.6025  0.0128 
b 05350  if 0.0100
 
 
 
 
Analytic (Ch. 3, case 4 (b)) 
*i 0.3749
*b 0.0477 
0.0110  
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Three test points: 
truck, bin and 
railcar 
(with traceability) 
 
 
Simulated (Ch. 5, Model D) 
 
i 0.6250
b 0.0539 
 
0.0140 
i 0.4160
b 0.0762 
 
if 0.0110
 
 
 
Simulated (Ch. 4) 
i 0.5833
b 0.0905 
 
0.0139 
i 0.3542
b 0.1025 
 
if 0.0110
 
 
Three test points: 
truck, bin and 
railcar 
(without 
traceability) 
 
Analytic (Ch.3, case 4 (a)) 
1*i  
0*b  
0.0250  
 
 
Simulated (Ch. 5, Model E) 
1i  
0b  
 
0.0283 
1i  
0b  
 
if 0.0250
 
 
Except for the supply chain model containing three test points without traceability (the final one 
under consideration in the table), the values of the simulated solutions for test rates are 
substantially higher than the analytic solutions for the other (three) models used for comparison. 
While the complexity of the simulation makes it difficult to know exactly why this is the case, 
the divergence between the iterated solutions from the simulation models and the solved analytic 
solutions of same seems to stem from the following factors: 
1. In the analytic model, farmers are homogenous in their behavior and there is no 
interaction between them. The farmer’s aggregate activity is thus linear in the analytic 
model and the behavior of the entire system can be solved by adding together the 
individual behavior of each agent. Such a linear system possesses exact analytic 
solutions. On the contrary, in the simulation model, farmers are heterogeneous, 
dynamically interacting through time and space, so their aggregate activity is inherently 
nonlinear. The behavior of a nonlinear dynamic system is not the mere sum of the 
behavior of its parts. When considering a nonlinear and complex system, simulations 
generate approximate solutions of the system but are only rarely as precise or exact as 
analytic solutions (Hommes, 2006). 
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2. In my analytic model, handlers are fully rational in making testing decisions. Under the 
assumption of perfect information, they always make the optimal decision regarding 
testing. In the simulation model, handlers are goal-oriented and adaptive, but only 
boundedly rational. Under imperfect information, they are limited in their cognitive 
ability to arrive at the optimal solutions of testing strategies (Kahneman, 2003). 
3. The analytic model does not allow for participants’ interaction so as to capture system 
dynamics on a variety of spatial and temporal scales, while the simulation model does 
this. The analytic model describes a simple (linear) stable system in which handlers have 
rational expectations and develop perfect testing strategies only simply allowing for each 
uniquely given misrepresentation condition. In the simulation model, due to assumed 
agent nonlinear interactions, agents are necessarily in a path-dependent world, in which 
early choices determine future possibility (Page, 2006). Any testing strategy at a specific 
time point will change the farmer’s misrepresentation probability distribution after that 
time and thus influence the testing strategy (and also the handling cost) in subsequent 
times. The simulated best testing strategy in time conditions on not only the system risk 
and cost under the current misrepresentation conditions, but also on system risk and cost 
under the redistributed misrepresentation probability in the subsequent time interval for 
simulation (30 years in this study). Rationally, testing more at the current time facilitates 
saving more in the future. 
4. The analytic solutions are solved under assumptions of perfect information. This implies 
handlers have exact knowledge about an individual farmer’s personal information, 
including technology level, and the response pattern to testing, or the chosen effort level. 
As a result, in the analytic model handlers know an individual farmer’s misrepresentation 
probability exactly and subsequently make their optimized decisions about testing. The 
simulation model effectively assumes a more realistic situation of information 
asymmetry, meaning that handlers have little information about an individual farmers’ 
misrepresentation condition. In this case, handlers only perceive and accumulate such 
information through testing. An enhanced testing intensity helps to better understand the 
farmer’s misrepresentation behavior and thus reduce potential system risk. This partly 
explains why handlers in the simulation always prefer higher testing rates than the 
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computed ones in the analytic model. Furthermore, handlers’ testing strategies are based 
on their perception of farmers’ misrepresentation probability. As shown in the simulation, 
handlers are necessarily limited in their information sources and perception errors always 
exist over time. Any perception errors in this respect can force the testing strategies to 
deviate from optimality.  
5. The simulated solutions only assure local optimization. The simulation programming is 
designed to find a global optimum and explores check test rate value areas where the best 
solutions are thought to be most possibly located, however, not all the possible 
combinations of truck testing and bin testing are examined. Theoretically, there exists a 
probability that better solutions are ignored by this simulation model.  
So although there is divergence across the solutions of the models used in this analysis, 
examining comparisons between the respective solutions can provide valuable insights into the 
overall analysis of the issue.  
1. As described, testing intensity for a truck or bin in the simulation model is always greater 
than in the analytic model. One explanation for this finding is that under imperfect 
information, handlers need additional monitoring efforts to prevent handling risk than 
those under a perfect information assumption. In other words, imperfect information 
constrains monitoring efficiency and increases monitoring costs. 
2. Solutions in the analytic model support a primary conclusion reached in the simulation 
models (Chapters 4 and 5) – that is, under the assumption that there are no contamination 
sources other than farmer’s misrepresentation, when the truck test point is available in the 
supply chain, bin testing is rendered less important.  
3. In fact, the analytic solutions for the case of three test points without traceability support 
the conclusion generated through the simulation - when the misrepresentation situation is 
severe, i.e. when misrepresentation rate is greater than 2%, the best overall testing 
strategy is to test all truck deliveries if the truck test point (my test point 1) is available.  
4. In all the simulation models, the perceived farmer’s misrepresentation probability is 
generally higher than the actual misrepresentation probability, due in this case to the 
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downward trend of misrepresentation probability over time and the exponentially 
weighted moving average used as a proxy for the farmer’s misrepresentation probability. 
This bias or over perception contributes to the higher test rate in the simulation model. As 
shown in Table 5.3, if handlers in the simulation can uncover the exact misrepresentation 
probability of each individual farmer as they do in the analytic model, the simulated 
solution does a better job at approximating the analytic solutions. From this perspective, 
the analytic solution and the simulation work in the same direction in developing efficient 
testing strategies. 
Clearly there is a trade-off between modeling accuracy and choice. Simulated solutions in these 
models do not necessarily iterate to globally optimal solutions with respect to testing strategies 
while analytic solutions yield these by design. Generally, analytic models defy realism (by 
ignoring heterogeneity, interaction and perception error) while simulation models allow 
whatever degree of realism of the phenomena is desired by the researcher (Shanthikumar and 
Sargent, 1983). In this sense, the use of analytic models for solving optimization problems in 
such systems is preferable if sufficient realism can be maintained in the analytic model 
assumptions. Unfortunately, the actual dynamic and heterogeneous grain handling supply chain 
system simulated here is inherently nonlinear and if modelled realistically in an analytic fashion, 
would not be solvable by those methods. Ultimately, if the researcher wants to obtain solutions 
for a nonlinear system that is designed to capture greater realism - for example better accounting 
for spatial interactions and temporal factors in the system - then computer simulations of that 
system are the only feasible way to realize that objective. 
  
5.6 Summary 
In this set of agent based simulations analyzing the efficiency of grain quality testing through a 
modern supply chain, a testing strategy is characterized by two key components. The first is the 
choice of testing points, while the second is the choice in testing intensity at each chosen test 
point. Clearly the best testing strategy from the primary grain handler’s perspective is one that 
minimizes handling costs. The five comparative models simulated in this chapter provide some 
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insight into handling strategies that could be under consideration by primary elevator handlers 
under a VED regime.  
It is found that the best handling strategies vary with farmer misrepresentation of grain type over 
time. To perform testing efficiently, results from past time periods need to be updated for current 
decision making. When farmer misrepresentation is frequent or serious, intensive testing at the 
earliest possible test point is critical to maintain a least cost yet quality assured handling system. 
Under this situation, primary elevator handlers will prefer Model A (truck, bin and railcar) or 
Model B (truck and railcar) in the simulations. When a truck test point is available in the current 
grain supply chain, bin testing is rendered less important since most of the contamination risks 
will already have been prevented from occurring.  
When farmer misrepresentation is less frequent or rare, truck or bin testing is rendered inefficient 
because the reduced contamination risks do not merit intensive testing. Under this situation, only 
infrequent delivery supervision is needed. In a supply chain with traceability, I find that it is 
more efficient to test later in the system even if doing so could raise contamination chances and 
moral hazard problems. Thus if misrepresented railcars are detected at the terminal, elevator 
handlers will use traceability to catch any offenders. Under some circumstances, the testing cost 
savings from reduced truck or bin tests can be greater than the contamination losses resulting 
from the absence of testing at point 1 or point 2, as well as the possible increased likelihood of 
moral hazard. But in this case, efficiency considerations indicate that no testing at the truck test 
point or bin test point should be conducted and monitoring deterrence can be realized by 
enacting a traceability mechanism in the supply chain. As a result, Model D (railcar only) of this 
supply chain becomes the elevator handlers’ preferred choice. 
The advantage of a supply chain model without traceability (Model E) is that it can save both 
sample retention costs and costs of realizing tracing procedures. But such cost savings are often 
less than the amount of contamination losses under defined farmer misrepresentation 
probabilities as used in this study. And if there is no traceability in the supply chain, handlers 
will lose the ability to request compensation from offenders for contamination and they will not 
be able to obtain useful information for test strategy improvements. Furthermore, farmers can 
underestimate the risks of misrepresentation and subsequently reduce their efforts on risk 
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control, increasing moral hazard potential. Data generated using the simulation support the 
notion that traceability is necessary in order to reduce the primary elevator’s handling costs. In a 
high initial misrepresentation rate case, handling costs in Model E (no traceability) are 16 
percent higher than those in the Model A (truck, bin and railcar). Conversely, in the low initial 
misrepresentation rate case, this cost increases to 67 percent. With respect to the structure of 
grain supply chains as represented by Models C (bin and railcar) and D (railcar only), 
contamination is more serious than in the other models considered. If no traceability mechanism 
had been assumed in those two models, contamination losses will grow quickly.  
Models in which contamination can be effectively prevented by truck testing, i.e. Models A, B 
and E, under a high misrepresentation situation are associated with small farmer losses. Models 
in which there are no truck test points, i.e. Model C and Model D, suffer from a higher likelihood 
of elevator contamination. And farmers’ losses also increase when contamination sources can be 
traced exactly. I find that the value of farmers’ losses in Model E (no traceability) is the lowest 
because farmers who misrepresent do not share losses for elevator contamination.   
Total economic costs are also evaluated within the grain handling supply chain. Assessing the 
value of total costs is a way to compare the feasibility of wheat handling strategies from a social 
perspective. Under the principle of minimizing the primary elevator’s handling costs, the 
resulting total costs do not possess the same ranking as found for handling costs. In addition, the 
handling strategies preferred by the primary elevator handlers do not align with the objective of 
total cost minimization. The reason is that the primary elevator handlers focus on their own 
objectives instead of minimizing farmer losses. For example, if the primary elevator tests at the 
earliest possible testing point, farmers’ losses are reduced to their lowest level. But if the gains 
from testing cannot cover the testing costs, then the primary elevator has little incentive to 
continue doing this. Therefore, if the welfare of the whole supply chain is taken into 
consideration, the best testing and tracing strategies may be very different from those developed 
and simulated here. 
It is concluded that a policy of traceability appears to be an efficient way for primary elevator 
handlers to retrieve contamination losses. From a social welfare perspective, the amount of 
penalty charged to offenders does not increase the value of the supply chain. But under the 
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assumption that the imposed penalty can motivate farmer’s efforts for delivering eligible wheat, 
a penalty can contribute to a reduction in moral hazard, supporting the overall reliability of the 
handling system and likely increasing social welfare.   
For any test point combination, efficient testing intensity at each test point can be worked out in 
more detail through simulations. The primary elevator handlers can identify an efficient test 
point combination to allow for specific misrepresentation conditions. This type of analysis offers 
further flexibility for the primary elevator handler concerning their choices of test points as well 
as the application of test and trace strategies under different situations in a grain handling supply 
chain. 
Within the simulations, the wheat supply chain is modeled as a complex system composed of 
boundedly rational participants possessing a set of nonlinear relationships. For such a complex 
system, analytic or globally unique solutions cannot readily be found but simulated solutions can 
be used to identify the most efficient testing strategies. In fact, the testing strategies identified 
through simulation in Chapters 4 and 5 are somewhat different from those generated by the 
analytic solutions derived from the model of Chapter 3. Generally, the simulated solution values 
are greater than comparable analytic solution values when misrepresentation probability is low. 
An explanation for this phenomenon is that under an assumption of imperfect information, 
handlers must increase monitoring efforts in trying to understand a farmer’s misrepresentation 
behaviour. And this research also indicates that compared to analytic solutions, simulated 
solutions of systems are often only nearly optimal, but simulations can generate very good 
approximations depending on model circumstances.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Canadian grain handling industry is an export focused supply chain. While movements are 
often bulk in nature, the suppliers are concerned with product safety and quality. Grading of 
wheat for value-added blending has historically been accomplished by a visual identification 
method known as KVD. KVD was phased out for all primary classes of wheat and replaced by a 
trust-based declaration system called VED. Essentially, VED relies on individual trust to ensure 
that farmers will deliver reliably and accurately into the supply chain.  
Under the VED system, although wheat varieties put forward for registration have to meet all 
other registration requirements, they can be similar in appearance to existing wheat classes. If 
one of these varieties is misrepresented as another type of wheat physically similar to it, using 
low cost visual inspection methods wheat handlers would not be able to readily distinguish these 
from each other. As a result, the quality and safety of wheat handling cannot be guaranteed under 
VED. Given the costs of controlling on-farm commingling risks and implementing a declaration 
system through the current wheat supply chain, there exists some potential for accidental or 
opportunistic misrepresentation behavior under a declaration system on the part of Canadian 
wheat producers.  
To manage and optimize wheat safety and quality, the first priority under a VED system is to 
manage the misrepresentation problem. It is well understood that the long-term solution to wheat 
misrepresentation lies in the development of rapid and affordable variety identification 
technology. However, a short to medium-term solution is to develop efficient testing strategies 
for monitoring visually indistinguishable wheat varieties. In light of this, there will be important 
operational issues such as determining the best location to test, how intensively to test, 
appropriate penalty levels for misrepresentation, feasibility of system traceability and how 
relative costs might be distributed among participants. 
This study uses both analytic method and simulation to explore optimal testing strategies for 
handlers to minimize their handling costs. Under some simple assumptions, a contractual 
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economic model is developed to explore the economic incentives for farmers to practice risk 
control and identify optimal handling strategies to mitigate contamination risks. However, this 
model is found somewhat lacking to capture the subtleties of such a complex system as a grain 
supply chain. To develop a more realistic description of supply chain dynamics and operations, 
the study of testing strategies is conducted through an agent-based simulation model. 
In the analytic model, objective functions for cost were structured allowing for different test 
locations with or without a traceability mechanism in the wheat supply chain, from the individual 
farm level to the terminal elevator. Through solving this minimization problem, some efficient 
testing strategies using different test locations were identified. While limited in explanatory 
power, in fact these solutions facilitated the analysis of how related factors affect the set of 
testing strategies in the simulation. 
Under VED, if testing on farmer deliveries is inadequate or the penalty for offenders is below a 
critical level, there will be moral hazard issues arising in the farmers risk control efforts. The 
same problems exist in the primary elevator handlers’ decision-making if their railcar deliveries 
are not fully inspected or the penalty for offences is limited. Knowing this, the solution for an 
individual participant cost minimization may differ from that for the entire system of grain safety 
and quality assurance. This study suggests that if incentives can be effectively designed to make 
the relative parties with moral hazard bear fully the consequences of their actions, the moral 
hazard problem will be mitigated. That is, if a testing mechanism can eventually detect all 
offenders through either testing or tracing, and the penalty for offenders is exactly equal to the 
expected damage resulting from their misrepresentation, the moral hazard problems inherent in 
farmer and handler behaviors can be eliminated. While farmer moral hazard potential adds costs 
to wheat handling, alleviating them by the strategy of increasing testing intensity is also costly. If 
the expected cost of inducing the farmer to select an appropriate level of effort is relatively high, 
cost minimizing handlers will refuse to do that, and instead they will try to motivate some 
reduced level of effort from the farmer at lower cost, allowing the moral hazard problems to 
remain. 
To address the limitations of the static analytic model of the problem and incorporate more 
realistic behavior of future supply chain participants under VED, an agent-based simulation 
model was developed to help model factors such as agent heterogeneity, interaction, adaptation 
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and dynamics. Mirroring reality, wheat supply chain participants under VED are represented as 
autonomous agents exhibiting heterogeneous behavior. These agents interact with each other as 
well as with their environment via a set of rules governing their actions and decisions. Following 
this construction, Chapter 4 (and Chapter 5) develops supply chain models allowing for different 
combinations of test points to provide an overall view of handling strategies that can be 
potentially considered by the primary elevator handlers under VED. Results suggest 
contamination testing strategies under VED are more efficient when they are adaptable and can 
be readily adjusted throughout the supply chain. 
Testing strategies considered in the simulation allow for a combination of test points in the chain 
and testing intensities at each test point. As a dynamic simulation, the determination of efficient 
handling strategies varies with farmer misrepresentation situation over time. To efficiently 
allocate testing, information from the past needs to be used and updated for current decision 
making. For example, when individual farmer misrepresentation is frequent or serious, intensive 
testing at the earliest test point is crucial to help maintain the quality of the handling system and 
keep handling costs low. Under this situation, the effect of a bin test is rendered insignificant 
because almost all contamination risk would have been eliminated through testing at the previous 
test point. Conversely, when farmer misrepresentation is infrequent or rare, intensive testing at 
the earliest test point is inefficient.  
Chapter 5 reaches a conclusion that a VED grain handling system with a functional traceability 
mechanism further enhances the safety and efficiency of wheat handling. Although sample 
retention costs and tracing cost can be saved if there is no traceability, in the given 
misrepresentation environment used in this study, such cost savings are much lower than the 
benefits forgone. The advantages of traceability are obvious- penalties from uncovered offenders 
can be used to cover contamination losses, information obtained through traceability can be used 
for optimizing future testing, and traceability deterrence reduces those moral hazard problems 
inherent in risk control behaviors.  
The latter simulations also generate results about the cost distribution of monitoring among the 
supply chain participants. These facilitate a comparison of efficiencies between different testing 
strategies. Due to the diversity in individual objectives, testing strategies that work best for the 
primary elevator handlers likely will not benefit farmers. In light of this, if the welfare of all 
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supply chain participants is under consideration by a regulatory body, actual testing strategies 
may be different from those identified and examined in this study. 
However, agent based simulation provides a foundation on which to identify a set of testing 
strategies that best align with a specific regulatory target. The simulation environment can also 
help evaluate the economic efficiency of a predetermined test strategy. Given the current 
uncertain policy environment regarding this issue in Canada, this research is timely and should 
provide valuable input into possible unforeseen consequences of switching to VED within the 
grain handling and transportation system. Ultimately, this research should also contribute to the 
continuation of a sustainable and competitive Canadian agri-food supply chain. While beyond 
the scope of the current analysis, the methodology could also be extended to other supply chains 
to help optimize risk management and control costs. Examples include an organic food handling 
system, genetically modified grain segregation systems as well as other food safety and quality 
assurance systems. 
To date, economists have not embraced agent-based simulation methods in the same manner as 
other social and physical scientists. More broadly, one can identify economic researchers using 
various types of computational simulation for economic analysis. But to the knowledge of this 
author, there are almost no existing studies that have developed a two-tiered modeling approach 
for such an economic problem, allowing comparisons between the analytic results to the 
simulated ones. Those comparisons put insight into discussions of developing efficient strategies 
to mitigate grain handling risks, and, in the meantime, help address some essential economic 
issues associated with complex grain supply chain systems. While the policy issue of KVD vs. 
VED may seem somewhat distant to those outside of the grain industry, from the point of view 
of modeling the problem it is believed that this thesis represents a somewhat unique contribution 
to the economic literature in this regard.  
Specification of complex systems is not an easy task. The simulation is based on assumptions on 
participant behavior and simple economic logic. In fact, the grain handling system is even more 
complex than the one described in my models. To more accurately simulate the adaptation of 
supply chain participant behavior would require incorporating considerably more detail. To 
really advance the modeling of these sorts of microeconomic issues, more research on farmers 
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and handling behaviour would be needed to help better understand the boundedly rational nature 
of their individual decision making.  
These models only develop a very stylized grain handling system, with just a single primary 
elevator in the simple supply chain. In this sense, the model is still quite abstracted from the 
actual Western Canadian wheat handling system and the complexity within it is reduced when 
compared to reality. In fact, there are many primary elevators and inland terminal elevators in the 
Prairie region. Due to spatial competition between them, they also interact to some extent with 
other elevators with respect to their handling strategies. In this light, models with multiple 
elevators could better mirror the actual set of decisions within the wheat handling system than 
this model using a single elevator. In addition, other assumptions were made to simplify both of 
the kinds of models utilized in this study. For example, this study assumed that all 
contaminations stem only from farmer misrepresentation, meaning there are no botched 
operations during elevator handling and wheat transportation. It is also assumed that testing 
precision is perfect. It is suspected that easing these assumptions could also contribute to a better 
understanding of a future grain supply chain under VED.  
The removal of KVD for registration and the implementation of a VED system created greater 
uncertainty in the Canadian wheat handling system. The operation of this kind of varietal 
declaration system could involve collaborative and participatory efforts at a number of levels, 
and could end up consuming more resources for producers and handlers or costing them more 
money than currently, whether directly or indirectly. The Canadian regulatory system carries 
some responsibility to develop appropriate quality assurance programs. It must also allow the 
grain quality assurance system to adapt to conform to the functional requirement of consistency 
and uniformity of wheat delivered to customers, while maintaining Canada’s reputation as a 
reliable supplier of quality grain. The cost-risk tradeoff of a switch to VED provides a primary 
incentive for the regulatory system to invest in the development of innovative handling 
strategies. There is a need for more research to address the area of risk and uncertainty and a 
more detailed assessment of costs of operating a new handling system under VED. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
DECLARATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR DELIVERY OF GRAINS  
AND OILSEEDS FORM 
 
I,                                                                (print name)  
of                                                               (print address)  
in the Province of                                    .                   
DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE THAT:  
1. I am the undersigned producer and have entered into a contract with the Grain Buyer to 
deliver grain and/or oilseeds. In the case of a Corporation that has entered into a contract 
with the Grain Buyer to deliver grain and/or oilseeds, I am an authorized representative 
of the Corporation and make this Declaration personally and on behalf of the Corpora-
tion.  
2. Any and all deliveries of wheat made by or on my behalf to the Grain Handling Company 
and/or the Grain Buyer are eligible varieties for delivery for the class of wheat for 
which payment is being requested in accordance with the Marketing Freedom for Grain 
Farmers Act, Canada Grain Act, Seeds Act, and all Regulations and Orders made pursu-
ant to those Acts (collectively, the “Acts”) as applicable. Any and all deliveries of other 
grains and/or oilseeds made by me or on my behalf to the Grain Handling Company 
and/or the Grain Buyer are eligible varieties for delivery for the commodity type of grain 
and/or oilseed for which payment is being requested in accordance with the Acts. I un-
derstand and agree that in order to be eligible, the variety must be registered by the Cana-
dian Food Inspection Agency as eligible for the commodity type (e.g. wheat, barley, flax, 
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peas, canola, mustard, etc.). I further understand that, in the case of wheat, the variety 
must be placed into a wheat class by the Canadian Grain Commission.   
3. If I, or anyone on my behalf, deliver(s) to the Grain Handling Company and/or the Grain 
Buyer grain and/or oilseeds that are not eligible varieties for delivery for the commodity 
type of grain and/or oilseed for which payment is being requested, I acknowledge and 
agree that the Grain Handling Company and/or the Grain Buyer may consider the repre-
sentation I made in paragraphs 1 and 2 above to have been made fraudulently and/or neg-
ligently, in which case I will be liable to the Grain Handling Company and/or Grain Buy-
er for all claims, damages, losses and costs (including legal fees) that may result from 
such false and/or negligent representation. I further acknowledge and agree that the Grain 
Handling Company and/or Grain Buyer may consider me to be in default of my delivery 
contract and, in addition to any other remedies available to the Grain Buyer and/or Grain 
Handling Company, may cancel any contracts between myself and the Grain Handling 
Company and/or the Grain Buyer.  
4. I acknowledge and agree that the Grain Handling Company and/or Grain Buyer may ex-
change with each other and the Canadian Grain Commission relevant materials (includ-
ing producer name, address, delivery sample information, and a portion of the physical 
sample taken by the Grain Handling Company) relating to suspected deliveries of ineligi-
ble varieties of grains and/or oilseeds by me or on my behalf to the Grain Handling Com-
pany. I understand that this information will be used as the basis for establishing respon-
sibility, which may result in the imposition of penalties and/or claim for damages on me, 
as part of evidence given in an arbitration process and/or court proceeding.  
5. This Declaration is made and intended to apply to all deliveries of grains and/or oilseeds 
made by me or on my behalf to the Grain Handling Company from and including the date 
indicated below until the end of the 2012-2013 crop year, or until this Declaration is re-
placed or withdrawn by my written notice acknowledged by both the Grain Buyer and the 
Grain Handling Company.  (Source: CGC (2012)) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE PRIMARY ELEVATOR COST FUNCTION FOR CASE 
4 (B) IN CHAPTER 3 
 
The objective functions in case 4 (b) are the most complex ones among all the cases in Chapter 
3. Functions in other cases only contain parts of the components of the functions in case 4 (b). As 
described, cost functions in case 4 (b) allow for three test points and according traceability. 
The farmer’s cost function is composed of, 
1. Expected Penalty 
1.1 Expected Penalty from the Testing on the Farmer’s Delivery If he or she was detect-
ed, 
11 qf                                                                                                                               (A3-1) 
1.2  Expected Penalty from the Tracing Stemming from the Primary Bin Contamination 
Detected, 
12 )1( qf b                                                                                                                  (A3-2) 
1.3 Expected Penalty from the Tracing Stemming from the Railcar Contamination De-
tected, 
13 ))(1)(1( qnf tb                                                                                                   (A3-3) 
2. Risk Control Cost, 
1qce                                                                                                                                   
(A3-4) 
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Totally, the farmer’s cost objective function is, 
 
Farmers’ loss= 
11312111 ))(1)(1()1( qcqnfqfqfJ etbb                                            (A3-5) 
The primary elevator’s cost function is composed of, 
1. Sampling and Sample Retention Cost 
srC                                                                                                                                    (A3-6) 
2. Testing Costs 
2.1 On Farmers’ Deliveries, 
 iiqc 1                                                                                                                           (A3-7) 
2.2  On Primary Elevator Bins, 
  iiib qc )1(2                                                                                                             (A3-8) 
3. Costs due to the primary elevator bin contamination 
3.1  Detected by the Primary Elevator Bin Testing, 
  iiiibp qmf  )1(2                                                                                                        (A3-9) 
where mq represents the volume of wheat in bin contaminated by misrepresented delivery. 
     3.2 Detected by Railcar Testing at the Terminal Elevator, 
  itibiiip qnmf ))(1()1(3                                                                                  (A3-10) 
+expected penalty (include price reduction) 
+risk control cost 
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If a contaminated bin was not detected at the bin test, wheat in it will be delivered to the 
terminal elevator and misrepresented.  It is assumed that wheat in a contaminated bin is 
loaded in ih  railcars. If one of the ih  railcars is detected, the contaminated bin will be traced. 
Then all railcars loaded from the contaminated bin will be identified. So the detection 
probability of a misrepresented railcar is different from t . The value of )( tin   is used to 
represent the probability that a contaminated bin is traced or a misrepresented railcar is 
identified, where in  is a probability multiplier (to know more by referring to Appendix 3.2).  
4. Tracing Costs 
4.1 Tracing Enacted by Bin Testing, 
  iiiib qmc  )1(1                                                                                                      (A3-11) 
4.2  Tracing Enacted by Railcar Testing, 
  iiiibti qmnc  )1)(1)((1                                                                                   (A3-12) 
5. Retrieved Losses (Benefit) from Testing and Tracing 
5.1 From Testing on Trucks, 
 iiii qf 1                                                                                                                     (A3-13) 
5.2 From Tracing  Enacted by Bin Testing, 
ibiii qf  )1(2                                                                                                        (A3-14) 
5.3 From Tracing Enacted by Railcar Testing, 
itibiii qnf ))(1)(1(3                                                                                        (A3-15) 
In total, the primary elevator handling costs can be obtained through a summation of 
components of A1-A16, 
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That is,  
itibiiiibiii
iiiiiiiibti
iiiibitibiiip
iiiibpiiibiisr
qnfqf
qfqmnc
qmcqnmf
qmfqcqcCJ
))(1)(1()1(
)1)(1)((
)1())(1()1(
)1()1(
32
11
13
2212





 
  
  
                                      (A3-16) 
+sampling and sample retention cost 
+testing costs and tracing costs 
+ costs due to bin contamination 
- retrieved costs from testing and tracing 
 
Handling costs = 
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APPENDIX C 
 
THE PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFYING A CONTAMINATED BIN THROUGH 
TRACEABILITY 
 
If there are a bins and each bin can load b railcars. The total number of railcars that can be 
loaded is ab . If h railcars are randomly tested at the terminal elevator, the test rate for railcars 
will be 
ab
h
.  I assume the primary elevator handlers have all loading and unloading information 
recorded and the terminal elevator can obtain information concerning the exact bin from which a 
railcar was loaded. So if a misrepresented railcar was tested and detected, the corresponding 
contaminated bin will be traced and all other misrepresented railcars loaded from this bin will be 
identified. If there is traceability, the farmer who misrepresented the deliveries and resulted in 
the contamination will be detected. 
When h railcars are tested, the total combination of railcars is habC . If there is a contaminated bin 
from which b  railcars loaded, the probability that there is at least one railcar from this 
contaminated bin among all tested railcars is 










h
ab
h
ba
C
C )1(
1 . Such a probability is just the one that 
the contaminated bin will be identified or the one that the farmer responsible for the 
contamination will be traced and detected. Then the probability multiplier will be:  

















h
ab
C
C
n
h
ab
h
ba )1(
1  
For example, say there are 20 bins and each bin can load 6 railcars. There was 1 farmer that 
misrepresented the delivery without being detected. This misrepresented delivery resulted in 
contamination in the bin in which the misrepresented were unloaded. If there are 60 railcars 
tested at the terminal elevator, the terminal elevator’s test rate is 0.50. The probability that the 
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contaminated bin can be identified is 96.01
50
120
50
114 








C
C
, much greater than the test rate 0.50. That 
is, all misrepresented railcars from the same contaminated bin will be detected with a probability 
0.96. The farmer who misrepresented the delivery and resulted in contamination can be detected 
at the same probability 0.96. Under these conditions, the probability multiplier n is 1.92. In this 
study, there are about 32 railcars used for each delivery. When the railcar test rate is 0.80, a 
contaminated bin or a misrepresented farmer’s delivery can be identified with a probability 
998.01
26
32
26
28 








C
C
. The probability multiplier n is 1.25.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
EXPONENTIALLY WEIGHTED MOVING AVERAGES 
 
An exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) applies weighting factors which decrease 
exponentially. The weighting for each older data point decreases exponentially, giving much 
more importance to recent perceptions while still not discarding older perceptions entirely. In 
this study, EWMA is used to assess the misrepresentation situation when the test strategy for 
farmers and for the primary elevator bin for the first delivery within a year is developed.  
The degree of weighting decrease is expressed as a constant smoothing factor , a number 
between 0 and 1. A higher  discounts older observations faster. Alternatively,  may be 
expressed in terms of N time periods, where 
1
2


N
 . For example, N=8 is equivalent to 
222.0 .  
The observation at a time period T is designated TY , and the value of the EWMA at any time 
period T  is designated TS ( 1S is undefined). 2S may be initialized in a number of different ways, 
but is done more frequently by setting 2S  to 1Y . However, other techniques exist, such as setting 
 to an average of the first 4 or 5 observations. The prominence of the  initialization's effect 
on the computed moving average depends on , where smaller values make the choice of S2 
relatively more important than larger  values, because a higher discounts older observations 
faster. 
The formula for calculating the EMA at time periods 2T is 
11 )1(   TTT SYS   
2S 2S
 
 
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This formulation is based on the work of Hunter (1986). By repeated application of this formula 
we can eventually write TS as a weighted sum of the data points TY , thus, 
)1(4
3
3
2
21 )1...()1()1()1((   kT
k
TTTTT YYYYYS   
for any suitable ...3,2,1k , and the weight of the general data point iTY  is 
1)1(  i . 
In those models, the EWMA uses N=8. In this way, the EWMA gives significant more weights 
to recent observations. For example, the calculated weights from the past 1 to 8 years are 0.222, 
0.178, 0.134, 0.105, 0.081, 0.063, 0.049 and 0.038 respectively. The total weight for the past 8 
years data is 0.866 and the rest of the years account for 0.134. Figure A-D1 shows the weight 
distribution among past 20 years.  
 
 
Note:  EWMA Weights N=8 
Figure A-D1 Weight Distribution of an EWMA Over 20 Years 
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APPENDIX E: CONTROL FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE SIMULATION 
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APPENDIX F 
 
THE DENSITY FUNCTION AND 
THE MEAN OF THE MISREPRESENTATION PROBABILITY 
 
The farmer’s misrepresentation probability function is, 
T
j
T
j
j
k
c
T e




 
Under the assumption c[b1,b2], the  density function for c is, 
 12
1
)(
bb
cf

  
The property of the misrepresentation probability function indicates, 
 
where g() is the density function of .   
Then,  
 
 
The mean of  is,  
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When 
 
=10, b1=0.15, b2=1, k=1.9, one gets that,
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APPENDIX G: FULL SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 5 
   
    (a1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (a2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (a3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
   
    (a4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (a5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (a6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
 
        Figure A-G1 Model A - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
Figures in row 1: testing strategies (there are three test points in model A, test points 1, 2 and 3) 
Figure 5.1(a1): The number of tested trucks (red line) and the number of detected trucks (blue line) at test point 1 
Figure 5.1(a2): The number of tested primary elevator bins (red) and the number of bins proven contaminated (blue) at test point 2  
Figure 5.1(a3): The number of tested railcars (red) and the number of detected railcars (blue) at test point 3 
Figures in row 2: tracing strategies 
Figure 5.1(a4): The number of tested trucks (red) and the number of detected trucks (blue) in the first tracing triggered by detected 
contaminated primary elevator bin.   
Figure 5.1(a5): The number of tested primary elevator bins in the second tracing triggered by detected misrepresented railcars 
Figure 5.1(a6): The number of tested trucks (red) and the number of detected trucks (blue) in the second tracing.  
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    (b1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (b2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (b3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
   
    (b4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (b5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (b6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
 
 
Figure A-G2 Model B - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
Figures in row 1: testing strategy (there are two test points in model B, test points 1 and 3) 
Figure 5.2(b1): The number of tested trucks (red line) and the number of detected trucks (blue line) at test point 1 
Figure 5.2(b2): There is no test at test point 2 in this model 
Figure 5.2(b3): The number of tested railcars (red) and the number of detected railcars (blue) at test point 3 
Figures in row 2: tracing strategy 
Figure 5.2(b4): There is no traceability involved at test point 2 
Figure 5.2(b5): The number of tested primary elevator bins in the second tracing triggered by detected misrepresented railcars 
Figure 5.2(b6): The number of tested trucks (red) and the number of detected trucks (blue) in the second tracing 
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    (c1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (c2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (c3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
   
    (c4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (c5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (c6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-G3 Model C - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
Figures in row 1: testing strategies (there are two test points in model C, test points 1 and 2) 
Figure 5.3(c1): There is no test at test point 1. 
Figure 5.3(c2): The number of tested primary elevator bins (red) and proven contaminated (blue) at test point 2 
Figure 5.3(c3): The number of tested railcars (red) and detected railcars (blue) at test point 3 
Figures in row 2: tracing strategies 
Figure 5.3(c4): The number of tested trucks (red) and detected trucks (blue) in the first tracing triggered by detected 
contaminated primary elevator bin 
Figure 5.3(c5): The number of tested primary elevator bins in the second tracing triggered by detected misrepresented railcars 
Figure 5.3(c6): The number of tested trucks (red) and the number of detected trucks (blue) in the second tracing 
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    (d1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (d2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (d3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
   
    (d4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (d5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (d6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Figure A-G4 Model D - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
Figures in row 1: testing strategy (there is one test point in model D, test point 3) 
Figure 5.4(d1): There is no test at test point 1. 
Figure 5.4(d2): There is no test at test point 2 
Figure 5.4(d3): The number of tested railcars (red) and detected railcars (blue) at test point 3 
Figures in row 2: tracing strategy 
Figure 5.4(d4): There is no traceability involved at test point 2. 
Figure 5.4(d5): The number of tested primary elevator bins in the second tracing triggered by detected misrepresented railcars 
Figure 5.4(d6): The number of tested trucks (red) and the number of detected trucks (blue) in the second tracing 
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    (e1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (e2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (e3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
   
    (e4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (e5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (e6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-G5 Model E - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
Figures in row 1: testing strategy (there are three test points in model 5, test points 1, 2 and 3) 
Figure 5.5(e1): The number of tested trucks (red line) and the number of detected trucks (blue line) at test point 1 
Figure 5.5(e2): The number of tested primary elevator bins (red) and the number of bins proven contaminated (blue) at test 
point 2 
Figure 5.5(e3): The number of tested railcars (red) and detected railcars (blue) at test point 3. Railcars are completely 
tested by the terminal. 
Figures in row 2: tracing strategy (there is no traceability in model E) 
.  
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    (a1) Model A: Effort      (a2) Model A: Technology  (a3) Model A: Misrepresentation Rate 
  
 
    (b1) Model B: Effort     (b2) Model B: Technology (b3) Model B: Misrepresentation Rate 
   
     (c1) Model C: Effort     (c2) Model C: Technology  (c3) Model C: Misrepresentation Rate 
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    (d1) Model D: Effort     (d2) Model D: Technology  (d3) Model D: Misrepresentation Rate 
   
    (e1) Model E: Effort     (e2) Model E: Technology   (e3) Model E: Misrepresentation Rate 
Figure A-G6 Evolution on Farmer’s Efforts on Risk Control, Technology Efficiency and Misrepresentation Rate  
(High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
 
1
6
0
 
161 
 
 
  
    (a1) Model A: Handling Costs     (a2) Model A: Farmers’ Losses     (a3) Model A: Total Costs 
   
    (b1) Model B: Handling Costs     (b2) Model B: Farmers’ Losses     (b3) Model B: Total Costs 
   
    (c1) Model C: Handling Costs     (c2) Model C: Farmers’ Losses     (c3) Model C: Total Costs 
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    (d1) Model D: Handling Costs     (d2) Model D: Farmers’ Losses     (d3) Model D: Total Costs 
   
    (e1) Model E: Handling Costs     (e2) Model E: Farmers’ Losses     (e3) Model E: Total Costs 
 
Figure A-G7 Handling Costs, Farmers’ Losses and Total Costs (High Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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    (a1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (a2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (a3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
 
  
    (a4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (a5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (a6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
  
 Figure A-G8 Model A- Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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    (b1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (b2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (b3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
 
  
    (b4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (b5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (b6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
 
 
Figure A-G9 Model B - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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    (c1) Test Point 1: Truck Test      (c2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (c3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
   
    (c4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (c5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (c6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
  
 
 
Figure A-G10 Model C - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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    (d1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (d2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (d3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
   
    (d4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (d5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (d6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
 
 
 
Figure A-G11 Model D - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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    (e1) Test Point 1: Truck Test     (e2) Test Point 2: Bin Test     (e3) Test Point 3: Railcar Test 
   
    (e4) Traceability 1: Bin to Farmer     (e5) Traceability 2: Railcar to Bin     (e6) Traceability 2: Bin to Farmer 
 
Figure A-G12 Model E - Elevator’s Testing and Tracing Strategies and Results (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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    (a1) Model A: Effort     (a2) Model A: Technology  (a3) Model A: Misrepresentation Rate 
   
    (b1) Model B: Effort     (b2) Model B: Technology (b3) Model B: Misrepresentation Rate 
   
    (c1) Model C: Effort     (c2) Model C: Technology (c3) Model C: Misrepresentation Rate 
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    (d1) Model D: Effort     (d2) Model D: Technology   (d3) Model D: Misrepresentation Rate 
   
    (e1) Model E: Effort     (e2) Model E: Technology   (e3) Model E: Misrepresentation Rate 
 
Figure A-G13 Farmer’s Efforts on Risk Control, Technology Efficiency and Misrepresentation Rate 
 (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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    (a1) Model A: Handling Costs     (a2) Model A: Farmers’ Losses     (a3) Model A: Total Costs 
   
    (b1) Model B: Handling Costs     (b2) Model B: Farmers’ Losses     (b3) Model B: Total Costs 
   
    (c1) Model C: Handling Costs     (c2) Model C: Farmers’ Losses     (c3) Model C: Total Costs 
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    (d1) Model D: Handling Costs     (d2) Model D: Farmers’ Losses     (d3) Model D: Total Costs 
 
  
    (e1) Model E: Handling Costs (e2) Model E: Farmers’ Losses     (e3) Model E: Total Costs 
   
Figure A-G14 Handling Costs, Farmers’ Losses and Total Costs (Low Initial Misrepresentation Rate) 
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APPENDIX H 
 
TOLERANCE LEVEL FOR OTHER CLASSES/ 
VARIETIES OF WHEAT IN CWRS 
 
Grade name 
Wheat of other classes or varieties 
Contrasting classes % Total % 
No.1 CWRS 0.5 1.5 
No.2 CWRS 1.5 3 
No.3 CWRS 2.5 5 
No.4 CWRS 2.5 5 
CW Feed No limit – but not more than 10% amber durum 
Source: Official Grain Guide, CGC 2012. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
RECENT PRICES OF CWRS 13.5% PROTEIN, BY GRADE 
 
Year 
No.1 CWRS 13.5% 
protein, Thunder Bay 
CWB delivery price, 
CD$/bushel 
No.2 CWRS 13.5% 
protein, CWB export  
price, CD$/bushel 
Wheat feed,  
Thunder Bay cash, 
CD$/bushel 
Final average 2011 8.41 10.29 6.92 
Final average 2010 N/A 11.81 6.64 
Final average 2009 N/A 8.79 4.84 
Source:  Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2012.  
